DISARMAMENT

A periodic review by the United Nations

Volume XVIII, Number 2 1995

Global Nuclear Issues in the Asia-Pacific Regional Context

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The Role of Confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific Region

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The Seventh Regional Disarmament Meeting in the Asia-Pacific Region held at Kathmandu, Nepal, 13-15 February 1995

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Opening Statements
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Concluding Statement
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Editor's Note

This issue of DISARMAMENT *is based on material presented at the Seventh Regional Disarmament Meeting of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific on the theme "Openness, Assurance of Security and Disarmament", held from 13 to 15 February 1995 in Kathmandu, Nepal.*

The meeting was convened within the framework of what has become known as the "Kathmandu process", a long-term effort to facilitate exchanges of ideas and information among governmental representatives, the non-governmental sector, and other experts, on security and disarmament issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The overall objective of the process is to foster a search for common ground among regional Governments by delineating areas of possible future negotiation and agreement, in order to enhance peace and security in that part of the world.

As the meeting took place early in the year, there was much interest expressed in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference (NPT), which took place 17 April–12 May 1995. A number of the papers presented dealt primarily with preparations for that Conference and positions in respect of the extension of the Treaty. In preparing this issue after the Conference's conclusion, the Editor selected those presentations made in Kathmandu that dealt with topics which were of continuing and pressing interest to States in the Asia-Pacific region, and to other States concerned with the region.

The programme of the regional meeting, the opening and closing statements, the reports of the two working groups and the list of participants are reproduced in this volume, so that the reader may have a fuller understanding of the proceedings of the Kathmandu meeting.

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With the apologies of the Editor

Corrigenda to Volume XVIII, Number 1, 1995

1. On page 124, seventh line, the last four words, "as proposed by Australia", should be omitted. The sentence should have read:

"The real obstacles to resolving the scope issue are exceptions such as safety and reliability tests and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs)."

2. On the front cover, the author's name should have read: *Frode Ringdal*.

Global Nuclear Issues in the Asia-Pacific Regional Context

Security Assurances and Regional Stability

Ben Sanders

This paper discusses whether and how security assurances affect political stability in geographic regions. Before embarking on what is necessarily a limited analysis of a complex subject, I point out that the subject is by no means new. For centuries, vast areas of the world have been affected by forces used against them by more powerful States, which at one time or another incorporated large parts of them into overseas colonies or contiguous empires. The new factors are the emancipation of those areas into independent regions, made up of States that play their own parts in international affairs, and the possession by a handful of Powers, outside or on the edge of those regions, of a specific form of superior force: nuclear weapons.

Ben Sanders is Executive Chairman of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), and was a consultant to the Secretariat of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. He prepared this paper in his private capacity; it does not necessarily reflect the views of PPNN's Core Group, of any of the members of that Group, or of the NPT Conference Secretariat.

There are various reasons why most of those States are not in a position, or do not wish, to resort to defensive alliances or to acquire their own means to ensure that those weapons are not used against them. The majority of them look for political ways to do so, through promises made by the possessors of those weapons to refrain from using them or, if necessary, to come to the aid of States that have become, or are at risk of becoming, victims of their use.

Although the object of *nuclear* security assurances is new, the concept of security assurances is ancient The quest for common security has existed since human communities were first exposed to attacks by other groups. From time immemorial, any kind of social or political unit, any group of individuals living in close proximity, which saw its security threatened, sought protection from that threat, by its own means if possible, and by help from others if necessary. Whenever a given group sees that another group has the means to threaten its survival, it will look for ways to deflect that threat or to make sure that those means will not be used against it. If it is in a position to do so, it may seek to defend itself by becoming stronger than the potential adversary. Or it may try to reach an accommodation with that adversary, by asking it for a commitment not to attack, now known as a *negative* security assurance. Or it can look outside to a third group, with which it can either ally itself against the adversary, or from which it may obtain the promise that it will, under certain circumstances, come to its defence, a commitment now known as a *positive* security assurance.

History is replete with accounts of human groups seeking the protection of stronger groups, starting with farmers or villagers petitioning a strong overlord for protection against marauders or for assurance that he would not attack their farms or their village. At the next level, the local lord might call upon his duke to protect him from the nearby earl and guarantee the integrity of his fiefdom. The earl, in

turn, might join with others of his kind to seek the protection of the king against the duke, or any other common enemy. Together with other States, a monarch might take his kingdom into an empire or an alliance against outside threats, on the understanding that the emperor would leave him alone or, in the case of the alliance, that the allies would refrain from attacking him. Each of those arrangements had its price; often, too, it was less the case of the group seeking protection from the stronger unit than of the latter imposing its protection on the weak. The overlord made his villagers work for the shield he extended over them or obliged them to become part of that shield. The feudal nobles who received shelter from their king paid for the privilege by service and tribute. The States that formed the empire did so at the expense of sovereignty and independence, and the price of alliance was reduced freedom of action and military or financial contributions.

In those cases one party possesses the means of power which another party lacks. Alternatively, one party suspects or fears the present or future existence of parties having such means and goes to another powerful party for active protection against attacks or threats. In each historical case, there is but a short distance between protection or non-aggression, on the one hand, and physical or political dominion, on the other.

A contemporary national variant of that theme occurs when a group of people refrains from particular actions or abstains from the possession of particular means of defence on the understanding that a specific entity will take those actions or possess those means of defence and use them on the group's behalf. Most modern-age municipalities maintain police forces to protect citizens from those who disrupt law and order, and any modern State has the means to protect its inhabitants from outside threats. The State provides its forces with the weapons needed for their tasks and the right to use them as appropriate. The citizens of the town or country are not supposed to have such weapons, or at least not to use them

other than upon the say-so of the authorities. There is an understanding between authorities and citizens that the authorities will refrain from using violence against the citizens and will defend them when there is need.

The latter two examples have two elements in common: they combine "positive" protection against third parties and a "negative" promise of the more powerful entity not to harm the weaker. And they are bought at a price that may range from servitude to the non-possession of means of self-defence.

The NPT and security assurances

The modern political world is obviously not organized like a national community and lacks the "social compact" inherent in a national or subnational entity, be that a medieval city-state or a major modern country. Its imperfect stability is based on a conglomeration of alliances, formal agreements and understandings among States, each seeking to maintain its integrity and security but differing widely from others in the means at its disposal. Nowhere is the difference more obvious than with regard to the possession of nuclear weapons. And nowhere is the issue of security assurances more relevant to the great majority of nations that feel exposed to the superior force of a few than in the context of nuclear weapons. The history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) demonstrates the role which the concept of security assurances plays in current international relations.

Since the beginning of what is conveniently called "the nuclear age", when it became obvious that nuclear means of mass destruction would play a role in the strategic relationship between countries, and particularly since the 1960s, when it became clear that the possession of nuclear weapons would not be limited to the two super-Powers, States that did not have such weapons have looked for means that

would save them from being attacked or threatened with them. Much of the motivation among non-nuclear-weapon States for the creation of the NPT may be found in an attempt to achieve greater security in the face of that new peril. The negotiating history of the Treaty shows that a good part of the initial support for it among non-nuclear-weapon States was generated by the thought that, as long as the nuclear-weapon States had not divested themselves of their nuclear arsenals, their own best protection lay in security assurances, and by the suggestion that the Treaty would be the appropriate vehicle to convey them.

Thus, from the moment they began participating in multilateral negotiations on the instrument that would oblige them to abstain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States have called for the establishment, either within the instrument itself or outside it, of formal and binding security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States. That call did not come just from non-aligned States. Some States that enjoyed the protection of nuclear weapons, through membership in one of the major alliances of the cold war or by association with them, also championed their inclusion. Japan, for instance, was one of the States that sought such assurances from the beginning.[1]

During the negotiations, the three participating nuclear-weapon States adopted different approaches to the issue. When the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) discussed the text of the NPT in 1966 and 1967, most of the non-aligned members called for the inclusion of an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. The former USSR said that it was willing to include a clause that would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that were party to the Treaty and did not have nuclear weapons on their territory. The United States opposed the inclusion of such a provision, but said that a non-nuclear-

weapon State threatened with nuclear weapons would receive its strong support. With regard to the question of security assurances, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States declared that they viewed the matter in the context of action relating to the United Nations, outside the treaty itself but in close conjunction with it.

When in 1967 the Soviet Union and the United States submitted identical but separate drafts for a treaty, Nigeria, on behalf of a group of non-aligned countries, put forward a number of amendments, including one providing for security assurances. That was not accepted by the three nuclear-weapon States, which held fast to the point of view that the issue was a matter for the United Nations and did not belong in the treaty.

Resolution 255: positive security assurances

Accordingly, the three nuclear Powers introduced in the ENDC a draft resolution on security assurances, which they undertook to submit to the Security Council in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that draft, the Security Council would recognize that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat thereof, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would call for immediate action by the Security Council, above all by its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter. It would then take note of declarations by certain States to provide such assistance immediately and reaffirm the inherent right, under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurred. In that connection, the United States and the USSR advised the ENDC of their intention to make identical declarations that they would provide support in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, if the draft resolution was supported by other nuclear Powers, permanent

members of the Security Council, which were also proposing to sign the NPT and would make similar declarations.[2]

The resolution was adopted in the Security Council on 19 June 1968. It was followed closely by a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States, where "measures to assure the security of non-nuclear weapon States" were at the top of the agenda. The Final Declaration of that Conference contained, in its first paragraph, the reaffirmation of "the necessity of further steps for an early solution of the question of security assurances in the nuclear era".[3] Against that background, which also included various actions of the General Assembly along similar lines, the process of signature and ratification of the NPT, opened for signature on 1 July 1968, took place.

Further moves

The positive assurances contained in the declaration by the three nuclear-weapon States in connection with resolution 255 was welcomed in principle by non-nuclear-weapon States, but was not considered adequate. The objections have since been summarized cogently in a memorandum prepared by Nigeria for the Fourth NPT Review Conference, in 1990.[4] They are not basically different from those expressed twenty-odd years ago and are relevant to the subject of this paper:

> (a) The Security Council resolution did not define the nature of the action that would be taken against the delinquent State.
>
> (b) The Security Council resolution and the declarations made by the three Powers merely reaffirm the existing Charter obligations to provide assistance or support to a country that has been attacked, irrespective of the type of weapons employed.

(c) Positive security guarantees are incompatible with the non-aligned and neutral status of some non-nuclear-weapon States.

(d) The nuclear threat can come only from a nuclear-weapon State. Since all five nuclear-weapon States are permanent members of the Security Council with the right of veto, any decision concerning military or non-military action against a delinquent State would be impossible, since it is unlikely that an aggressor would consent to the taking of collective action against itself.

The question of security assurances has remained an important aspect of multilateral discussions on arms limitation and disarmament. It has played a role at the four Review Conferences of the NPT that were held in the period 1975-1990 and has figured prominently at each special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Especially during the early stages of this debate, attention tended to focus mainly on the negative security assurances. Binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States have become essential parts of nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements. Such assurances have been incorporated into Protocol II of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, covering Latin America and the Caribbean, and into Protocol 2 of the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, covering the South Pacific. Not all nuclear-weapon States have given assurances in respect of both Protocols, and some assurances are accompanied by reservations. The nuclear-weapon States have also made a series of unilateral declarations setting out the conditions under which they undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Those declarations vary in specific ways, and none is given in an unambiguously binding manner. Shortly before the start of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, the five nuclear-weapon States once again made a series of declar-

ations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, very much on the same lines as before. As the non-aligned nations made abundantly clear at the Conference, those declarations once again failed to meet their demand for uniform and legally binding assurances that would have formal status.[5]

Possibly the most representative expression of the issue is contained in the Final Document of the first special session, held in 1978.[6] Paragraph 32 reads in part, "while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security". Paragraph 59 calls on the nuclear-weapon States "to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The memorandum which Nigeria submitted at the Fourth NPT Review Conference served to convey to that Conference a draft agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. That document calls for an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against a party to the NPT which does not belong to a military alliance and does not have other security arrangements providing for mutual defence with a nuclear-weapon State. It is relevant to the discussion in this paper to mention that the draft also provided for non-use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party that belongs to a military alliance or has other such security arrangements, as long as it has no nuclear weapons on its territory and promises not to take part in a military attack on any nuclear-weapon State party to the agreement or any of its allies.[7]

It is fair to say, and it has often been maintained by political analysts from non-aligned nations,[8] that the internal security of the Western world seems to improve while the developing parts of the world are in greater need than ever of the means to protect their security. The end of the cold war does not seem to have ended that disparity as yet. In some respects the contrasts between the two groups of States may have grown: the end of the nuclear threat among the major Powers has improved their security, but it may also have reduced their interest in the fates of non-aligned nations with whose well-being they may formerly have been more actively engaged. The decrease in global tension, however, may have created conditions more favourable to agreement on measures to improve the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; one might suppose that the nuclear-weapon States might now be less averse to the adoption of such measures than some of them may have seemed to be under more tense conditions. The non-aligned nations however, have continued, and indeed intensified, their search for means to compensate for that inequality through arrangements that would promise them freedom from nuclear threats and offer them protection.

Regional aspects

In the following sections, the regional dimension of security assurances is discussed mainly in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Those zones are not the only means of enhancing regional security, but they are the most prominent. Nuclear security assurances relate to the non-nuclear status of a region; it is mainly through the creation of such zones that participating States obtain security guarantees.

As we have seen, the pursuit of negative security assurances became the immediate focus of non-nuclear-weapon States. Over the years, however, the issue of positive

security assurances has gained in importance. That development seems to be connected with the emergence of new de facto nuclear-weapon States[9] since the NPT was opened for signature. The importance some non-nuclear-weapon States attach to positive guarantees is proportional to the security situation in their specific region and particularly to the presence of States with a nuclear-weapon capability. Israel's suspected multi-weapon nuclear arsenal may have prompted Egypt to submit to the Fourth NPT Review Conference a working paper calling for the adoption by the Security Council of a new resolution that would go beyond resolution 255 (1968). *Inter alia*, it specified the mandatory action to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in the case of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT and obliged States to provide immediate assistance to the victim. Similarly, Pakistan, with India in mind, has expressed interest in a nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement in its region, which would be guaranteed by all five recognized nuclear-weapon States. Ukraine acceded to the NPT on the condition that it would receive negative and positive assurances; its main concern seemed to be the Russian Federation, which in fact joined the other nuclear-weapon States in complying with Ukraine's demand. India is the one State situated in a region fraught with nuclear rivalry that opposes the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone there, and might, by implication, be seen to have rejected security assurances in that region. It has expressed the view that it could not participate in a nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement unless China did so, too; China's unconditional assurances do not seem to have convinced it.[10]

One aspect of positive security assurances that must not be overlooked is the possibility that their application may affect, i.e., detract from, the independence of the State or States to which they apply. In that respect, positive security assurances may serve the interests of the guarantor as much as,

or even more than, those of the beneficiary. The Nigerian memorandum referred to above came close to saying so when it pointed to the difficulty of reconciling non-aligned or neutral status with the acceptance of positive security assurances. Of course, negative security assurances may also come at a price, in that they tend to be conditional upon the guarantee of being non-nuclear, i.e., they are given to States that either join a nuclear-weapon-free zone or are parties to the NPT. Either condition subjects them to a verification regime that monitors their compliance.

If a conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the relatively scant evidence so far available, it would seem to be that nuclear-weapon States find it easier to commit themselves in a legally binding manner to security assurances in specific cases or in regional situations than in a wider, more general context. While they have usually expressed their willingness to extend assurances to nations that show their non-nuclear status by adhering to a global instrument like the NPT, they have not so far been able to agree on the text of any treaty provision in that regard. The binding assurances they have given so far have been extended mainly in the framework of nuclear-weapon-free zones, notably the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga. They have also found themselves constrained by circumstance to give assurances to individual States; recent examples are Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which have given up their "semi-nuclear-weapon status" in return for specific security assurances, among other things, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which has demanded security assurances as part of the price for stepping back from a presumed nuclear-weapon programme. The non-nuclear-weapon States have for many years called for uniform commitments from the nuclear-weapon States in an instrument applicable under all circumstances. Whether in the framework of the NPT, in a nuclear-weapon-free zone, or as the result of an individual commitment, the common motiv-

ation of the non-nuclear-weapon States involved in demanding security assurances is their wish to compensate for the loss of security they might suffer by relinquishing certain options. The arguments that convince the nuclear-weapon State concerned to give security assurances, however, may vary from case to case. On occasion the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States may be very different from those of the nuclear Powers, especially with regard to specific regional arrangements. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, whose additional protocols have not been subscribed to by all the nuclear-weapon States to which they are addressed, is a case in point. Here is an illustration of how States in a region have sought to enhance security by banning nuclear weapons from their area, while nuclear-weapon Powers, for their own strategic reasons, have simply refused so far to give the assurances required to make the scheme a practical reality.

Any State that possesses a superior weapon will resist attempts by others to constrain its use. Security assurances constitute a limitation on the use of nuclear weapons. That may explain the reluctance of some nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to binding, formalized security assurances. It is also the reason why they have traditionally adopted a cautious attitude to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones: such zones, combined with negative security assurances to their member States, obviously hamper the unlimited deployment of nuclear weapons in large areas of the globe. An exception to the empirical rule that the strong tend to hesitate to commit themselves in advance not to use their strength is the case where such a commitment helps to enhance their own security situation. The promise by nuclear-weapon States to extend security assurances to States that join the Non-Proliferation Treaty indirectly also serves their own security interests. But, as we have seen, not all nuclear-weapon States consider each nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement conducive to

their security, and some therefore may not be ready to extend security guarantees in such a framework.

This may cause a problem. As was once again demonstrated in the recent declarations by nuclear-weapon States, the latter are generally inclined to give negative security assurances to parties to the NPT, but since such assurances are neither legally binding nor uniform, they do not meet the requirements of the protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements. Therefore, nuclear-weapon States that see a security interest in retaining the non-nuclear-weapon status of a given zone are practically obliged to extend specific, binding assurances in the context of the zonal agreement in question.

As long as there is no multilateral legal instrument to codify nuclear-weapon States' security assurances in a universally valid form, and though nuclear-weapon States may view a particular regional arrangement with different degrees of benevolence, the most viable solution to the demand of non-nuclear-weapon States for such assurances still lies in the kind of undertaking which they may expect to receive as parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement. Under such an arrangement a group of States, all of which would clearly have had to adopt a nuclear-weapon-free policy, could probably count on receiving at least negative security guarantees from all the nuclear-weapon States. In other words, for the foreseeable future the search for a binding and, if not uniform, at least clear security assurance seems most likely to be satisfied through membership in a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Of course, the relationship between security assurances and regional issues is not defined only by the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It appears that the establishment of zones can serve to elicit security assurances, but so can the adherence of all States of a region to the NPT or to any other

legal instrument that conveys the obligation not to have or to make nuclear weapons and imposes a multinational system to monitor compliance with that obligation. For the purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that the complete denuclearization of a region, under whatever name, can qualify it as an area to which security guarantees will tend to be extended.[11]

Security assurances and regional stability

That assumption, however, does not answer the question of whether the denuclearization of a region enhances its stability, nor does it say anything *per se* about the effect of security assurances in this context. One can assume that, by levelling the regional playing-field, denuclearization contributes to stability in the area. One can also share the assumption made by participating States that security assurances are a *conditio sine qua non* of the nuclear-weapon-free zone and are therefore, by extension, good for regional stability. That brings around once again the "negative" and the "positive" aspects of security assurances, as well as the disparity between the general interests of non-nuclear-weapon States and the specific aims of nuclear-weapon States. Though it is difficult to devise a generally applicable rule—geographic, political and strategic conditions vary between regions, and conditions do not stay the same forever—there are, however, some aspects that may have universal application.

Negative security assurances: a minimum requirement

It is reasonable to assume that the extension of negative security assurances in the framework of a nuclear-weapon-free zone adds to security and stability by helping to keep the regional playing-field level. Yet not all nuclear-weapon-States apply their assurances in the same way. As we

have seen, their assurances all differ somewhat, and a number of them have been made with specific reservations. There is also no absolute guarantee that the nuclear-weapon States will live up to their undertakings if their own security is affected. While it is fair to say that stability in a region cannot be founded on negative security assurances alone, they should nevertheless be viewed as a minimum requirement.

Positive security assurances: a reinforcing factor

Positive security assurances extended to a region play a different role. Positive assurances serve one of two purposes: either they may be extended to protect the region against nuclear violence from outside, or they may be directed at a particular State in the region. That has important repercussions for the way security assurances should be applied if regional perturbations are to be avoided, and it merits a few additional remarks.

The first situation implies that the region is a nuclear-weapon-free zone, or consists of States that are all parties to the NPT, or includes States subject to full-scope safeguards by virtue of any similar undertaking. Should nuclear-weapon States not be convinced of the non-nuclear-weapon status of all the countries in the region, they could not be presumed to be willing to extend positive security assurances to the region as a whole. In fact, unless a nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement specifically requires it or includes provisions that go beyond Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the declarations made by the depository States, there seems to be little sense in extending positive assurances to a region as such, as the countries concerned would in any case benefit from such assurances in consequence of that resolution.

If the region is not yet a nuclear-weapon-free zone, a demand for positive security assurances by countries in the

region would be made with the establishment of such a zone in mind and would be aimed specifically at countries within the zone that are suspected of possessing a nuclear capability. Again, one may assume that the existence of such assurances would not by itself suffice to establish the zone unless they resulted in the suspected State's fully joining the zonal arrangement as a demonstrably non-nuclear State. That would probably only occur if the positive assurances were strong enough to deprive the State concerned of any incentive to develop or maintain a nuclear arsenal. This, however, would amount to the de facto extension of the kind of nuclear protection or "umbrella" that the super-Powers have traditionally held over close allies under their respective cold war alliances. Indeed, an arrangement of that kind would amount to an alliance. It would almost certainly have to be selective, i.e., it would apply to only one or two or a few of the States in the area, and it would probably not be acceptable to other States in the region. It is unlikely that more than one or two of the nuclear-weapon States, would be willing to join such arrangement, and if they did, they might well do so under widely varying conditions. Far from contributing to regional stability, therefore, that kind of assurance (the term "guarantee" might be more appropriate) would tend to be destabilizing.

There are reasons for assuming that nuclear-weapon States will not be inclined to extend security assurances to regions that are not clearly non-nuclear. Logically, the requirement for the extension of security assurances, i.e., "real" denuclearization, would mean that a nuclear-weapon-free zone could not include a threshold State. Conversely, that would also mean that positive security guarantees could not be used within a region and were, therefore, not applicable as a way to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a region where one country was suspected of having a nuclear capability. In principle, however, nothing would prevent individual States in a given region from asking for positive security guarantees

as a step towards the denuclearization of that region. In such a case, to stay within the purview of this paper, one might assume that the purpose of the call for security assurances is the improvement or establishment of stability in a region that is probably relatively unstable. To what extent the invocation of positive security guarantees under such circumstances would have a constructive effect remains to be seen. One wonders also what nuclear-weapon State would be tempted to take responsibility for a step that might heighten tensions unless that step has been agreed to by a large majority of States in the region.

Viable variations?

A related question is whether nuclear-weapon States would feel constrained from extending security assurances to the members of a denuclearized region that includes a non-nuclear ally of a nuclear-weapon State. In the case of the Rarotonga Treaty, two parties, Australia and New Zealand, are also members of a defensive alliance with the United States. The latter has not extended the security assurances demanded by the Rarotonga Treaty, but it is interesting that other States, not associated with that alliance have done so. There are no indications that regional stability is at all affected by that situation, which would indicate that the answer to the question is dictated by political and geographic circumstance. A case that was never put to the test was the initiative of the former Soviet Union for a nuclear non-use zone running in a North-South direction through Central Europe.[12] One of the purposes of the scheme was said to have been to disqualify as viable NATO members Western States through whose territory the zone would run. The plan never had a chance to succeed; it is mentioned as an example of a case where the extension of security assurances by either side might have had a disastrously destabilizing effect.

One more question is what effect security assurances might have in the case of a zone that is physically part of an area that comprises a nuclear-weapon State. Under the circumstances prevailing in South Asia, one might reason that security assurances by exterior States would have to take into account the involvement of China, and that China's own assurances, as a party in regional matters, could hardly be credible. India's reaction to Pakistan's proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, with China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States as guarantors, was that such a zone would not be possible unless China itself could become a member. The regional equation has three nuclear factors: China, India and Pakistan, among which China and India are adversaries, as are India and Pakistan, while China and Pakistan are friends. Under such complicated circumstances, the role security assurances would play is hard to assess. The United States is in a different situation with regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It has good relations with most of its neighbours. It is the only nuclear-weapon State in the area. The only State with which it has serious political problems is Cuba, which does not pose a strategic threat and may well join the Treaty soon. The principal effect of the assurances that have been given pursuant to the Treaty seems to have been wide acceptance. That has been an important factor of stability in the region. In that light, the answer to the question posed at the start of this paragraph seems to be that the effect security assurances have on regional stability in an area that contains a nuclear-weapon State will depend on the basis of that stability, its nature, the factors that threaten it and the conditions that may help it to survive or become stronger.

If the above definitions are accepted in regions that do not have nuclear-weapon-free zones, security guarantees could be extended only to individual States. Such assurances might well become a disturbing factor. A given region may, for instance, contain a nuclear-threshold country that is not a party

to the NPT and would thus not benefit from more general security assurances. In the case of a conflict between such a country and an NPT party, a question might arise as to whether and how such guarantees would be applied if the NPT party were the aggressor, all the more so if the victim of the aggression is an ally of one of the nuclear-weapon States that extended the security assurance. Another problem might arise if the non-party to which the assurances are not extended is clearly a non-nuclear-weapon State and receives a nuclear threat from another non-party. In a properly verified nuclear-weapon-free zone that situation could not arise.

A non-nuclear digression

This paper has so far dealt only with the issue of actual or potential *nuclear* conflict. The question of whether and how regional stability in an area that is not a nuclear-weapon-free zone is affected by aggression by *conventional* means against a State closely associated or allied with a nuclear-weapon State which has extended assurances to every country in the region, or at least to both sides in a conventional conflict, was raised by Nigeria in the draft resolution it proposed at the Fourth NPT Review Conference. If the guarantor is a nuclear State that has adopted a non-first-use policy, the situation is no different from what it would be if either party were allied to some other powerful non-nuclear-weapon State. If the nuclear-weapon-State has no such policy, the question is whether it has extended only a positive or also a negative assurance. If the latter, regional stability should not be upset more than by any other conventional conflict in the area. That, however, may be no more than a hope: no matter what assurances they may have given, nuclear-weapon States that see their friends threatened may rattle their nuclear sabres anyway. The Nigerian draft resolution of 1990 may point the way.

Some final observations

This, then, is another possible conclusion: regions may be subject to conflicting power extensions from within as well as without. Individual countries may seek protection in open or implicit alliances with nuclear Powers outside the region. Unless positive security assurances are uniformly extended to all States in the region, they will not contribute to the stability of the area.

In more general terms, there is much overlap between the global and regional aspects of security assurances. Because of the nature of the weapons with which they deal, security assurances affect individual States, regions and world-wide strategy.

The discussion of security assurances goes on unabated, in many venues. They are a subject of global arms control politics and form a very practical aspect of regional security.

Discussions so far have not been very productive. The political arguments used are frequently more ritualistic than realistic. At least in their public utterances, many non-nuclear-weapon States present the case for security assurances as a price for adherence to regional or world-wide denuclearization or non-proliferation measures as a means to help offset such adherence, given the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. In response, nuclear-weapon States tend to claim that the denuclearization arrangements to which the non-nuclear-weapon States refer serve their interests as much as anyone else's, and should not be held hostage to the form or content of security assurances. Some of the nuclear-weapon States have long been inclined to give preference to positive security assurances over negative ones, but they are now taking a more benevolent view of the latter as an element of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The time may have come to switch the dialogue from a mainly political to a more analytical and practical approach. The conversation might become more productive if actual or potential recipients of security assurances perceived them as latent strategic assets of unproven value. For the guarantor, to whom security assurances may present restrictions on scope of action, it might be helpful to realize that they also delineate the playing-field more precisely and that, above all, they contribute indirectly but importantly to international stability and security by promoting non-proliferation.

Security assurances are no cure-all. Their impact may vary. Their utility under various conditions should be ascertained, and they should be formulated so as to make them as useful and reliable as possible, acceptable both to recipients and guarantors. They should be handled with great care, as concrete factors in international relations, rather than as political arguments. They need more dispassionate consideration and study.

Notes

1 Japan's main consideration is said to have been concern that it might at one time or another lose its nuclear protection. The motivation of Germany and Italy in seeking to limit the initial duration of the NPT to 25 years is also said to have been inspired by the concern that NATO might not exist forever and they might eventually have to do without the alliance's protection.

2 On 11 April 1995, less than a week before the start of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 984 (1995), which welcomes the intention of the nuclear-weapon States to come to the aid of any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that is a victim of an act or the object of a threat of nuclear aggression. This resolution updates resolution 255. It should be noted that this time the undertaking comes from all five nuclear-weapon States.

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was convened in Geneva in August–September 1968.

[4] See document NPT/CONF.IV/17, annex, para. 7.

[5] The negative security assurances extended by the five nuclear-weapon States in April were reproduced separately as General Assembly and Security Council documents A/50/151-S/1995/261 to A/50/155-S/1995/265, all on 6 April 1995. They were also referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on positive security assurances. That resolution and the five statements are reproduced in this publication under the section "Documentation Relating to Disarmament and International Security".

[6] The Final Document was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution S-10/2.

[7] See NPT/CONF.IV/17, appendix. For an excellent summary of events at the Fourth NPT Review Conference, which was held in Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990 (United Nations publication (Sales No. E. 91. IX. 8)), pp. 147-182.

[8] See for instance Aswini K. Ray, "Third world perspectives on security and nuclear non-proliferation: An Indian view", in John Simpson, ed., *Nuclear Non-Proliferation: An Agenda for the 1990s* (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[9] The NPT does not recognize the existence of any nuclear-weapon States besides the five which conform with the definition of article IX, 3. For the purpose of this discussion, it is necessary to acknowledge that there are other States that probably possess a "nuclear-weapon capability". I prefer the crisp term "de facto nuclear-weapon States" to vague ones like "threshold States" or "clandestine nuclear-weapon States".

[10] The increased interest in positive security assurances is evidently not caused exclusively by the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. Ukraine is a new State, but its concern is with a well-established nuclear-weapon State,

viz. Russia. India, on the other hand, itself suspected of having a nuclear-weapon capability, does not seem to meet its concern about Pakistan, or even China, by calling for positive security assurances, but rather to rely on an interestingly opaque form of nuclear deterrence.

11 It would be going too far to discuss here the question of the substance of the security assurances. Protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties tend to specify the assurances to be extended. A signatory may seek to give its specific slant to the text by including reservations, but their validity may be open to discussion. Individual assurances, however, and assurances given in general terms vary more widely. That in itself may make a de facto nuclear-weapon-free zone less effective than one set up *de jure*, apart from the various other substantive and institutional advantages offered by a treaty-based nuclear-weapon-free zone.

12 For a brief overview of the history of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the motivation for their creation, see NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/5.

Regional Approaches to Increase Nuclear Transparency

Hiroyoshi Kurihara

The end of the cold war had a significant impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It was evident that the two super-Powers possessed nuclear weaponry far in excess of their needs; both countries have started the process of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. Table 1 estimates the current number of nuclear weapons of the two major Powers and the other three nuclear-weapon States (NWS).

Post–cold war problems

While nuclear disarmament progressed significantly after the end of the cold war, new problems arose in the area of non-proliferation. On the positive side, the conclusion of START I and II offers good prospects that the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation will be reduced to 3,000-3,500 warheads each by the year 2003. The NWS, with the exception of China, are continuing their moratoriums on nuclear testing. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) is under negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, though the pace of work has been somewhat slower than expected. Negotiations are to begin shortly on a treaty on the prohibition of the production of

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nuclear material for weapons purposes (cut-off treaty), called for by President Clinton in September 1993.

Very serious problems, however, have emerged in connection with the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Nuclear materials released from nuclear weapons have to be disposed of by the least environmentally dangerous methods, and, if possible, in a way beneficial to economic development. Security and safeguards associated with storage, disposal or subsequent use must be maintained effectively. Are there any effective measures to deal with the illicit trafficking of plutonium and highly enriched uranium? Or to ensure that land and sea are not contaminated by the dismantlement of nuclear submarines? If a brain-drain is to be avoided, ways must be found to help nuclear scientists of the former Soviet Union who have lost their jobs. The international community will have to resolve those difficult problems soon.

We shall have to exert further collective efforts to strengthen non-proliferation. Though the number of NWS has not increased, the number of so-called threshold States has. In that connection, the international community has gained experience by dealing with such cases as Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

When considering nuclear disarmament or a total ban on nuclear weapons, both vertical proliferation (i.e., nuclear disarmament) and horizontal proliferation (so-called non-proliferation) need to be considered. In Japan those two types of proliferation have tended to be discussed by different groups of experts: arms control and disarmament by international political scientists and military/arms control experts, and non-proliferation by civilian nuclear engineers and scientists. I am a nuclear scientist, and my field of expertise is nuclear safeguards and physical protection technology. As concerns

Table 1. Estimated number of nuclear weapons as at January 1994[1]

United States		
	ICBM	2,200
	SLBM	3,072
	Heavy bomber	3,060
	LANCE	20
	Nuclear cannon	5,080
	SLCM	many
	ALCM	1,860
	SRAM	1,100
	Tactical bomb	4,125
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)		
	ICBM	6,065
	SLBM	2,384
	Heavy bomber	1,374
	Short range nuclear bomb	900
	Land-based missile	4,300
	GLCM	40
	Nuclear cannon	6,085
	Tactical bomb	many
United Kingdom		
	SLBM	100
	Tactical bomb	100
France	Land-based missile	68
	SLBM	384
	Tactical bomb	60
China	ICBM	4+
	Middle-ranged missile	56
	SLBM	24
	Tactical bomb	150

have grown about both types of proliferation, I have also become involved in discussions on various measures to accelerate nuclear disarmament. In this paper I have touched upon some aspects of arms control and disarmament, but I shall concentrate mostly on horizontal non-proliferation.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation measures

Since President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" declaration, at the General Assembly in 1953, many countries have made efforts to commercialize the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially nuclear-power generation. In 1993, 17.5 per cent of electric power generation throughout the world was supplied by nuclear energy. Table 2 illustrates the situation with respect to nuclear-power generation in various

Table 2. Electric power generation by nuclear power stations and their share in the total generation[2]

	1992		1993	
	X 10^8 kwh	Percentage	X 10^8 kwh	Percentage
Lithuania	156	80.0	123	87.2
France	3,217	72.9	3,502	77.7
Belgium	409	59.9	395	58. 9
Slovakia	111	49.5	110	53.6
Hungary	131	46.4	130	43.3
Slovenia	38	34.6	38	43.3
Sweden	608	43.2	589	42. 0
ROK	565	43.2	554	40.3
Switzerland	221	39.6	220	37.9
Bulgaria	116	32.5	140	36.9
Spain	534	36.4	536	36. 0

Taiwan	325	35.4	330	33.5
Ukraine	710	25.0	752	32. 9
Japan	2,170	27.7	2,463	30.9
Germany	1,500	30. 1	1,450	29.7
Czech Republic	123	20.7	126	29.2
United Kingdom	591	23.2	798	26.3
United States	6,188	22.3	6,103	21.2
Canada	760	15.2	886	17.3
Argentina	66	14.4	72	14.2
Russian Federation	1,196	11.8	1,192	12.5
Netherlands	36	4.9	37	5.1
South Africa	93	6. 0	72	4.5
Mexico	39	3.2	37	3.0
India	56	3.3	54	1.9
Pakistan	5	1.2	4	0.9
Kazakhstan	5	0.6	4	0.5
China	5	0.1	25	0.3
Brazil	18	0.7	4	0.2
Total	20,274	16.7	20,935	17.5
Global total	121,680		119,480	

countries. The United States has more than one hundred nuclear power stations in operation and generates the largest amount of electricity in the world. France, Japan, Germany, the Russian Federation, Canada and the United Kingdom, in that order, are the major nuclear power States in terms of quantity of electricity generated. The ratio of nuclear power to total power generation gives us a different picture. Lithuania,

France, Belgium and Slovakia, in that order, rely on nuclear power for more than 50 per cent of their electricity generation. The United States relies on nuclear means for a little over 20 per cent of its power generation.

Historically the initial centre for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was the United States. The major supplier of information at the first world-wide conference on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in 1956 (first Geneva Conference) was the United States. As time passed, the centre of nuclear energy development for civilian use gradually shifted to Europe—the 1970s and 1980s could be considered the age of Europe. The next century may be known as the age of Asia. Japan is the third nuclear power in the world; the Republic of Korea's nuclear power is a full 40 per cent of its total electricity generation. Both countries plan to expand their nuclear power programmes. China has announced a very ambitious expansion of its nuclear power programme. The South-East Asian countries have shown keen interest in developing their domestic nuclear power stations.

Two key technologies should be considered with respect to possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons—enrichment and reprocessing.

Light water reactors, the ones most widely used nowadays, require 3 to 4 per cent light enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel. The enrichment technology to be used for LEU could be misused for production of highly enriched uranium, HEU>90 per cent, which is necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. Gas-cooled reactors (GCR) and heavy-water reactors (HWR) like CANDU do not require enriched uranium; natural uranium is enough. It might be desirable to choose this process for lowering the possibility of the misuse of enrichment technology. But plutonium (Pu) produced after being burnt in the reactor core of HWR or GCR can be used more easily for weapon purposes. Pu separated from LWR has

a high burn-up potential and contains a high ratio of Pu-240, Pu-241 and PU-242, which have undesirable physical properties for weapons production.

The major framework for the consideration of global non-proliferation at the early stages of nuclear development was in the form of bilateral agreements between supplier States (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom) and recipient States. Those agreements contained various supplier's rights, including bilateral safeguards, prior consent on reprocessing and transfers to third countries.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957. One of its major roles was to carry out safeguards and inspections. It took time, however, for the Agency to develop an effective safeguards system. The first comprehensive document to implement safeguards procedures was INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 of 1968. The suppliers' right to employ bilateral safeguards was transferred to the IAEA upon the conclusion of trilateral agreements between the supplier, the recipient and the Agency.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force in 1970 and has become the fundamental instrument to promote world-wide nuclear non-proliferation. The IAEA was asked to administer safeguards based on article III of the Treaty. The safeguards procedure was contained in INFCIRC/153 and applies to the entire fuel cycle of the non-nuclear-weapon State concerned.

The global nuclear non-proliferation regime established by IAEA now covers a complex of measures. Apart from the NPT and IAEA safeguards, regional treaties, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty covering Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific, export controls on sensitive items (London Suppliers' Guidelines), and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1980 (aimed at preventing theft and

unauthorized removal of plutonium), are the main components of the regime.

The non-profileration regime was created during the cold war. The main targets were those States with advanced nuclear fuel cycles, such as Germany, Italy, Japan and Sweden. States with advanced fuel cycles were subject to more stringent implementation of IAEA safeguards. History has shown, though, that concerns about proliferation arose in other parts of the world. The concern of the international community turned to those States which had not yet fully established civilian nuclear fuel cycles and which might want to develop independent, clandestine military facilities. Israel, Pakistan and South Africa, and, to some extent, India, fell into that category. Faced with significant changes in the international political and social situation, the effectiveness of traditional global non-proliferation efforts needs to be re-examined to meet the current situation. One improvement would be to enhance transparency in the civil uses of nuclear energy.

Enhancing transparency

The definition of the word "transparency" is still under debate. It can be used differently when speaking of arms control or of non-proliferation. Increasing transparency in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy has been widely discussed. Experts consider that enhancing transparency in safeguards implementation is one way to strengthen the international safeguards regime. It is also generally accepted that enhancing transparency in respect of nuclear-related activities contributes to global non-proliferation and promotes peaceful nuclear energy development.

Transparency was central to the deliberation of the Japanese Long-Term Nuclear Energy Development Programme in 1994. Japan has made steady progress in the civil

use of nuclear energy with its research and development programme. It believes that plutonium recycling can be beneficial if controlled from the safety and non-proliferation point of view. Japan's new programme continues to favour the Fast Breeder Reactor Project, the construction of a commercial reprocessing facility and research activities associated with plutonium recycling.

Only a few States, however, still pursue plutonium reutilization. The United States originally had promoted actively Pu-recycle technology. President Carter changed United States policy, and since his time no large project has been initiated to promote the utilization of plutonium in civil use. In Europe, France still engages in research on actinide utilization. The United Kingdom and France both continue to reprocess spent LWR fuel. Switzerland and several other States still use Pu-bearing fuel in LWRs. Generally speaking, however, major programmes involving Fast Breeder Reactors have been cancelled.

Under those circumstances, and bearing in mind the highly unstable political situation on the Korean peninsula, Japan's Pu utilization programme has been gravely misunderstood by United States and European experts. They suspect that Japan has not given up its Pu programme because it does not want to abandon the option of developing a nuclear arsenal. That point of view was expressed, for example, in the introduction to the section dealing with East Asia and Australasia in the publication entitled *The Military Balance 1993-1994*.[3] In order to allay such suspicion, Japan's Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) has proposed the incorporation of more transparency measures into Japanese nuclear policy.

Regional approaches to enhance transparency

There are various measures to strengthen non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Table 3 shows actual measures

already taken or under discussion based on the type of approach adopted. With more than 175 States parties, the NPT is the most important international measure to secure non-proliferation in the world. It is the treaty with the widest adherence in the field of disarmament. That the NPT has its shortcomings, however, is clear. Because of its discriminatory nature, some major actors in the world will not adhere to it—India, Israel and Pakistan, particularly.

Table 3. Various measures for non-proliferation

(1) Nuclear Disarmament

	Unilateral	Bilateral	Regional	Interna-tional
Arms control and disarmament		SALT INF START		
Nuclear test ban	Voluntary declaration			PTBT CTBT
Cut-off of production	Voluntary decision			Cut-off Treaty
No first use	Unilateral declaration			
Export control (missile)				MTCR
Nuclear-weapon-free zone		(Korean Peninsula?)	Latin America South Pacific Antartica	

(2) Non-proliferation

	Unilateral	Bilateral	Regional	International
Prohibition of production, possession etc. of nuclear weapons		(Korean Peninsula?)	Latin America South Pacific Antartica	NPT
Safeguards	(Voluntary NWS)	ABACC (Brazil/ Argentina Bilateral Agreement)	EURATOM	IAEA
Export control		Bilateral Agreement		London Suppliers' Guidelines
Physical protection		Bilateral Agreement		Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
International control of Pu./ HEU				(IPS) (Informal meeting of 9 States)

In a way, IAEA safeguards are a window opened to the outer world. Through the inspections it conducts, the Agency can obtain information and confirm that a State's activities remain peaceful. In other words, safeguards activities are actions to increase transparency through international means.

If international means cannot be applied for some reason, a regional or bilateral approach may be introduced instead. While maintaining the use of international means, a

regional approach could be also be adopted in order to increase and upgrade the effectiveness of the whole system.

The Tlatelolco Treaty, which denuclearized Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Rarotonga Treaty, which did the same for the South Pacific, are two good examples of a regional approach. Negotiations are under way on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Similar regional approaches could work for South-East Asia, for the CIS countries (except Russia), or even for South Asia, including India and Pakistan, or the Middle East, including Israel. If such regional schemes could be put in place, transparency could be enhanced and the overall non-proliferation regime would be greatly strengthened.

A regional system in Asia

In contrast to Europe, Asia has made few region-wide efforts in the field of security. There is no organization similar to NATO in the region, nor is there a EURATOM controlling the civil use of nuclear energy and ensuring non-proliferation. Asia is more heterogeneous than Europe, culturally, ethically, politically, religiously and technologically. It lags behind in the use of a regional approach in the field of disarmament. Nonetheless, there is an interest in examining the application of such a concept in the Asian situation. For example, the revitalization of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum could be reinforced.

Recently the "ASIATOM" concept has been attracting wider attention in Japan. I should like to analyse, first, the reasons for the heightened interest, and second, the possible operative mode of such a concept.

The reasons for promoting that concept vary among its supporters but could be summarized in the following way:

(a) The Asian region has begun to accelerate nuclear energy development. ASIATOM is needed as an organization to promote regional cooperation and coordination in the research and development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(b) The need for sensitive technology, such as enrichment or reprocessing, will increase along with the development of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. It would be useful to examine the possibilities of finding a regional solution, such as a regional fuel-cycle centre;

(c) A body to coordinate national policy on nuclear energy development in Asian countries could be considered as a centre for clearing information on nuclear activities, thereby enhancing transparency and decreasing instability in the region;

(d) Upgrading the level of nuclear safety, radiological protection, nuclear material control, and physical protection in Asian countries could be envisaged;

(e) The creation of a regional safeguards system, similar to EURATOM, could lessen IAEA's burden of implementing safeguards; and

(f) Such a system could contribute to the upgrading the level of collective security in the Asian region. It could have an effect similar to that of the nuclear-free zone concept, depending, of course, on its member States.

Though some say it is possible, others have argued that ASIATOM could not duplicate EURATOM. In my opinion, Asia will find an Asian way, at least initially. The heterogeneous nature of Asia would make it difficult to create a predetermined organization. In my view, an information exchange could be accelerated, and close consultation could be encouraged in various areas. Currently the Japan Atomic

Energy Commission holds a regional conference every year on cooperation in nuclear research and development. The themes discussed at that forum are restricted to the utilization of radiation in the fields of medicine and agriculture and to the use of research reactors. But the range of topics could be expanded in the future. Policy discussions among member States have just begun. That forum, for instance, could act as a key structure for the coordination of national nuclear energy policies.

I personally would like to see close cooperation and an information exchange on nuclear material control, domestic safeguards and physical protection of nuclear material among three States in Far East: Japan, with its complete domestic nuclear-fuel cycle, including more than 40 power reactors, enrichment plants and reprocessing facility; the Republic of Korea, with more than 40 per cent of electricity reliance on nuclear power but no sensitive facilities yet; and China, still at the very beginning of an ambitious programme. Collectively enhancing the transparency of facilities' operations in those three countries could promote peaceful nuclear development and non-proliferation. In the future, the possibility of establishing a joint inspectorate like EURATOM or ABACC (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) could be examined.

Another possibility could be to establish a regional operation of a nuclear facility. In the 1980s a global evaluation of nuclear fuel cycles (INFCE) was conducted. One of the proposals that emerged was the concept of a regional fuel-cycle centre. If a sensitive facility, such as a reprocessing plant, could be operated not by one State but by a multinational body, transparency could be intensified and confidence built in and outside the region. The Republic of Korea, for example, has no definite plan for its accumulating spent fuel. In the future, China will require a reprocessing capability for civilian purposes. South-East Asia must begin to consider a way to

dispose of its spent fuel once it establishes a commercial reactor economy. In my view, such a regional scheme may have a positive impact on Asian regional security.

It is not important whether such a regional system is called ASIATOM or PACIATOM; what is important is transparency. If Asia closes its doors to the outside world, suspicion will grow. An Asian system would need to invite its Pacific neighbours, including Australia, Canada and the United States, to participate.

Conclusions

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the post-cold war era require a rethinking of the regime that existed during the cold war.

START I and II are welcome advances, but more pressure must be brought to bear on the NWS to further reduce their arsenals.

A long-term extension of the NPT is necessary and, in addition, the networking of regional frameworks could be examined.

In order to increase transparency, and to further peaceful nuclear energy development and non-proliferation, Asian regional cooperation should be enhanced, perhaps in the form of ASIATOM.

Notes

1 Ryukishi Imai, "IAEA inspection and nuclear proliferation", December 1994. Table as received from author. Publication not identified.

2 From *Data Book of Japan Atomic Industry Forum*. Table as received from author. Publication not located.

[3] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, (London, Brassey's, 1993), p. 147.

Cooperation in the Field of Non-Proliferation and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Brahma Chellaney

This being the 50th year of the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the issue of cooperation in the field of non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy has gained added significance. It is a bit ironic, though, that 50 years down the road the subject is still being debated and that cooperation in non-proliferation and commercial nuclear power should remain contentious issues on the international agenda.

For example, during the discussions at the Seventh United Nations Regional Disarmament Meeting in Asia and the Pacific in Kathmandu, 13-15 February 1995, concerns were raised with respect to Japan's civilian nuclear programme. Japan is a linchpin of the international non-proliferation regime. Its non-proliferation credentials are almost impeccable. Yet there were lurking suspicions about its commercial nuclear power programme.

Another example is that of the Islamic Republic of Iran, also a charter member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

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Treaty but a country that the United States has officially stated should be denied any peaceful nuclear assistance, even under international safeguards.

Many other countries feel growing concern—driven by emphasis on non-proliferation—that an interest in commercial nuclear power can signal a potential interest in nuclear-weapon capability. That is underscored by the Arab League's recent complaint that the supplier nations had imposed a selective embargo on the export of nuclear components and technology to its member States. I have heard questions raised about the intent of the Indonesian commercial nuclear power programme and why Malaysia and Viet Nam are having their nuclear scientists trained in India. There has to be a proper balance between non-proliferation concerns and the right of nations to meet their energy requirements through commercial nuclear power programmes.

Peaceful nuclear cooperation and the NPT

Cooperation in non-proliferation and in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy was the centre-piece of the bargain struck in 1968 between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards were devised to ensure that non-proliferation goals were not undermined by cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

So why did the issue of peaceful nuclear energy cooperation dog the NPT review and extension debate?

There are several reasons:

1. Since the bargain was struck in 1968, the non-proliferation and safeguards regime has been progressively tightened and reinforced in a way that has tilted the bargain in favour of the supplier nations and hindered cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy application. If recent years are any indication, no

amount of tightening seems to satisfy the regime leaders.

2. The secret formation of a technology export control cartel, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also known as the London Club, contravened the spirit, if not the letter, of the bargain struck in 1968. The cartel was formed in 1975, but it was not unveiled publicly until 1978. The lack of transparency in its operation remains an issue of concern. The cartel meets behind closed doors, and minimal information is released about its deliberations.

3. National and multilateral export control barriers to peaceful uses of nuclear energy have grown enormously since the mid-1970s:

(a) The export controls first focused on controlling the spread of plutonium, viewed as the "root of the problem", as reflected in India's 1974 detonation of a nuclear device.

(b) Then national and multinational controls prohibited the transfer of all technologies and components related to uranium enrichment and the separation of plutonium from irradiated fuel.

(c) Then came even more sweeping restrictions on the form of controls on dual-use items and technologies.

(d) Finally, there came lists of countries thought to be engaged in nuclear proliferation, with which all nuclear cooperation, including safety-related assistance, was proscribed, whether or not they were members of the NPT.

The growing emphasis on controlling dual-purpose technologies, particularly since the end of the war in the Persian Gulf, raises questions that go beyond the subject of

peaceful nuclear energy cooperation and touch the core issues of civilian modernization in the developing world.

Technological cooperation and technology control

All technologies, particularly advanced technologies, have civil and military applications. The very technologies that are at the cutting edge of civilian modernization are vital to military modernization. Examples are information technology, advanced composite materials, and biotechnology. Military innovations in the West rely increasingly on commercial technologies, so it is becoming very difficult to separate civil from military technology.

Admittedly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot promote regional or global security. Nuclear weapons are a technology from the 1940s and within the reach of many nations. If we are to deter further proliferation and find ways to promote nuclear disarmament, there is a greater need today for cooperation between those who rely directly or indirectly on nuclear weapons for their security and the rest of the world.

The London Club, like other technology-control cartels, is made up largely of States within the present system of security alliances and umbrellas.

How should we promote cooperation in non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear energy?

1. Greater transparency in the functioning of the London Club is crucial.

2. The United Nations should supervise multilateral export barriers. Now, the non-proliferation regime is a mixed bag: an international treaty (the NPT), a safeguards agency affiliated with the United Nations (the IAEA), and the London Club, which has

no international sanction. All the pillars of the regime should enjoy international legitimacy and support. It is unfortunate that even the institution that has international sanction (the IAEA) has come under attack from some analysts. If the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards regime is questioned and is used to block peaceful nuclear cooperation or raise doubts about the peaceful intent of a nation's programme (such as Japan's), the future of the international non-proliferation regime will be seriously undermined.

3. Streamlining of national and multinational export controls is needed. A key question that arises is: should the protected area continue to be expanded through a growing web of technology controls, or should higher fences be built around a set of core technologies that are directly related to weapons of mass destruction? As I have said, proliferation is in no nation's interest. However, the future of non-proliferation depends on consensus-building, not on unilateral or cartel actions.

4. End-use controls should be accepted as an adequate protection against the diversion of nuclear materials and technology to weapons use. Such controls include on-site monitoring and challenge inspections. End-use controls are the answer, not technology controls and technology denial. Technology control and denial are intended to impede cooperation rather than to promote it. At present, the suppliers insist on riding two horses simultaneously: end-use controls and technology control and denial.

Proliferation—a political problem

Proliferation is a political problem. Technical fixes by themselves cannot help to resolve political problems or even deal with them. A political problem needs international cooperation and support for settlement. Maintaining lists of proscribed items and proscribed countries runs counter to that objective. Technology control and denial policies, especially those that target an array of commercial technologies, also run counter to the objectives of developing an international free-trade regime. Developing countries are already raising the point that a free-trade regime should involve trade not only in goods and services, but also in the technological processes involved in manufacturing those goods and rendering those services.

The issue of a new, acceptable bargain between those countries which directly or indirectly rely on nuclear weapons for their security and the rest of the world resurfaced with the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT (17 April–12 May 1995). In order to achieve a favourable outcome, those relying on nuclear weapons for their security needed the support of a majority of States parties to the NPT. For that, they needed to strike an acceptable bargain with the majority. Nuclear weapons, I repeat, are within the reach of many nations. As United States President Harry Truman said after the first hydrogen-bomb test: "We must realize that no advantage we make is unattainable by others, that no advantage can be more than temporary".

If a majority of countries with nuclear technological capability and economic resources have not developed nuclear weapons, it is because they see the possible advantages of nuclear arms as outweighed by political costs or as available through alliance with a nuclear-weapon Power. However, perceptions of the value of an independent arsenal can change. Although the cold war has now ended, a new

security order has yet to emerge. The current global political-military situation appears to be in a state of transition, with no clear indications of how a future world order will look. If the momentous developments of recent years indicate any trend, it is that perceptions and interests of nations and alliances can shift rapidly.

Build consensus for peaceful cooperation

It is therefore doubly important that, in order to promote non-proliferation, we seek to work on consensus-building and cooperation in the peaceful uses of technology, not on technology control and denial. We need greater international legitimacy and support for institutions. Without an enduring bargain, the nuclear monopoly of the five would not survive for long and the NPT would unravel.

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The Role of Confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United Nations Guidelines for Regional Approaches to Disarmament

Peggy Mason

This article will discuss the consensus "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" approved by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) at its 1993 session.[1] Outside the delegations in New York whose representatives formulated it (and the relevant "desk officer" in their respective capitals), that document, arduously elaborated over a period of three years, appears little known and, when raised, attracts even less interest. In my view this is a serious mistake. I make this assertion because the document in question represents common ground on the issue of the content of a regional security dialogue in a vast and diverse region, most of the countries of which have agreed only

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recently—and somewhat grudgingly—to sit down together at the cooperative security table.[2]

Pengiran Osman bin Pengiran Haji Patra writes in this publication on the history, current status and future prospects of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the region-wide security dialogue forum which held its inaugural meeting at the Ministerial level in July 1994. As Chair of the second annual meeting to be held in July 1995, Brunei is well-placed to provide an assessment of where the ARF has come from and where it is going. In the final part of his comments, Mr. Osman addresses the "process versus content" debate. On the "content" side, he notes that proposals received to date—largely from Western participants—had been grouped into four categories: (a) confidence-building measures (CBMs); (b) preventive diplomacy; (c) disarmament measures and (d) conflict resolution mechanisms.

A realistic approach, in his view, is to start with confidence-building measures, then consider issues of preventive diplomacy and "in the long-term possibly conflict resolution". Such an approach, he argues, is well-suited to the ASEAN way of working which centres on consultation, quiet diplomacy, inclusiveness and a gradual pace, while avoiding "formal and legalistic" approaches. Security was viewed in a holistic manner as a comprehensive concept and the aim of the ARF was to provide a venue for consultation and cooperation on regional security matters so as to, in turn, establish the necessary stable, peaceful context for economic growth to proceed and to continue. As such, the ARF was an "evolving process" where the aim of "keeping it going" is as important as concrete results. Above all, informality is the key.

A vivid metaphor for the ARF has been provided by Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan, a participant in the meeting in Kathmandu. He described it as a "young plant" which should not be "overburdened" by the expectations of its multiple

parents. Above all, there was an evident need for "consensual parenting".

If the European experience of confidence-building teaches anything at all, it is that the process of altering traditional security perceptions cannot be "forced", as if it were one of the thousands of Canadian tulip bulbs manipulated to blossom in time for Ottawa's annual Festival of Spring. On the otherhand, if the ARF is not to find itself as unprepared as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was when the Balkan conflict erupted in its midst, then the salient question must be, will the region's plethora of simmering disputes remain quiescent until the maturation of the regional process to the point where it can effectively deal with them? It is not enough that a consensus is reached to give the plant water. If it also needs light to survive and become strong, then that too must be provided.

The problem with the plant analogy is that it is usually pretty evident what a plant needs to grow strong and healthy. It is somewhat more complicated to determine what subjects are fertile soil in which to nourish the recently acquired, and still somewhat peckish, appetite of many ARF participants for multilateral dialogue on security-related issues. It is more difficult still to agree to actively pursue those subjects.

In putting meat on the bones of the Asia-Pacific regional dialogue processes (whether official, non-governmental or "mixed"), there is an understandable reluctance among Asian nations to directly borrow from the European experience. And even if they wanted to, they would find nothing in that region's landmark Stockholm Document of 1986 on confidence- and security-building measures to address the maritime dimension that so dominates the Asia-Pacific security equation. But a rejection of the architecture for security cooperation constructed in other regions does not mean that the Asia-Pacific has to begin drafting its

blueprints on an entirely blank page. For the last decade the international community has been studying various regional experiences in an effort to identify principles and guidelines of more general application. It is the central thesis of this paper that the series of agreements resulting from this multi-year effort at the global level represent a *common foundation* upon which Asia-Pacific nations can begin to build their own indigenous security structures.

If consensual parenting is indeed a *sine qua non* for a healthy, well-adjusted child, then the ARF's disparate array of progenitors would be wise to pay heed to any child-rearing principles upon which agreement amongst them had already been reached, particularly when the alternative—at least at present—is no agreed approach at all. If it is not straining the metaphor too much, the Disarmament Commission effort in developing agreed regional approaches to disarmament, together with the earlier confidence-building and transparency agreements on which it builds, can be compared to a rolling series of seminars on "cooperative security parenting" which ultimately yielded a common *modus operandi.* And the fact that many of the Asia-Pacific participants were elaborating the guidelines in the firm belief that they, at least, would never become the parents of such an unattractive and unwieldy offspring, makes the consensus finally achieved no less significant nor less worthy of careful study.

The "Guidelines"

The United Nations Disarmament Commission is a global, deliberative body which meets annually in New York for a three-week session beginning in mid-April. Like the First Committee of the General Assembly, all members of the United Nations are entitled to participate in its working groups. Unlike the First Committee, however, there are no resolutions to be voted upon. Rather, the Commission focuses

on a limited range of items (up to a maximum of four) over a three-year period and, like the Conference on Disarmament (CD), works by consensus. Every participating country must either agree or, at a minimum, refrain from objecting, to the document elaborated if there is to be a successful result. Once agreed in the Commission, the document is then endorsed by the First Committee and the General Assembly, representing three occasions when member States pass judgment on the agreement in question.[3]

Because the Commission is a *deliberative*, rather than a negotiating body—the CD is the sole global, negotiating forum—the results constitute *politically*, rather than *legally* binding agreements. Nonetheless, such "political commitments" can carry considerable weight, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms being a clear case in point. In truth, the strength of the commitment is as great as the international community wishes it to be. If a significant number of participating States act in accordance with the document negotiated and communicate their expectation that other participating States will do the same, then few will easily flaunt the consensus which they, after all, shared in creating. Conversely, if the document is negotiated and then promptly forgotten, only those who find it convenient to rely on will feel bound to do so.

A final point about the participation of Asia-Pacific States in this process. The Indonesian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti, chaired the Working Group on the subject during its first year of work. During the third and final session when the critical compromises had to be made to secure overall agreement, Indonesia, as Chair of the United Nations Member States which belong to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, was again in a pivotal position.

After three years of work, the Commission produced a 52-paragraph document comprised of four sections and an appendix. Section I explores the relationship between regional disarmament and global security. Section II outlines general "principles and guidelines" which "should govern" regional approaches to disarmament. Section III identifies five types of "ways and means" including confidence-building measures, disarmament and arms limitation agreements, zones free of weapons of mass destruction and consultative and cooperative arrangements. The role of the United Nations in facilitating regional approaches is outlined in Section IV and the Appendix includes an illustrative list of confidence-building measures drawn from relevant global and regional agreements.

Scope of the document—disarmament as a broad concept

As the above outline suggests, the subject matter is not restricted to disarmament in the narrow sense of formal agreements to limit or reduce arms. Rather a broad process is envisaged from tension reduction and confidence-building at one end of the spectrum through the establishment of consultative fora on security cooperation to the regulation of armaments at the other. Likewise, non-military aspects of the regional context which might affect security are also included. Regional approaches to disarmament, thus defined, are deemed one of the "essential elements in global efforts to strengthen international peace and security" (para 2). Positive benefits to be expected from the implementation of concrete arms reduction measures include relaxed regional tensions (para 5), the "freeing up" of resources for the promotion of economic and social development (para 16) and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to political settlement of regional disputes (para 26). Paragraph 32 outlines the merits of CBMs:

> "Appropriate confidence- and security-building measures which foster mutual trust and understanding, as well as transparency and openness, can defuse tensions and promote friendly relations among States. Furthermore, such measures can facilitate the disarmament and arms limitation process and can improve the prospects for the peaceful settlement of disputes, thus contributing to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security."

Note first that it is not every CBM that will have such congenial effects but only those that are "appropriate" to the specific conditions and characteristics of the region (the need to tailor efforts to the region in question being expressed as a general principle in paragraph 15). Note also that "transparency and openness" are seen as a positive result of confidence-building on par with "mutual trust and understanding". The language is even stronger with respect to one particular type of transparency—openness in military matters. In paragraph 28 it is asserted that regional approaches to disarmament and arms limitation "*should* promote transparency and openness in military matters in order to build confidence among the States of the region concerned" (emphasis added).[4]

That Asia-Pacific States embraced that formulation may well seem surprising to those accustomed to the oft-repeated assertion that "transparency" is a particularly unsuitable term for the region, translations of which inevitably conjure up notions of vulnerability and nakedness.[5] The difference in attitude is not just because the disarmament experts were, by then, thoroughly familiar with a concept about which they had first reached agreement in the Commission's 1988 Guidelines for Appropriate Types of Confidence-Building Measures[6] and had elaborated in even greater detail Guidelines and Recommendations for Objective Information

on Military Matters, adopted by the Commission in 1992.[7] The key factor was that, during those lengthy negotiations, the implications of transparency, its benefits and limitations and, above all, its appropriateness elsewhere than in Europe, had all been carefully considered and the necessary nuances and caveats articulated to the satisfaction of all participants from every regional grouping (including China which began the 1992 discussion with the announcement that it did not believe in openness in military matters). In a very real sense, the end result was to *internationalize* both the terminology and the underlying principles.

But because the disarmament bodies in New York and Geneva are still mainly the province of a narrow range of experts, that singular transformation is little known and less appreciated.[8] As a result, the debate over the merits of transparency for the Asia-Pacific continues. This is not to suggest that, even if the promotion of openness and transparency in military matters was widely accepted *in principle* by ARF participants, they would find it any easy to *implement*. What an acknowledgement of the global framework for confidence-building could do, however, is to decisively shift the focus from a now largely sterile debate over "whether" to a more concrete consideration of "how".

Paragraph 2 of the 1992 "Guidelines on objective information on military matters" asserts that, "through a dynamic process over time", the encouragement of openness and transparency on military matters will "build confidence, enhance mutual trust and contribute to the relaxation of tension and to promote specific disarmament agreements and other concrete disarmament measures". Other purposes include assisting States in determining the level of forces and armaments sufficient for an adequate defensive capability, increasing the predictability of military activities in order to head off dangerous errors or misperceptions and promoting

greater public understanding and discussion of disarmament and security-related issues.

Paragraph 4, first subparagraph, asserts that, "All States have the *responsibility* to provide objective information on military matters and the right of access to such information" (emphasis added). The public dimension referred to above is further elaborated in the Principles section with the assertion in the third subparagraph that such information "should be accessible to the public of all States to the maximum degree possible consistent with national security and the provisions of related agreements". In the fourth subparagraph, which places a "special responsibility" on the States with the largest and most sophisticated arsenals, the "duty" of all States to provide objective information on military matters is reiterated. Any field of military activity might be considered for the provision of objective information (subparagraph 7 and paragraph 5). In determining the "practical level of information necessary to promote openness and transparency, with the aim of contributing to confidence and stability", account should be taken of the specific characteristics, degree of political stability and political climate in each particular region (subparagraph 6). Subparagraph 8 declares that "States should promote, through consultations on their own initiative, practical measures on the exchange of objective information on military matters, in the light of their specific situation and political, military and security conditions."

That injunction to States to *take action* in respect of the provision of objective information on military matters is repeated in the Recommendations section of the document, paragraphs 13 and 14.

All in all, the consensus language of the 1992 document on objective information on military matters is unqualified in its commitment to the *objective* of transparency

and forthright in its injunction to States to take appropriate action to implement it. Note in particular that regional specificities are cited not as an excuse for limiting transparency but as factors to be taken properly into account in order to ensure that transparency is effectively implemented.

In a region which is going in the opposite direction from the global downward trend in military spending and arms acquisition, it might be instructive to examine how the main document under discussion, the 1993 Guidelines on regional approaches to disarmament, treats the issue of conventional armaments, the acquisition of which, in and of itself, is a legitimate aspect of the inherent right of self-defence of all States.[9] While the *objective* of undiminished security at the "lowest possible level of armaments and military forces" was enshrined in the 1978 Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I),[10] it took the end of the cold war and the revelations of the Gulf war to compel the international community as a whole to begin to address conventional armaments. Reflecting both the practical experience of conventional disarmament in Europe, and lessons from the Iraqi arms build up, the Guidelines outline several criteria for addressing conventional armaments at the regional level.

In the Principles section, paragraph 18 states that priority should be given "to the elimination of the most destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances". Regional approaches, however, are not restricted to such situations of instability and imbalance. Reflecting the original consensus in SSOD-I, paragraph 20 establishes a positive standard or goal in respect of arms acquisitions—the "lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces consistent with undiminished security for all of the participating States." This standard is expressed in a slightly different way in paragraph 23. Accumulations of conventional weapons "beyond the legitimate self-defence requirements of States" should be

addressed. Paragraph 38 states that, in addition to seeking the lowest level of armaments consistent with undiminished security, the aim should be to eliminate the capability for large-scale offensive action and surprise attacks.[11] States are then explicitly admonished not to "seek an armament and military spending level that exceeds their legitimate self-defence requirements."

On 31 January, 1992, in the aftermath of the second war in the Gulf, the Security Council held its first ever (and, to date, only) summit meeting. In a unanimous declaration, the Council *inter alia* underlined the need for all member States "to avoid excessive and destabilizing accumulations or transfers of arms".[12] Paragraph 40 of the Guidelines takes this admonition to the next logical step and encourages all States to "regulate" the acquisition of armaments in order to prevent their "excessive and destabilizing accumulation".

In South-East Asia and elsewhere in the region, it is commonplace to hear that there is no need to scrutinize the conventional arms build up because all that is taking place is prudent force modernization in light of increased economic prosperity and new United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mandated maritime responsibilities.[13] At the same time, while most analysts agree that there is no arms race, many still caution that the lack of transparency, predictability and demonstrable rationality in the arms acquisition process is bound to generate suspicions over time.[14] The thrust of the 1993 Guidelines is unmistakable. Whether or not one believes there is anything disconcerting about the procurement patterns in the Asia-Pacific, governments have a duty to shed more light on these and other "military matters", as a first step toward ensuring that enhanced national self-reliance contributes to, rather than detracts from, increased regional confidence and stability.

Who should participate?

Principles 12 and 13 deal with the vexed question of who should participate in regional efforts. On the one hand, the "participating" States should define the region to which the arrangements would apply. On the other, such arrangements should be open to all "concerned" States. A definition or means of determining what constitutes a "concerned State" is conspicuously lacking. The dilemma here is between the need to include all States necessary to satisfactorily resolve the issues at hand (which may mean, for example, that a subregional geographic criteria is too narrow) and the desire to avoid giving one or more States the means to block the process from getting underway at all. The language also reflects the need to allow maximum flexibility in the potential design of regional and subregional approaches, depending on the particular problem sought to be addressed. In the Asia-Pacific region, at least three levels of security building activity have been identified.

The first is the issue-specific level, involving only those players directly involved in the dispute and perhaps a small number of facilitators. A good example is the Canadian-financed and Indonesian-hosted series of workshops dealing with the South China Sea. The second level is the subregional one, involving States of a particular geographic location, for example, ASEAN. Finally, the third level is the region-wide process, of which the ASEAN Regional Forum promises to be an example.[15]

None of these levels is entirely self-contained, however. Issue-specific fora may fail without the moral suasion that only a larger process can provide, particularly if there are significant asymmetries in the size and military capacity of the parties to the dispute. At the other extreme, a region-wide dialogue seeking to embrace many diverse perspectives may satisfy no one unless it can draw from, build

on and, ultimately, reinforce sub-regional efforts among more like-minded participants.

Muthiah Alagappa, addressing the second annual Kathmandu seminar, contended that, while the process of regional cooperation was being broadened, intra-ASEAN cooperation must be deepened "to move the Association further along the road towards a pluralistic security community". In particular, he urged ASEAN to demonstrate a greater political commitment to resolving outstanding bilateral disputes by embracing conflict resolution rather than avoidance.[16] A continued deepening of intra-ASEAN consultations is clearly necessary if the needs of its members—existing and prospective—in a time of transition, uncertainty and increasing complexity are to be effectively met.[17] Certainly, if the Association wishes to continue to exercise the leadership role it has so deftly carved out for itself in the ARF process, then it must begin to demonstrate an ability to bring coherent, forward-looking proposals to the ARF table.

Despite the deep-seated reluctance of most ASEAN members to begin to discuss sensitive military issues on a multilateral basis even amongst themselves, it is possible that the way might be smoothed somewhat by an initial focus on global principles which ASEAN members have already participated in developing, albeit in another forum. What are "legitimate self-defence needs" in the ASEAN context? What of the "duty" to provide objective information on military matters? What is the "practical level of information necessary" to promote openness and transparency on military matters in South-East Asia? The 1993 Guidelines might prove an even more useful reference point for discussions among the disparate membership of the ARF. A working group could be tasked to solicit national perspectives on each of the key principles, as a basis for further discussion.

The United Nations can help inform the content part of regional cooperative security-building by providing a global framework or foundation of principles to be further elaborated and applied in the Asia-Pacific context. It can also help by facilitating the process itself. Section IV of the Guidelines envisages the United Nations promoting "complementarity" between regional and global processes of disarmament "by establishing effective liaison and cooperation with relevant regional bodies". In the Asia-Pacific context this would imply liaison and cooperation with both the ARF and ASEAN. Although there have been some efforts to this end, a lot remains to be done. The United Nations, beset with financial and staffing restraints even as its sphere of activities grows by leaps and bounds, has largely concentrated its regional dialogue efforts on support for the Arms Register (through a variety of workshops and seminars) and the "Kathmandu process" of regional conferences and seminars.[18] Recently, the Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific has sought to establish ties with the leading non-governmental organization focusing on security dialogue, the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), by seeking Observer status with that organization.

Important efforts have also originated within the region to establish more effective liaison between the United Nations and regional security organizations. In 1992, ASEAN introduced a resolution at the First Committee, explicitly in furtherance of the call by the United Nations Secretary-General in *Agenda for Peace* for a closer relationship between the United Nations and regional associations (47/53 B).[19] The resolution invited all United Nations Member States to endorse the guiding principles of the Association which are enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and was ostensibly a first step toward the Association becoming an Observer Intergovernmental Organ-

ization (IGO) to the United Nations.[20] Although the resolution was adopted without a vote in both the First Committee and the General Assembly, this promising initiative has not been taken further, perhaps reflecting some internal debate about the merits of moving closer to the United Nations but more likely a casualty of the charged ASEAN agenda in light of the newly created ARF.[21]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and the United Nations organized three ASEAN-United Nations Workshops on Cooperation for Peace and Preventive Diplomacy in the period from March 1993 through February 1994. Involving academics and officials from 16 Asia-Pacific countries and United Nations representatives, topics included the role of multilateralism in South-East Asia, cooperation between regional groupings and the United Nations and specific territorial and boundary disputes. Once again the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was also examined as a possible basis for a statement of common principles (work which is now continuing in the context of preparations for the second ASEAN Regional Forum in July 1994).

In December 1994, NIRA, a think-tank with close ties to the Japanese government, sponsored a small conference on "Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region" which took as its starting point the definitions in the United Nations Secretary-General's *Agenda for Peace*. Invitees were mainly officials in their "personal" capacity, senior academics with a strong policy orientation and the Assistant Secretary-General for the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Ms. Rosario Green. Symptomatic of the ongoing difficulties which the United Nations secretariat has in staffing "non-essential" activities, Green was forced to cancel out at the last minute. The meeting was surprisingly united in its view that concrete regional initiatives such as a Japanese-sponsored centre for preventive diplomacy, and not just endless "track two" meetings, were now required. However, agreement on

the thorny question of which disputes such a centre might begin immediately to tackle proved more elusive.

Most recently, the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific has invited a political officer from the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs to its second meeting to be held in Singapore in mid-May of 1995.[22] This is most appropriate in light of the agenda of that meeting which will focus on both regional and global confidence-building measures and it is a welcome departure from past practice in American-led efforts. In this case, not only was the American co-chair of the Working Group instrumental in getting the invitation issued in the first place, another American non-governmental organization is making possible its acceptance by covering the United Nations official's travel costs.

While these efforts suggest a growing interest in greater cooperation between the United Nations and regional bodies, more follow-through is required if effective, regularized liaison is to be established. One practical problem that should be easier to address than the financial crisis at the United Nations is the location of the Asia-Pacific Regional Centre in Kathmandu, Nepal. Nepalese support in 1989 for the creation of the Centre was both far-sighted and courageous. It was also absolutely essential to the Centre's successful emergence at a time when most of the region was hostile to the notion of a United Nations regional role. Nonetheless, its remote location has proven such a significant barrier to effective liaison efforts that discussions are now quietly underway to relocate the Centre, on a temporary basis at least, to a more central locale, probably in South-East Asia. If the move takes place, ASEAN will be in an enviable position to enhance its organizational and substantive links with the cooperative security "outreach" arm of the United Nations secretariat.

In paragraph 51 of the UNDC Guidelines, the United Nations is urged to make available its own, hands-on experience in carrying out activities related to the maintenance of international peace and security. It was from just this type of practical experience that the Thai-sponsored United Nations and Preventive Diplomacy workshops hoped to benefit. However, more Member States must be willing to speak up at the United Nations General Assembly, the First Committee and most especially in the Fifth Committee (where the budget is considered) on the fundamental importance of United Nations participation—and indeed leadership—in longer term efforts at cooperative security-building. Without this kind of advocacy, it is inevitable that crisis-management will continue to monopolize virtually all of the preventive diplomacy assets at the United Nations disposal.

Similarly, member States need to pay more constructive attention to the continuing reorientation of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs (CDA) to enable it to take a more holistic and activist approach to disarmament issues as one facet of a complex security equation encompassing military and non-military factors. Despite its implicit recognition in the UNDC Guidelines of the need to end its artificial segregation, the disarmament community *per se* has been slow to embrace a more integrated approach.[23] The CDA, on the otherhand, has not.

A good example of the new approach is the United Nations Advisory Mission to the Saharan-Sahel. Initially in response to a request to the United Nations Secretary-General from the President of Mali to provide assistance in the collection and control of illicit small arms proliferating in his country, it soon became clear that this problem could not be considered in isolation, without focussing on its many causes and consequences including a deteriorating security situation and cross-border arms flows involving several of Mali's neighbours. The resulting United Nations Advisory Mission

(which has, to date, carried out two fact-finding visits to the subregion) is the first ever to include political officers from the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, the African Regional Centre and the African division of the Department of Political Affairs. The two outside experts recruited to lead the Mission—former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, Eteki-Mboumou of Cameroon, and retired Brigadier-General Henny Van der Graaf (who now heads a prestigious verification institute in the Netherlands)—also represent a balance of geographic and substantive disarmament/conflict resolution expertise.

Such combined efforts from within previously discrete (and often excessively turf-conscious) components of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs will begin to build a base of international security expertise within the Centre for Disarmament Affairs which will increasingly enable it to provide important practical, as well as conceptual, inputs into nascent regional and subregional efforts.

Concluding remarks

At the outset of my remarks, I referred to Mr. Numata's warning that the fragile ARF "plant" not be overburdened. He also added, that neither should it be "invisible". ASEAN has been described as the institutional anchor of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The quality of leadership it provides will determine in large measure whether the ARF flourishes or withers on the vine. Michael Krepon, in another article in this publication, underscores the importance of political leadership in moving the security dialogue process forward. This is certainly true but solid policies are the bedrock of successful engagement and the development of those policies is the responsibility of government bureaucrats.

The Asia-Pacific is a region where increases in defence spending in real terms and the number and quality of

the weapons being acquired have made it the fastest growing arms market in the world. It is also a region where security analysts have fundamental disagreements over the implications of the arms build up, where the level of transparency in military expenditures is so low that it is often impossible to relate the procurement process to a perceived set of military needs, and where all of this is taking place against a backdrop of uncertainty, vastly increased geostrategic complexity and simmering disputes over sovereignty, territory and control of offshore resources. At the same time, it is also a period of relative calm and of increasing national and regional confidence. In short, it is hard to imagine how the circumstances could be *more* propitious for the introduction of a little substantive "bite" into official efforts to strengthen peace and stability in the region.

In the wake of the short-lived burst of multilateral-mania that marked the end of the cold war, completely unrealistic demands were made of the United Nations by an international community unprepared to provide the material and political support necessary to sustain far more modest objectives. Now that the rose-coloured glasses are gone, and with them the illusion that the United Nations can do everything, there is a tendency to conclude that the United Nations can therefore do nothing. A more measured analysis suggests a trend toward a new kind of burden sharing in which regional organizations increasingly seek to equip themselves to find practical, workable solutions to regional problems which might become crises requiring broader involvement if left unaddressed. In taking on these new roles, however, regional organizations need not start with a blank slate. They themselves have contributed to a body of global principles and practices which now should be put more directly to the test. Through just such an examination, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations might find a way to marry the

"ASEAN approach" on the process of trust-building with concrete cooperation in the security field.

Notes

1 *Official Records of the General Assembly. Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/48/42), annex II. Reproduced in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 18:1993, pp. 108-115.

2 For a thorough review of the development of an institutionalized security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, see Mack and Kerr "Getting it Right in the Asia-Pacific" in volume 18, Number 1 of *The Washington Quarterly*, pp. 123-140.

3 At each successive stage, the participation rate among member States increases as small delegations, without the resources to attend the earlier proceedings, join in. Both newcomers and States who have participated from the outset are free to refuse consensus in either of the subsequent stages. Nonetheless, it is relatively unusual that this occurs.

4 In United Nations terminology, the only stronger admonition than "should" is "shall".

5 Indeed just such a discussion took place during the Kathmandu seminar at which this paper was given.

6 Paragraph 33 of the 1993 UNDC guidelines reads as follows:
"For confidence- and security-building measures at the regional level, attention is drawn to the "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", as adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 43/78 H of 7 December 1988). Account could also be taken, as appropriate, of the experiences gained through the implementation of measures and guidelines designed for the global level, as adopted by the General Assembly, as well as measures developed in some regions."

7 *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/48/42). Reproduced in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 17:1992, pp.97-101.

8 For a discussion of some of the reasons behind this problem, see Peggy Mason "Efforts to Promote Regional Security Dialogue and Cooperation in the North Pacific" in *Transparency in Armaments, Regional Dialogue and Disarmament, Topical Papers 20* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.IX.12), pp. 69-73.

9 Article 51 of the UN Charter begins: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Operative paragraph 3 of the resolution which mandated the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms 46/36L, "reaffirms the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, *which implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves"* (emphasis added).

10 This first of three special sessions of the United Nations devoted to disarmament was the only one to achieve a consensus outcome. The document established disarmament priorities beginning with, but not limited to, the elimination of nuclear weapons. With the end of the cold war, questions have increasingly been raised about the need to re-examine the Final Document in the light of new circumstances. In the fall of 1995 the 49th session of the General Assembly decided to consider holding a Fourth Special Session in 1997 (49/75 I).

11 The objectives of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (November 1992) included the elimination of "as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe." *Status of Multilateral Arms and Disarmament Agreements*, Fourth edition:1992: vol. 1, p.288.

[12] Security Council document S/PV. 3046. Reproduced in *Disarmament*, vol. XV, Number 2, 1991, pp. 1-8.

[13] The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which entered into force on 16 November 1994, gives coastal States jurisdiction over 200 mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

[14] In his paper "Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Region: Implications for Security and Prospects for Constraints/ Controls", presented to the Seventh Asia-Pacific Roundtable held in Kuala Lumpur, 6-9 June 1993, Desmond Ball cites several "disturbing" aspects of current acquisition programs including a background of uncertainty, the lack of transparency about long range objectives and motivations, the absence of common threat perceptions and the offensive character of some of the new weapons systems. See also Selin "Asia Pacific Arms Buildups Part One: Scope, Causes and Problems", Working Paper No. 6 and "Part Two: Prospects for Control", Working Paper No. 7, published by the Institute of International Relations, The University of British Colombia (November 1994).

[15] Peggy Mason, "Guidelines and Recommendations for Regional Approaches to Disarmament within the Context of Global Security" *Topical Papers 18* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.IX.7),p. 51.

[16] Muthiah Alagappa, "Security in South-East Asia: beyond a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN)", *Topical Papers 6* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91. IX/ 16), p. 131.

[17] Of the South-East Asian States who are not members of ASEAN—Cambodia, Laos, Mynamar and Viet Nam—two now have Observer status, Laos and Viet Nam.

[18] For a discussion of the "Kathmandu process", see Peggy Mason, "Efforts to Promote Regional Security Dialogue and Cooperation in the North Pacific", op. cit., p. 69.

[19] A/47/277-S/24111 (issued also as a United Nations publication under the symbol DPI/1247).

[20] The South Pacific Forum has been an IGO (Intergovernmental Organization with Observer Status to the UN) since 1994.

[21] A further factor might be that Portugual took advantage of the resolution's introduction in the First Committee to criticize ASEAN's posture toward East Timor. Although delivered in muted tones, this action nonetheless exposed ASEAN to its first such scrutiny in that United Nations body.

[22] One of four CSCAP Working Groups, it is co-chaired by Singapore, South Korea and the United States. Its first workshop was held in Washington D.C., 11-13 October 1994. There is also a North-Pacific Working Group on "Frameworks for Stability on the Korean Peninsula", co-chaired by Canada and Japan, a Working Group on Maritime Cooperation, co-chaired by Australia, Malaysia and South Korea and a Working Group on Cooperative and Comprehensive Security, co-chaired by Malaysia and New Zealand.

[23] See Peggy Mason "Efforts to Promote...", ibid., pp. 69-73.

Risk Reduction and Maritime Security in Asia and the Pacific

Stanley B. Weeks

Risk reduction and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region are increasingly important aspects of broader regional stability. The military emphasis of many large, medium, and even smaller Powers of the region has shifted increasingly to more extended and capable off-shore maritime defence capabilities—spurred by reduced military focus on internal/counter-insurgency issues and by the November 1994 entry into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), extending exclusive economic zones (EEZ) to two hundred miles off-shore (with corresponding increased demands on maritime policing and resource management). Of course, it is the phenomenal trade-driven economic growth of Asia-Pacific nations that both enables greater expenditures on maritime security and increases the importance of the security of sea lanes and ocean resources. An additional factor in the new maritime-security equation in the Asia-Pacific region is the end of the cold war, which has eliminated the most serious previous single maritime risk of conflict (between the United States and Soviet navies), only to give rise to a variety of new maritime security concerns more directly affecting Asia-Pacific nations, particularly the reduced extent of the United States continued stabilizing military presence in the region and the—likely related—

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future naval potential (and interaction) of other major regional Powers (China, India and Japan).[1]

The more complex new maritime security context requires a new assessment of potential maritime risk reduction in the region, taking into consideration the relevance of existing maritime measures in the Asia-Pacific as well as the maritime risk reduction experience in other regions. A variety of maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) merit consideration for applicability to the Asia-Pacific region, including the most developed maritime CBM—incidents at sea (INCSEA) agreements—as well as broader CBM measures to enhance openness and transparency of regional military forces and plans.[2]

The Asia-Pacific strategic context

In assessing the specific relevance of maritime CBMs, the unique characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region must be noted. As a recent survey of CBMs noted:

> "The region is more geographically, politically, and culturally diverse than any other in which confidence-building efforts have been pursued. Perhaps most importantly, while troubled with some of the world's most explosive hot-spots, the Asia-Pacific as a whole is characterised less by actively adversarial relationships than by the potential for conflict. Territorial disputes, competing economic and resource interests and lingering domestic insecurities suggest the need for measures aimed at averting the rise of tension and conflict."[3]

That is not to suggest that previous maritime CBM experience (more oriented to actively confrontational situations) is not relevant to the Asia-Pacific region, but rather to argue for careful adaptation of each experience. Also, the geographic disparities in the Asia-Pacific region suggest the

need for varying subregional approaches in some CBM areas between North-East Asia, South-East Asia, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In North-East Asia, the maritime interests and forces of four major Powers (China, Japan, Russia, and the United States) intersect, while the continuing stand-off on the Korean peninsula implies that confidence-building, in the absence of political preconditions of normal relations, may be best limited to cold war-type conflict-avoidance measures. In South-East Asia, there is a long history of informal ASEAN maritime cooperation, supplemented by a more recent web of bilateral and multilateral confidence-building and cooperative maritime measures. In the South Pacific, broad cooperative maritime regimes have developed between Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Island States, focused on non-military maritime concerns of EEZ surveillance and control of fishing resources.[4] The Indian Ocean area has been less examined as a focus of localized maritime CBMs or cooperation. It is noteworthy that, in both North-East and South-East Asia, the main territorial disputes are maritime in nature (e.g., the Kurile Islands/Northern Territories (Russia-Japan), Dok-Do/Takeshima Island (Korea-Japan), Diaoyutai-Senkaku Island (China-Japan) , as well as Taiwan and, in the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands (Viet Nam-China) and the Spratley/Nansha Islands (Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Viet Nam). CBMs cannot substitute for formal diplomatic/legal negotiations to settle territorial disputes, but maritime CBMs may be particularly valuable in minimizing the risk of conflict in such circumstances.

Maritime confidence-building measures

There are a variety of maritime CBMs, in addition to Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreements (to be discussed separately below), which should be considered as a menu for

region-wide and/or subregional application in the Asia-Pacific region.

I. *Declaratory measures* (Figure 1)

Although not strictly maritime in nature, statements of intent such as the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia and the Declaration of Concord may establish regional principles of conflict-avoidance that can, over time, be developed through concrete CBM measures. In the maritime context, region-wide acceptance of the Law of the Sea principles of UNCLOS III would probably be the most appropriate CBM. Broader bilateral non-attack pledges, such as the Indo-Pakistani Simla Accord of 1971 and the Republic of Korea-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreement of 1991, also have obvious positive implications for maritime security. One of the most useful maritime declaratory measures might be for China and other nuclear-capable Asia-Pacific nations to join the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France in unilaterally renouncing normal deployment of nuclear weapons on ships and maritime aircraft.

Figure 1. Declaratory Measures

Briand-Kellogg Pact renouncing war (1928)
Soviet nuclear no-first-use pledges
Indo-Pakistani Simla Accord (1971), renouncing force
Helsinki Final Act (1975), acceptance of existing borders
December 1991 ROK-DPRK Agreements, non-attack and nuclear-free Peninsula pledges
Negative Security Assurances (NSA), pledging no nuclear attack of non-nuclear powers

Source: Susan Pederson and Stanley B. Weeks, *A Survey of Confidence-building Measures* (Forthcoming, CSIS Significant Issues Series).

II. *Transparency measures* (Figure 2)

A second general category of CBMs, transparency measures, encompasses information exchange, communication, notification, and observation and inspection measures.

1. *Information exchange*

In the current context of strategic uncertainty and maritime force development in the Asia-Pacific region, information measures may be the most valuable CBMs, applicable region-wide.

(a) *Dialogue*

In addition to the measures listed which might be applied in the Asia-Pacific maritime context, the value of maritime aspects of broader regional and subregional security dialogue is particularly noteworthy. In addition to the annual United Nations conferences in Kathmandu on regional security and confidence-building and the official ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) security discussions, inaugurated in 1994, a host of unofficial or "track-two" conferences and workshops dealing with Asia-Pacific maritime security and confidence-building have been conducted in recent years. Since its inception in 1988, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and its associated workshops have led the way in making maritime cooperation work. But all security dialogue meetings are particularly valuable for establishing contacts and serving as sources of ideas for future official consideration, when political conditions have ripened. Most important, even unofficial dialogue and contacts may help to establish expectations of routine cooperation and legitimize the concept of openness regarding maritime activities.

(b) *Defence White Papers*

Increasingly detailed White Papers have been published by many Asia-Pacific nations in recent years. The obvious next step is for other regional nations that have not yet done so to publish such papers, including details of their

current maritime force structure and perhaps a five-year force and shipbuilding projection. In that regard, development (perhaps by an ASEAN Regional Forum working group) of common minimum standards/outlines for Defence White Papers would be helpful.

(c) *Arms register*

The Malaysian Minister for Defence proposed in 1992 that a "regional register" be established to support the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in the Asia-Pacific region. The current United Nations regime provides for, among other things, reports of imports or exports of vessels or submarines of over 750 metric tons. Standardization and development of further regional reporting requirements might usefully be undertaken by an ASEAN Regional Forum working group. First priority should be for those Asia-Pacific nations not yet doing so to fully report to the United Nations.[5]

(d) *Military-to-military contacts/seminars/personal exchanges*

Recent trends in the Asia-Pacific region have been very positive (particularly United States–Russian exchanges, increased Korea-Japan maritime contact, the China-Japan strategic dialogue, and the web of interactions in the ASEAN/Australian area). That is an important area for developing (and making routine) professional contacts and exchanges. The recent Indian proposal for a February 1995 naval meeting of ships and leaders from both the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia also indicates how such exchanges can link subregions in Asia.[6]

(i) *Communications measures*

The Western Pacific Naval Symposium workshops have developed a regional Maritime Information Exchange Directory and are now developing a common Tactical Communications Manual.[7] In addition to wide adoption of

those practical maritime communication measures by all Asia-Pacific maritime nations, any eventual INCSEA agreements (to be discussed below) would include provisions for communication/consultation on unusual or dangerous maritime activities.

(ii) *Notification measures*

Experience to date with notification CBMs has primarily been with ground force manoeuvres. The tailoring of such measures to the varied maritime force structures and practices of a broad region such as the Asia-Pacific would require very difficult negotiations, more characteristic of formal arms control than CBMs. Nations have tended to resist notifying the movement of air and naval units to avoid limiting the inherent flexibility and mobility of such units. Accordingly, such measures do not appear to be an early promising CBM for the Asia-Pacific maritime environment.

(iii) *Observation/inspection measures*

CBMs in that category which are potentially applicable to the Asia-Pacific maritime environment include observation of naval exercises/manoeuvres, inspection of naval facilities, and surveillance regimes and control zones. The voluntary issuing of invitations to observe naval exercises and to inspect naval facilities would be noteworthy assurances of openness and should be considered by Asia-Pacific maritime nations. As with notification measures, however, attempts to negotiate such measures formally between the disparate Pacific maritime force structures would have the complexity of formal arms control and might engender less trust, not more. A particularly promising CBM for Asia-Pacific subregions is maritime cooperation on ocean resources surveillance. That type of surveillance regime has precedents in the Asia-Pacific region, including both multilateral (for example, fisheries surveillance cooperation in the South Pacific Forum) and bilateral (for example, Australia, Indonesia, Timor Gap

Figure 2. Transparency Measures

Information Measures	Communications Measures	Notification Measures	Observation/ Inspection Measures
Defense White Paper Publication Calendar of military activities Arms registry Exchanges of military data Military-to-military Contacts Doctrine/defense planning seminars Military personnel/ student exchanges NBCM material inventories NBCM facilities	Crisis Management (Hotlines) Conflict Prevention Centers (CPC) Multilateral Communications Network Mandatory consultations on unusual/dangerous activities Communication for unexplained nuclear incidents Obligatory consultations in situations with increased nuclear war risk	Military maneuvers/ Movements Military alerts Increase in personnel (ground/air) Call-up of Reserves Test missile launches Nuclear accidents	Invitation of Observers Surveillance and Control zones Open skies Troop separation and monitoring Sensors/Early Warning Stations Nuclear missile factories Nuclear missile destruction Chemical facilities

surveillance and Malaysia-Indonesia pollution monitoring) measures.[8]

III. *Constraint measures* (Figure 3)

1. *Risk reduction agreements*

Those types of agreements, such as INCSEA agreements, are designed to prohibit or contain the consequences of inherently dangerous or inadvertent military activities through articulating codes of conduct for military forces and mandating crisis consultation and communication. Because they tend to address the consequences of mutually undesirable activities without unduly constraining operational forces, risk reduction measures have figured prominently in the early stages of political relaxation of tensions.

(a) *INCSEA agreements*

As more Asia-Pacific navies grow in reach and capability in the post–cold war environment, both bilateral and tailored multilateral/subregional INCSEA agreements are potentially valuable CBMs. By way of background, the 1972 navy-to-navy United States-Soviet (INCSEA) Agreement was a product of initial cold war detente and a landmark tension-reduction and confidence-building measure between the navies of the major Powers.[9] Establishing special rules to minimize ship manoeuvres that create danger of collisions, to prohibit actions (simulated attacks etc.) that might be interpreted as hostile or harassing, and to set up special communications procedures, the United States–Soviet INCSEA Agreement has been remarkably successful in minimizing incidents between the two navies—despite their more frequent global interaction in the first two decades after the conclusion of the Agreement. The 1972 Agreement has also served as a model for more than a dozen more recent similar bilateral INCSEA agreements, as well as for the broader 1989 United States-Soviet Agreement, at the Joint/General Staff level, on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. The "high seas" coverage

limits of the INCSEA Agreement, however, do not address boundaries and operations in territorial waters, nor do the INCSEA provisions cover the inherently stealthy submerged submarine. Experience with the 1972 and 1989 Agreements suggests several supplementary approaches to minimize incidents at sea in the post–cold war Asia-Pacific region. Existing (United States–Russia, Russia-Japan, Russia-ROK) and potential additional bilateral agreements (Japan-China, ROK-China, Russia-China, DPRK-ROK, China-Taiwan, United States–China, and China-India) still provide a sound technical and political basis for avoiding particular bilateral incidents between naval Powers at sea.

Complementing those bilateral INCSEA agreements (or perhaps substituting for bilateral agreements not yet reached), serious consideration should be given to tailored INCSEA/"safety at sea" multilateral subregional agreements for North-East Asia, South-East Asia (and, perhaps, the Indian Ocean).[10] Such multilateral agreements, which might be negotiated by naval specialists meeting in subregional groups on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, would include the time-tested provisions of bilateral INCSEA agreements, requiring naval forces on the high seas to communicate and avoid dangerous manoeuvres and harassments. But those agreements could also be tailored to address particular subregional non-military maritime concerns, such as surveillance, fisheries, merchant shipping safety (search and rescue) and/or anti-piracy/anti-narcotics cooperation. In addition, provision should be made for an annual subregional review meeting/naval symposium, which would also provide the venue for the bilateral naval contacts and discussions that have proved so valuable and durable in existing (bilateral) INCSEA agreements.

Asia-Pacific nations might wish to reflect on some recent experience in other regions before disavowing as too ambitious such proposed subregional INCSEA/safety-at-sea

regimes. In December 1994, a similar draft regional multilateral INCSEA text and a text on search and rescue, developed by the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group after more than a year of negotiation between Arabs, Israelis, and Palestinians (with Canadian mentoring and United States and Russian co-sponsorship), were adopted at a plenary meeting of the Multilateral Middle East Peace Process and are now available for adoption and implementation in the Middle East region.[11]

The subregions of the Asia-Pacific should regard similar agreements as priority maritime CBMs. It is, however, important to recognize that INCSEA agreements alone cannot effectively address the problems of inherently covert submerged submarines or law-of-the-sea disputes over boundaries of territorial seas and EEZs. A flexible variety of bilateral and multilateral actions is needed to minimize these more difficult causes of incidents at sea. Such actions might include continuing bilateral and/or multilateral negotiations on agreed interpretations (under the Law of the Sea) of territorial seas and EEZ boundaries, the exercise of prudent caution in all forward naval operations near disputed boundaries, and perhaps provisions for submarine underwater communications in extreme situations of perceived close danger. A proper complementary mix of these suggested actions can help further reduce global incidents at sea in the post–cold war Asia-Pacific.

(b) *Exclusion/separation measures*

Despite longstanding Soviet and Russian proposals to "keep out" other navies operating in the strategically significant the Sea of Japan/Sea of Okhotsk area and certain strategic straits, such "keep-out" zones may be seen to undercut traditional freedom of the seas and mobility of naval forces,

Figure 3. Constraint Measures

Risk Reduction Measures	Exclusion/Separation Measures	Constraints on Personnel, Equipment, Activities
Agmt to Reduce Risk of Nuclear War (1971) Incidents at Sea Agmt (1972) Russo-Japanese Air Traffic Safety Agmt (1985)	Demilitarized Zones Disengagement Zones	Personnel: –National limits –Category limits –Zone limits Equipment: –Deployment limits (by geographic area or numbers) –Category/type limits –Storage/monitoring limits –Nuclear missile types/deployment-
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Agmt (1987) Dangerous Military Activities Agmt (1989)	Keep-out Zones (Air/Sea) NBCM-Free Zones	Activities –Maneuvers/movements limits, by size or geographic area –Advance notification for movements, exercises, alerts –Limits on readiness –Bans on simultaneous exercises/alerts and/or certain force/unit types –NBCM testing –Nuclear fissile material production constraints

and become a source of contention rather than of confidence-building.

(c) *Constraints on personnel, equipment, activities*

Those constraints have tended to prohibit military operations that have not been properly forecast or notified or that take place within certain exclusion or separation zones. In their European, Middle East, and South Asian forms, such measures have focused almost exclusively on ground forces. Of all CBMs, constraint measures come closest to technical arms control/limitation, and thus pose significant challenges of negotiation and verification. Such measures (with the broader exception of nuclear-free zones) are not a well-suited or a promising focus for maritime CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

In the inherently maritime Asia-Pacific region, many navies are extending their reach and capability in the strategically uncertain post–cold war regional security environment. To reduce uncertainty and risk regarding naval forces and plans, maritime CBMs—particularly those including a variety of information and transparency measures—are a first priority. To address potentially dangerous encounters of naval forces and to address particular subregional maritime problems through the establishment of routine procedures and meetings, selected bilateral INCSEA agreements and subregional multilateral INCSEA/safety-at-sea agreements should also be a priority for Asia-Pacific nations.

Notes

1 Derek da Cunha, "New balance of naval power in Asia-Pacific", *The Straits Times*, 7 January 1995, p. 34.

2 "CBMs" are defined here as measures that tend to make military intentions more explicit by increasing transparency and predictability, thus reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. Others have used the term confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), trust-building measures (TBMs), and mutual reassurance measures (MRMs).

3 Susan Pederson and Stanley B. Weeks, *A Survey of Confidence Building Measures* (Forthcoming Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Significant Issues Series).

4 Dick Sherwood Commander, Royal Australian Navy, "The Australian experience with regional maritime cooperation", a paper delivered to the Anatalya Round of the Middle East Peace Process Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, Anatalya, Turkey, 21 March 1994.

5 See "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms—whence? whither?... and why?", in *Disarmament, a Periodic Review of the United Nations*, vol. XVII, No. 1 (1994).

6 "Passage to India", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 January 1995, p. 12.

7 Sherwood, *op. cit.* p. 8.

8 Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

9 For more on the United States–Soviet INCSEA Agreement, see: Stanley B. Weeks, "Measures to prevent major incidents at sea" in Jozef Goldblat, ed., *Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence* (New York; United Nations publication, Sales no. GV.92.O.31). Robert P. Hilton, Sr., "A CBM at work: the 1972 United States–USSR incidents at sea Agreement", *Naval Confidence-Building Measures* (Disarmament Topical Papers 4) (United Nations publication 1990, Sales No. E.90.IX.10); and , S.M. Lynn-Jones, "A quiet success for arms control: preventing incidents at sea", *International Security*, vol. 9, No. 4. Spring, 1985.

10 For further discussion, Peter Jones, "Maritime Security Cooperation and CBMs in the Asia-Pacific: Applying

Maritime CBMs in Regional Contexts", paper for the Fourth Asia-Pacific Dialogue on Maritime Security, Nakorn Pathom, Thailand, 8-9 August 1994; S.M. Lynn-Jones, "Agreements to prevent incidents at sea and dangerous military activities: potential applications in the Asia-Pacific region" in Andrew Mack, ed., *A Peaceful Ocean? Maritime Security in the Pacific in the Post Cold War Era* (Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1993); C.A. Meconis, "Naval arms control in the Asia-Pacific region after the cold war", *Ocean Yearbook 11* (International Ocean Institute/U. of Chicago Press, 1994); and R. Swinnerton, and D. Ball, "A regional regime for maritime surveillance, safety and information exchanges", Working Paper No. 278 of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (Canberra; ANU, 1993).

11 The author, as a special member of the United States delegation, participated in all of the Middle East maritime negotiations and was particularly involved with negotiation of the INCSEA text.



The 1990s: the Decade for Confidence-building Measures

Michael Krepon

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have played an essential role in improving East-West relations. Nevertheless, these unilateral, tacit or negotiated steps to improve cooperation or decrease tension were the forgotten stepchild of the cold war, always taking a back seat to formal arms control negotiations. Now with the end of the United States–Soviet rivalry, CBMs are emerging from the shadows of strategic arms reductions to become the pre-eminent means of preventing accidental wars and unintended escalation in strife-ridden regions.

The East-West experience

Beginning with the establishment of the "hot line" after the Cuban missile crisis, the East-West CBM toolbox grew to include agreed rules for super-Power navies operating in close proximity and data exchanges on military equipment and force deployments. The West made a concerted effort not only to negotiate CBMs in the military-security area, but also to develop other "baskets" of measures to promote economic and cultural exchanges as well as respect for human rights.

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One of the most important breakthroughs in United States–Soviet relations—an agreement to accept mandatory on-site inspections—was first negotiated in Stockholm in 1986 to ease concerns arising from large-scale military exercises. Important new measures were added to the toolbox once the cold war began to thaw, such as the acceptance of cooperative aerial inspections or "open skies", observations within military garrisons, and the creation of a crisis prevention centre. Today there are literally dozens of CBMs to ease East-West security concerns that can now be used to establish new patterns of cooperation between old adversaries.

Nonetheless, nuclear arms control negotiations took centre stage during the cold war as both sides invested those weapons with symbolic power to match their destructive potential. The strategic arms limitation and reduction talks became, paradoxically, a reflection of the strategic competition and a means to ameliorate it. In conflict-prone regions like South Asia and the Middle East, CBMs assume that dual role. In the absence of political reconciliation in those tense regions, the negotiation and implementation of CBMs have been critical in maintaining the peace and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The East-West experience presents the most fully developed model for CBMs. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act formally recognized the status quo in Europe and facilitated a process of interaction between East and West, including the inviting of observers to military exercises on a voluntary basis. The 1986 Stockholm Document mandated such inspections, in addition to requiring an annual calendar of *notifiable* military activities. The 1990 Vienna Document considerably broadened data exchanges, including detailed information on force deployment, major weapons programmes, and military budgets.[1] The 1992 Vienna agreement added another level of

transparency by requiring demonstrations of new types of military equipment.

In the East-West struggle, CBMs facilitated the negotiation of formal arms control agreements and provided strengthening measures for existing accords. Their continuing utility stems, in part, from their adaptability. CBMs can be a growth industry in the 1990s because they are flexible instruments that allow national leaders to adapt to a radically transformed security environment.

A post–cold war growth industry

After every major war, perverse problems and heady opportunities present themselves in strange and variable mixtures. Those conditions have reappeared with the end of the cold war. Entropic forces coexist alongside integrative trends in economics and communications, while blood feuds proceed concurrently with democratic and market reforms. Under these confusing circumstances, political leaders would do well to accentuate the positive and guard against the negative. CBMs will become increasingly employed in many regions for precisely those reasons: they are well suited to consolidate gains while providing buffers against losses.

Once in place, CBMs can readily accommodate changed circumstances, as is most evident by the Open Skies Treaty.[2] Negotiated to increase transparency in a region divided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact alliances, cooperative aerial inspections can now be employed to alleviate security concerns between Russia and Ukraine and to dampen the potential for ethnic conflict between Hungary and Romania.

CBMs will also be a growth industry in the 1990s because they are easier to negotiate and implement than formal arms control agreements. CBMs can be tacit and informal, such as the general understandings between Israel

and Jordan to cooperate in combating terrorist incidents across the Jordan river, including the establishment of a hot line in 1975 between those nations' intelligence services, the Mossad and the Mukhbarat. Alternatively, CBMs can be quite specific but publicly unannounced, such as the existing agreements between India and Pakistan establishing ground rules for military exercises and aerial operations along their border.

Formal but private CBMs are also employed in the Middle East, where the United States routinely carries out aerial monitoring of the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement. In those operations, blessed by the States over-flown and code-named Olive Harvest, the United States confirms compliance with agreed-upon thin-out zones for military equipment and personnel. Many CBMs, however, are a matter of record, such as the agreement between Argentina and Brazil to permit international inspections of their nuclear facilities.[3]

As those examples suggest, CBMs are already a world-wide phenomenon, as national leaders far removed from the East-West conflict have begun to adapt old CBMs and design new measures for their own purposes. Those leaders understand that CBMs cannot be transposed mindlessly from Europe to other regions of the globe. Nonetheless, adaptation is possible because concerns raised during the cold war over border security, surprise attack, accidental war, and unintended escalation are felt in many regions.

During the Spring of 1990, for example, tensions were fuelled by large-scale violence in Kashmir, supported by Pakistan. The Indian Government moved troops into Kashmir to contain disturbances, but the Indian Army's Chief of Staff, General V. N. Sharma, kept his tank deployments behind the Indira Gandhi Canal so as to signal an intention not to cross the Pakistani border. Moreover, to clarify their peaceful intentions, both countries allowed United States observers to

monitor force deployments. For its part, Pakistan had permitted foreign defence attachés based in Islamabad to observe its 1989 Zarb-e-Momin exercises.

East Asian countries have also laid a strong foundation of CBMs. With the 1967 creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the commencement of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, multilateral institutions provide reassurance and improve security in the region. A variety of formal bilateral maritime-based CBMs, such as the Japanese-Russian Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), and informal mechanisms, such as military-to-military discussions between Japan and China or joint surveillance of the Timor Gap by Australia and Indonesia, have also taken root in the region.

The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea have negotiated an extremely ambitious CBM agenda including security, political, and trade-related measures. Implementation has been poor, however, as long as political conditions in the former are inhospitable to far-reaching transparency and reconciliation. Even in Central America, an area beset during the 1980s with internal conflicts and border friction, a five-nation security commission has begun to discuss region-wide CBMs. The Organization of American States (OAS) has recently created a special committee on hemispheric security which is investigating CBMs.

That brief sampling of CBMs suggests many shortfalls and halting steps, but is nonetheless impressive for its regional diversity and creativity. More and more political and military leaders are turning to those tools to prevent conflict, to provide indications and warning of troubling developments, to negotiate peace agreements, and to strengthen fragile accords.

Stage one: conflict avoidance

Negotiating and implementing CBMs require political will, but only modest amounts of capital need be expended to get the process started. Even in regions of considerable tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, useful initiatives have been taken despite the inability or reluctance of national leaders to resolve fundamental differences. Those steps have met the minimal requirements of not worsening any State's security and not increasing existing levels of hostility. No matter how serious outstanding grievances are, wise national leaders wish to avoid inadvertent escalation or accidental war.

The initial steps, like the establishment of hot lines between Indian and Pakistani sector commanders along the line of control in Kashmir, and between Indian and Chinese sector commanders along their disputed border, cannot solve underlying political and territorial disputes. Nevertheless, if precursor steps help to prevent a full-blown crisis they can still have enormous worth. The implementation of those measures can serve as an essential safety net against explosive developments, such as the destruction of religious shrines, urban acts of terror, and increased levels of violence in disputed territories.

Perhaps it is best to characterize initial steps to avoid unwanted wars and unintended escalation as conflict-avoidance measures (CAMs) rather than CBMs.[4] One such measure is the 1992 agreement between India and Pakistan to provide prior notification of military exercises involving more than ten thousand troops and the establishment of no-fly zones along their border. By opening channels of communication and providing a modest degree of transparency in selected military practices, those small tests of trust may also lay the groundwork for more substantive measures later on, if the

agreements are implemented properly and if political leaders are amenable to subsequent steps.

Conflict avoidance measures can be taken even when States have not established diplomatic relations, as attested to by the Israeli-Syrian aerial monitoring agreements along the Golan Heights. Conflict avoidance measures could include unpublicized "red lines" that are likely to trigger vigorous responses if crossed by outside military forces. Israel, for example, has drawn a red line for Syrian troops within Lebanon that Damascus has respected. Amman benefits from a similar Israeli red line for foreign troops crossing Jordanian borders.

Another conflict-avoidance measure, employed between Israel and Egypt, is the acceptance, with six hours' advance notification, of national aerial reconnaissance flights along the median line of the buffer zone separating Israeli and Egyptian troops in the Sinai peninsula. That practice, mediated by the United States in the 1974 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, established a framework for cooperative aerial inspections between once hostile States.

Not every first step needs to relate directly to conflict prevention. When government-to-government communication channels become a forum for ritualized grievances and rebuttals or when such channels are completely absent, non-governmental meetings can help to stimulate problem-solving approaches while combating enemy images. The "Dartmouth Group" meetings between American and Soviet experts served those purposes at the height of the cold war. A similar body, the "Neemrana Group" (named after a fort in Rajasthan), composed of Indian and Pakistani former officials and non-governmental experts, has been meeting regularly since 1991. Meetings among non-governmental organizations in East Asia played a key role in promoting security dialogues within ASEAN.

One reason to implement CAMs is to provide a cooling-off period after wars or periods of high tension. "Buying time" is neutral, however. Cooling-off periods can be used to prepare for new wars, to conduct diplomatic activity towards conflict resolution, or simply to freeze a conflictual situation, such as the cease-fire arrangements for the Turkish-Greek impasse over Cyprus. CBMs are not value-neutral: they will always be shaped by the motivation of national leaders.

As a result, fears will arise that initial steps may be a Trojan horse or the extension of a deadly strategic competition by other means. If that perception—whether real or imagined—is strongly felt, first steps will be halting, at best. In this way, the process of negotiating and implementing CBMs is self-regulating: if initial steps do not have proven worth, they will not readily be followed by others.

In South Asia, some fear that negotiating security-related CBMs will place national leaders on a dangerous "slippery slope" leading to membership in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. But leaders will always retain a veto power over the process: only those measures will be implemented that serve the interests of all participating States. The existing level of tension in South Asia has provided the most compelling reason to start that process, even though grievances over Kashmir clearly limit the extent of progress.

To get the process started, initial steps can be designed specifically to provide early indications and warning of hostile intentions. Measures that mandate annual calendars of military exercises or limits on their size and proximity to sensitive regions can be particularly useful in addressing domestic misgivings because they clearly promote national security. When agreed guidelines were not observed, a greater alert status would be warranted, and domestic advocates for more trusting arrangements would be weakened.

A building-block approach to CBMs is more appropriate in tense regions where little foundation for trust exists. Ambitious first steps, such as the comprehensive CBM agreements between the two Koreas, will face serious implementation problems, with no track record to alleviate distrust and no safety net to cushion failure.

The motivations behind the negotiation of initial steps need not be in concert as long as they are not implacably hostile. Nor do States require equivalent or balanced military capabilities to take initial steps, as the CBMs between Israel and Jordan or the Open Skies Treaty overflights suggest. All that is required is for the parties to see separate value in the particular steps chosen and for those steps not to intensify existing levels of hostility. If the parties view CBMs as a zero-sum game, negotiations will fail.

Integrated approaches that combine initiatives in the economic, political, humanitarian, cultural, and military realms are an ideal approach. In the East-West negotiations the creation of separate baskets facilitated trade-offs: at the outset of negotiations, the East hoped for economic gains and the West wanted improved records on human rights. Over time, both blocs came to see the value of security measures. That matrix proved a good fit.

A similar negotiating strategy has obvious limitations in other regions of tension. In the Middle East, for example, linkages between baskets is stymied by the lack of diplomatic relations between Israel and most of its neighbours. India and Pakistan have also confined their initial steps to conflict prevention, with the important exception of the 1962 Indus Waters Treaty brokered by the World Bank, which provides a cooperative structure for the sharing and use of the subcontinent's northwestern river waters that were disputed after partition in 1947. With the exception of the Korean peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region does not face the dilemma of how to

construct CAMs amid high levels of tension. Instead, the primary task within that diverse region appears to be that of preventing security concerns from escalating into conflicts. Economic growth and increased trade can provide a positive context for the establishment of conflict-prevention measures—if political leaders in the Asia-Pacific region are so inclined.

Stage two: confidence-building

Simply put, negotiating conflict-avoidance measures takes political will, but not in large measure, since prudent national leaders will wish to avoid unnecessary wars. The second stage of that process is far more difficult, as it requires traversing the critical passage from conflict-avoidance to confidence-building. Far more political capital is required to reach that higher plane when States have deep-seated grievances or core issues to resolve. The South Asian dispute is stuck here, between war and peace, awaiting national leaders willing and able to take politically risky initiatives toward reconciliation. The Arab-Israeli dispute is currently traversing that heavily-mined terrain.

In both regions, the building blocks for CBMs are in place, but more far-reaching measures have been held hostage to progress on core issues. In the Arab-Israeli dispute, demilitarized and thin-out zones along Israel's borders with Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic have been in place for two decades. Multinational peacekeepers effectively monitor buffer zones, and cooperative aerial inspections provide indications and warning of troubling developments. As a result, Arab and Israeli peace negotiators can argue that accidental war is no longer a great concern.

With the signing of the Israeli-PLO peace treaty in 1994, countries in the Middle East now face the test of moving towards true confidence-building. Israel would like to negoti-

ate CBMs, in part because of the uncertainties associated with territorial withdrawal. Arab leaders have expressed the view that CBMs are entirely negotiable, once Israel has agreed to tackle core political issues and swap land for peace.

In South Asia, the transition phase from conflict avoidance to confidence-building is even more difficult. To begin with, CAMs are far less sturdy and their implementation has been spotty. Moreover, an active negotiating channel still does not exist to address Pakistan's grievances over the status of Kashmir and its Muslim population, and India's central grievances over Pakistan's support of separatist groups. Both Governments are leery of taking any steps that can be viewed as conciliatory—and politically damaging in the face of continuing provocations.

As a result of lingering grievances, India and Pakistan are not yet ready to adopt an unequivocal "live-and-let-live" policy towards one another. Each continues to jab at the other's soft spots while avoiding open warfare. As a result, partial steps have been taken to decrease the probability of unintended escalation, but that foundation for CBMs remains unfinished, and new construction has stopped after the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu chauvinists, the bombings in Bombay apparently coordinated by Muslim criminal elements, and continuing high levels of violence in Kashmir initiated principally by Indian security forces but also by separatist militants.

In the light of those developments, Pakistan has deferred implementation of agreements negotiated with India in 1991 to exchange military bands and to conduct joint mountaineering expeditions and naval sailing races. Such measures are now considered cosmetic and damaging politically by Pakistani officials and high-ranking military officers. In contrast, Brigadier General Dilber Naqvi, the director of operations and intelligence on the Pakistani Joint Staff,

asserted in an interview that the value of CAMs was "beyond question".

Interviews with Indian Government officials suggest similar political constraints to the negotiation of CBMs for reconciliation at this time. As the former Indian director general of military operations, Lieutenant General V.R. Raghavan, said in an interview, "As long as we are exchanging fire every day, there can be no CBMs". With the existing level of violence in Kashmir, cautious national leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad can use existing CAMs to contain explosions, but not as a springboard towards political reconciliation.

The current situation in other parts of the Asia-Pacific region seems ripe for further CBM negotiation. Unlike Europe or Latin America, much of the Asia-Pacific region does not have the habit of formal multilateral security cooperation. Potential conflict areas include territorial claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, border disputes between China and Viet Nam, and defence modernization programmes spurred by rapid economic growth in the region. Since the seas connect the far reaches of the Asia-Pacific region, and since the seas can also become a medium of conflict, maritime CBMs appear to merit special attention. Yet clearly there are benefits to be derived from confidence-building in all spheres of military activity.

Within the region, Australia has broken important ground by unilaterally committing itself to open military exercises for international inspections, to prepare a calendar of military exercises, and to publish defence papers. Malaysia has proposed a regional arms register to collect information not just on arms transfers, but also on current holdings and financial terms of sale. At a time of reduced tensions, the negotiation and implementation of such CBMs by other States can build a firm foundation for future cooperation in the region. It is particularly important for China to join its

neighbours by embracing increased transparency in its defence programmes and policies.

CBMs can become vital companions to peacemaking, but not substitute for it in regions of great tension. Indeed, without CBMs, including the good offices of a trusted third party, politically risky peacemaking efforts can easily fail. Many measures are available to facilitate the transition to confidence-building when political conditions permit. Those CBMs might build upon precursor steps, such as formally acknowledging tacit understandings already in place or resolving border disputes that are not central to national security.

The forms adopted for CBMs can be as important as their substance. The transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building can be symbolized by the acceptance of foreign military observers at pre-notified exercises. If that transition is too difficult to accomplish in one step, third parties can be usefully engaged, including multinational inspection teams composed of representatives from adversarial States.

Security measures are absolutely essential during the transition stage, but true peacemaking also requires CBMs in the commercial, humanitarian, and cultural areas. The objectives at that stage are to establish new patterns of interaction that will become perceived as beneficial within participating States, and to make those patterns harder to reverse when perturbations occur.

The process of transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building is obviously easier if there are no core issues blocking the way. Domestic impediments that have prevented progress will still have to be surmounted, however. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, it is noteworthy that CBMs on nuclear programmes were undertaken only after fledgling democracies were in place in both Governments, which were

committed to devoting greater resources to economic development. Even without deep-seated grievances, both countries were unable to agree to transparency measures under military-dominated Governments.

Risk-taking for peace

The stakes involved in the United States–Soviet competition ensured a far more perilous transition from conflict avoidance to conflict resolution. Mikhail Gorbachev successfully challenged Washington to move beyond cold-war thinking with powerful symbolic gestures and public declarations, such as his frank acknowledgment that the Krasnoyarsk radar constituted a violation of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was a risk-taker of similar stature. His trip to Jerusalem utterly recast Israeli-Egyptian relations, despite the hard-nosed content of his speech before the Israeli Knesset. President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolized his intention to close down the Brazilian military's nuclear weapons programme by flying to the Amazon and shoveling dirt into a deep shaft originally dug for the purpose of carrying out an underground nuclear test.

Significantly, the symbolic gestures and transformational journeys of Sadat and of Collor de Mello did not occur in a vacuum; they were preceded by useful conflict avoidance measures. In the United States–Soviet competition, precursor CBMs, such as the hot line and the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, helped to prevent unintended escalation until Gorbachev was willing to change ingrained habits of super-Power hostility. Sadat's initiatives were facilitated by an impressive set of conflict-avoidance measures brokered after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war by the Nixon administration.

In each of those cases, the groundwork for CBMs was different in important respects. In the East-West competition

the precipitous decline in the Soviet economy appears to have been critical to Gorbachev's calculations. In the Middle East, Sadat earned freedom of manoeuvre by waging war against Israeli occupation of Egyptian land. In the Southern Cone, discredited military regimes allowed fledgling democracies to break new ground. Comparative studies of those and other transitions from conflict avoidance to confidence-building are essential in order to understand better the dynamics of transformation.

Active and farsighted leadership is required when the risks associated with political reconciliation are great. When security issues weigh heavily in that transition, conflict-avoidance measures provide an essential safety net for peacemaking. The implementation of those prior steps was intrinsically valuable and absolutely essential for the transition to confidence-building in United States–Soviet relations and in the Israeli-Egyptian peace process. Conversely, in regions where building blocks to CBMs have yet to be implemented, such as the Korean peninsula, the process remains stuck.

Conflict avoidance measures are also a necessary precondition to confidence-building because setbacks will inevitably occur during peacemaking. The process of political reconciliation will energize opposing forces, and opposing forces in tense regions often resort to violent means. Precursor steps can help to contain the damage and make setbacks less severe and long-lasting.

Just as important, conflict avoidance measures can have a trampoline effect if and when peacemaking takes hold, allowing leaders to elevate political relations onto a higher plane. The transition from cold war to unsettled peace in United States–Soviet and Israeli-Egyptian relations came remarkably fast, considering the distances travelled. The rate of transformation was accelerated, in part, by channels of

communication and patterns of cooperative behaviour developed through precursor steps.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Anwar Sadat received international acclaim for their risk-taking strategies, but both paid a heavy price for their leadership. Nor did President Collor de Mello fare well, despite his path-breaking efforts. Does the fate of those national leaders suggest that future risk-takers will be deterred from peacemaking and confidence-building?

A careful assessment of cause and effect is warranted here. The downfall of Collor de Mello was due to personal corruption, not CBMs. On the other hand, Argentine President Carlos Menem has been well served by his efforts to strengthen Argentine-Brazilian cooperation. Sadat's death can clearly be tied to his efforts at political reconciliation, which were widely opposed within Egypt as well as by the Arab world. A decade later, however, his framework for peace with Israel has resulted in a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. As a result, a renewed appreciation of Sadat is evident among Egyptian elites; his place in history is already secure outside the region.

Evaluations of Gorbachev's downfall will continue for decades. Most assessments are likely to focus on the bankruptcy of the Soviet economy and Communist party leadership and the poverty of communism as an ideology. The Stockholm accord and other CBMs may have accelerated the demise of a surprisingly brittle system, but so, too, did bloated United States and Soviet defence spending, the Kremlin's disastrous decision to intervene in Afghanistan, and a dozen other factors. As such, it is wildly inappropriate to credit or blame CBMs for Gorbachev's failure and that of the Soviet system.

What, then, can be said of the political fortunes of those who wanted to make the transition from conflict

avoidance to confidence-building? Only that the biggest risk-takers lost the most in the near term, and will probably gain the most recognition and appreciation over time. Clearly, the negotiation of CBMs to accompany peacemaking can be the source of lasting credit, regardless of other leadership failures.

Few national leaders, however, are willing to tackle peacemaking in extraordinarily bold steps. A safer strategy is to employ smaller tests of trust—a process perfectly suited to CBMs. That process is obviously easier when there are no core issues in dispute, as in the Argentine-Brazilian case. Still, in that case, as in the United States–Soviet and Israeli-Egyptian cases, breakthroughs were accomplished only after earlier tests of trust had been passed.

Every case of risk-taking for confidence-building and peacemaking is unique. Some national leaders may well be deterred from embarking on that path because their security problems are not ripe for solution, or because they lack domestic support, personal courage or regional standing. There simply are no substitutes for the political will and the political base to assume the risks associated with the transition from conflict-avoidance to confidence-building.

Occasionally, heroic efforts are called for, but true heroes at the presidential or prime ministerial level are a rare breed. Extremely tough decisions are unavoidable, however, when confidence-building must proceed parallel with peacemaking, as is the case in the Middle East. Progress on the CBM front is also painfully slow in South Asia, where there is still no active negotiating track to deal with core issues. Fortunately, most national leaders face less daunting challenges when negotiating CBMs.

Stage three: strengthening the peace

If formidable hurdles can be surmounted to avoid war and then to negotiate a fragile peace, national leaders can continue to employ CBMs to strengthen the peace. Objectives at that stage of the process include broadening and deepening existing patterns of cooperation and making positive developments as irreversible as possible. The creation of properly functioning institutions to develop trade and cultural exchanges can be particularly helpful.

A number of security-related CBMs can also be usefully employed. Peace-strengthening measures might include constraints on the size and location of military exercises. Highly intrusive transparency measures, such as agreements to permit virtually unrestricted open skies and short-notice observations within military garrisons, could demonstrate non-hostile intent.

One way to measure progress in normalizing relations is to monitor the nature and number of exchanges between formerly hostile States. In 1992 the Israeli Government of Yitzhak Rabin made a significant gesture to Cairo by returning archaeological objects collected by Moshe Dayan in the Sinai. United States and Russian exchanges are now routinely carried out at nuclear-weapon laboratories and bases. In contrast, India and Pakistan have almost no contact at official levels. They have agreed in principle to a regular exchange of military officers at each other's national defence colleges, but implementation has been held up for political reasons. China and India have made considerable progress in that sphere. High-level exchanges between governmental officials and military leaders have been routinized, as one would expect between States that are in the process of reducing tension and thinning out forces along their disputed border.

CBMs: a tool for security in the nineties

Confidence-building measures are pragmatic steps towards ideal objectives. Those steps will necessarily be small at the outset if serious grievances must be bridged. A broad CBM negotiating framework that facilitates linkages and trade-offs is advisable, but when central security concerns are at issue, and when States have powerful military establishments, military-related steps tend to dominate at the outset. Ultimately, however, success in negotiating CBMs in the military sphere will depend on multiple initiatives in the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian realms.

The process naturally begins by identifying shared interests and developing an ethos of cooperation over time. CBMs can be molded to fit multiple needs, ranging from avoiding unintended escalation to making new wars unthinkable. An evolutionary step-by-step approach seems to work best, at least until core security issues must be tackled. It makes sense to start the process modestly, with steps that will be perceived widely as successful, not with suggestions that would lessen a nation's ability to defend itself. A successful CBM process can be encouraged with follow-up meetings, review conferences, and other techniques to institutionalize patterns of cooperation.

CBMs are like motherhood, apple pie, hummus, falafel, pakora, and kebab. They do not generate reflexive opposition except among those ideologically opposed to tension reduction. CBMs naturally commend themselves to national leaders who are both risk-averse and risk-takers.

A successful CBM process involves creating a framework of principles, values and objectives that will govern foreign relations. Building blocks can be symbolic as well as substantive. After all, when Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev declared that a nuclear war must never be fought and could never be won, they changed nothing and

everything: while targeting plans remained constant after their declaration, the status of nuclear theologians on both sides began to plummet. The importance of symbolic gestures in confidence-building cannot be underestimated.

The record to date suggests that the decade of the 1990s can be a time of considerable progress for CBMs. Those steps cannot resolve blood feuds like those under way in the former Yugoslavia, but they can help States in South Asia, the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to avoid new explosions. Existing conflict-avoidance measures are fragile between India and Pakistan. Strengthening measures might be especially useful for large-scale military exercises, which led to tense confrontations in 1987 and 1990. In the Middle East, it will take little imagination to devise CBMs to facilitate peacemaking, if only national leaders can be persuaded to take bold steps. In the Southern Cone, CBMs can help democratic Governments consolidate recent gains.

CBMs could also be usefully employed to avoid conflict and reduce tensions in the former Soviet Union, Africa, South-east Asia, and other regions well suited for missionary work of this kind. In short, CBMs are an ideal tool for the 1990s, a decade of great opportunity as well as of great potential for backsliding. It makes sense to promote CBMs in regions of tension and to call attention to the East-West experience, not as a blueprint, but to stimulate problem-solving approaches. Outsiders can provide useful help and general guidelines, but the heavy lifting must come from within regions of tension.

Notes

1 Circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1070). The text is reproduced in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, appendix III.

2 The text of the Open Skies Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX), vol. 2.

3 On 4 March 1994, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA, signed in 1991, entered into force. Subsequently, in February 1995, Argentina acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

4 The author is grateful to Peter Constable for suggesting this term.

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Disarmament and Stability on the Korean Peninsula

A Perspective from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

So Chang Sik

With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, one military bloc became dominant. The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has intensified its role. The process of confidence-building, security and disarmament in Europe was thrown off balance, giving way to intra-national and ethnic conflicts. This is clear proof that nowhere on the planet is there an exemplary regime for confidence-building and security.

Peace, security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region

The Asia-Pacific region, still burdened with the legacy of the cold war, constitutes a threat to international peace, security and disarmament, owing to the actions of

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certain States poised to fill the power vacuum created in the post–cold war period.

In recent years, as the economy of the Asia-Pacific region has developed rapidly and its strategic importance has been recognized, powerful countries, supported by their own military strength, have been pursuing policies of domination and hegemony there. Hence military confrontation and the intensification of arms races between countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Another reason for the lack of peace, security and disarmament is the continuation of unjustifiable political and military pressure and threats.

Each country pursues its own interests rather than trying to solve conflicts with its neighbours in a mutually beneficial way. The current situation proves that it is possible to promote regional disarmament and security only after bilateral confidence has been established. As long as one nation is afraid of being victimized by another, confidence cannot be established and, peace, security and disarmament cannot be realized.

Confidence-building starts with dialogue and negotiation, a process that the present situation on the Korean peninsula clearly calls for.

Present situation in the DPRK

Today our people are grieving deeply over the unexpected passing, in July 1994, of the Great Leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, whom they hold in higher esteem than any other figure in the 5,000-year history of the nation. They grieve for the loss of their fatherly Leader, who devoted his life to their freedom and liberation, to the prosperity and development of the country and to world peace. We firmly believe that our respected and beloved Leader will always be with us.

Our people could not have transformed their loss into strength and courage had it not been for another Great Leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il, who has been wisely directing the general work of the party, State and army for some time.

Things are going well in the DPRK because the Dear Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il is inheriting what the Great Leader worked for during his lifetime.

Confidence-building: the key to peace, security and disarmament

The DPRK–United States Agreed Framework

Implementation of the DPRK–United States Agreed Framework is the means at present for establishing confidence and paving the way for peace, security and disarmament on the Korean peninsula.[1]

On 16 June 1994, shortly before his death, Comrade Kim Il Sung met with former United States President Jimmy Carter, who was on a visit to the DPRK, and clarified our position, that the nuclear issue could be resolved through dialogue and negotiations between the DPRK and the United States; confidence-building between both countries was the main approach.

Our Government, honouring the will of the Great Leader, concluded the DPRK–United States talks, which had lasted about a year and half, by adopting the historic DPRK–United States Agreed Framework in October 1994. The adoption is of great significance for giving impetus to peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula and to building peace and security in Asia and the world. The Agreed Framework is an historic document, guaranteed by the two Heads of State, and marks a turning-point in the resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and in the development of the DPRK–United States relations.

If the Agreed Framework is implemented, hostile relations between the two countries will come to an end, finally leading the way towards confidence, a full resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, and the denuclearization of that area.

The DPRK Government is making every sincere effort to implement the Agreed Framework. Some forces, however, are spreading rumours which could have a negative impact on implementation and are an attempt to aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula and to disturb the smooth implementation of the Agreed Framework, which has entered a new stage. Implementation must be encouraged rather than complicated if the nuclear issue here is to be resolved.

A new peace agreement

A new peace agreement between the DPRK and the United States would be the principal means of building confidence and defusing tension. It would replace the Korean Armistice Agreement. The Korean peninsula urgently requires legally binding assurances for solid peace.

The Armistice Agreement, as the name implies, is an agreement to enforce a temporary cease-fire, and its implementation mechanism is a supervisory body. The Government of the DPRK proposed 20 years ago that the Armistice Agreement be replaced with a peace agreement, and in April 1994 it renewed that proposal.

The work to build a framework for peace and security on the Korean peninsula through negotiation is already under way with the withdrawal of the Korea-China representation—one side of the signatories of the Military Armistice Commission—and the opening of the representative office of the Korean People's Army, in Panmunjom.

If the new peace arrangement is established, peace and security in this region will be legally assured, since the

North and South confirmed their commitment to non-aggression in 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and South.[2]

Reunification

Reunification of the country is the cornerstone for building confidence, peace, security and disarmament on the Korean peninsula. Last year, President Kim Il Sung took steps that opened up a new phase in efforts towards reunification. The tireless efforts of the respected Leader were geared to the reunification of the motherland and to transforming confrontation into dialogue and negotiation.

Those efforts filled the nation with hopes for reunification. The South Korean authorities, however, took action against the nation and reunification by pointing their weapons at the hearts of their fellow countrymen and taking the road towards a fascist crack-down during the period of mourning for the Great Leader, instead of expressing their condolences as a partner in the reunification dialogue and as a part of the Korean nation.

The policies of our Government are consistent. We maintain the principles of independent and peaceful reunification in great national unity, as set forth by the Great Leader during his lifetime.

The "Ten-Point Programme of Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country", advanced by the Great Leader in April 1993, constituted a guideline for putting an end to 50 years of division and confrontation. (See Annex for the text of the Ten-Point Programme.) It stipulates that a unified State should be established which would represent all political parties, social organizations and individuals from all walks of life, and would leave intact the existing two systems and two Governments. Furthermore, it is made

clear that the unified State—a confederal Government equally represented by the regional Governments of the North and South—should be an independent, peaceful and non-aligned neutral State.

If the pan-national State based on confederation is established, security issues on the Korean peninsula, such as denuclearization and disarmament, will be resolved as a matter of course. Development of a North-South dialogue would be one of the essential elements in achieving reunification. The main obstacles to the opening of humanitarian exchanges, dialogue and contacts are the existence of the "National Security Law" of South Korea, which labels the members of the same nation as an "enemy", and the concrete walls, symbols of division and confrontation. Therefore, all legal and physical barriers should be removed as soon as possible in order to achieve free contacts, exchange and cooperation between the North and South and to bring about great national unity.

Notes

1 The text of the Agreed Framework was reproduced in *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*, vol. XVII, No. 2 (1994).

2 The text of the Agreement is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 2 (1992). It was also circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1147). The Agreement came into effect on 19 February 1992.

Annex

Ten-Point Programme on the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country

To put an end to the nearly half a century of division and confrontation and reunify the country is the unanimous demand and desire of the whole nation. For the independent and peaceful reunification of the country it is necessary to achieve the great unity of the whole nation. All those who are concerned about the destiny of the nation—whether they be in the North, or in the South, or overseas, and whether they be communists, or nationalists, rich, or poor, artists, or believers—must unite as one nation, transcending all their differences, and together pave the way for national reunification.

Those with strength devoting their strength, those with knowledge giving their knowledge and those with money donating their money, all should make a tangible contribution to the reunification of the country and development and prosperity of a reunified land, thus putting an end to national division and displaying the dignity and honour of the reunited 70 million fellow countrymen to the world.

1. A unified State independent, peaceful and neutral, should be founded through the unity of the whole nation.

The North and South should found a pan-national unified State to represent all parties, all groups and all the members of the nation from all walks of life, while leaving the existing two systems and two governments intact. The pan-national unified State should be a confederal State in which the two regional governments of the North and the South are represented equally, and an independent, peaceful

and non-aligned neutral State which is not aligned with any great Power.

2. Unity should be based on patriotism and the spirit of national independence.

All the members of the nation link their individual destiny with that of the nation, love their nation passionately and unite with the single desire to defend the independence of the nation. They should display dignity and pride in being members of our nation and reject sycophancy and national nihilism that erode the nation's consciousness of independence.

3. Unity should be achieved on the principle of promoting co-existence, co-prosperity and common interests and subordinating everything to the cause of national reunification.

The North and South should recognize and respect the existence of different beliefs, ideas and systems, and achieve joint progress and prosperity, with neither side encroaching on the other. They should promote the interests of the whole nation before regional class interests and direct every effort to the accomplishment of the cause of national reunification.

4. All political disputes that foment division and confrontation between fellow countrymen should be ended and unity should be achieved.

The North and South should refrain from seeking or fomenting confrontation, end all political disputes between them and stop abusing and slandering each other. As fellow countrymen they should not be hostile to each other and, through the united efforts of the nation, they should counter foreign aggression and interference.

5. Fear of invasion from both South and North and the ideas of prevailing over communism and of communization should be dispelled, and North and South should believe in each other and unite.

The North and the South should not threaten and invade each other. Neither side should try to force its systems on the other or to absorb the other.

6. The North and South should value democracy and join hands on the road to national reunification, without rejecting each other, because of differences in ideals and principles.

They should guarantee the freedom of debate on and of activities for reunification and should not suppress, take reprisals against, persecute or punish political opponents. They should not arrest anyone because of their pro-North or pro-South tendencies and should release and reinstate all political prisoners so that they may contribute to the cause of national reunification.

7. The North and South should protect the material and spiritual wealth of individuals and organizations and encourage their use for the promotion of great national unity.

Both before reunification and after it they should recognize State ownership, co-operative ownership and private ownership and protect the capital and prosperity of individuals and organizations, as well as all interests concerned with foreign capital. They should recognize the social reputation and qualifications of individuals in all domains including science, education, literature, the arts, public debate, the press, health care and sports, and continue to guarantee the benefits granted to people who have performed meritorious services.

8. Understanding, trust and unity should be built up across the nation through contact, exchange visits and dialogue.

All the obstacles to contact and exchange visits should be removed and the door should be opened for everyone without discrimination to undertake exchange visits.

All the parties, groupings and people of all social standings should be given equal opportunities to conduct dialogue, and bilateral and multilateral dialogue should be developed.

9. The whole nation, North, South and overseas, should strengthen its solidarity for the sake of national reunification.

Things beneficial to national reunification should be supported and encouraged in an unbiased manner and things harmful to it should be rejected in the North, in the South and overseas, and all should assist and cooperate with one another, going beyond their own narrow enclosure. All political parties, organizations and the people from all walks of life in the North, in the South and overseas should be allied organizationally in the patriotic work to achieve national reunification.

10. Those who have contributed to the great unity of the nation and to the cause of national reunification should be honoured.

Special favours should be granted to those who have performed exploits for the sake of the great unity of the nation and the reunification of the country, to patriotic martyrs and to their descendants. If those who had turned their back on the nation in the past return to the patriotic road, repentant of their past, they should be dealt with leniently and assessed fairly according to the contribution they have made to the cause of national reunification.

(Ed. Note: Text has been reproduced as presented by the author.)

A Perspective from the Republic of Korea

Seo-Hang Lee

The Korean peninsula is a region where arms control and confidence-building measures are badly needed.[1] From 1950 to 1953, Korea experienced a devastating war, and ever since then the arms race between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has continued without any sign of easing. Currently, the peninsula is one of the few areas of acute military confrontation in the world. Along the 155-mile demarcation line dividing the South and the North, about one and a half million heavily armed soldiers confront each other (Table 1). In that situation, there is an urgent need in the peninsula for arms control on a bilateral basis. This need can be explored from four major perspectives.

The need for arms control

First, it is imperative to actualize arms control in order to establish a solid peace system and ultimately to achieve the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. A peace system without any military confidence-building measures or any arms reduction between the South and the North would be unstable. Since the legacy of the Korean War still remains, and intense military confrontation exists along the Demilitarized

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Zone, there are real dangers of renewed armed conflict. The sheer size of the forces arrayed on both sides—a million in the North and 650,000 in the South—is dangerous enough. This military concentration along the demarcation line raises the risk of an impulsive reaction in tense times. The recent downing of a United States helicopter that strayed into North Korea's airspace showed how easily shooting could begin on the Korean peninsula.[2] In those circumstances, nothing is more important than preventing renewed conflict from occurring and establishing a solid peace structure. Arms control will prevent movement towards a South-North war and will enhance military stability.

Second, arms control is needed to release resources for economic development as a long-term strategy for the prosperity of the Korean peninsula. The division of the peninsula and the continued arms race between the two Koreas have brought about a serious security dilemma whereby the more defensive measures one party adopts to increase its sense of security, the more insecure the other party feels. The latter then takes additional measures of its own, which causes the former to take more measures, and so on. That security dilemma has not only undermined political and military stability on the Korean peninsula, but has also adversely affected economic development. There is a need to reduce the military share of the gross national product (GNP) and to enhance the economic well-being of the Korean people.

Third, arms control is needed to overcome the cold war legacy on the peninsula and to contribute to the stability of the North-East Asian region as a whole. The end of the cold war has greatly improved the security climate in the region—the immense ideological barrier that gave rise to

Table 1. Military Capability of ROK and DPRK

Classification		ROK	DPRK
Troops	Army	540,000	1,000,000
	Navy	60,000	46,000
	Air Force	55,000	82,000
	Total	655,000	1,128,000
Ground Force			
Unit	Corps	11	16
	Divisions	50	53
	Brigades	21	99
Equipment	Tanks	1,950	3,800
	Armored vehicles	2,100	2,500
	Field Artillery	4,600	10,800
Naval Force			
	Force Combatants	190	434
	Support vessels	60	310
	Submarines	2	26
Air Force			
	Tactical aircraft	520	850
	Support aircraft	190	480
	Helicopters	620	290

Source: Defense White Paper, 1994-1995 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1994), p. 74; and The Military Balance, 1994-1995 (London: IISS, 1994), pp. 178-81.

distrust and hostility among States for decades—has collapsed. While that does not necessarily mean that peace has finally arrived, the improvements in relations between States in the region clearly provide new opportunities for the future. Military confrontation on the Korean peninsula has been a major obstacle to securing peace and stability in North-East Asia. In order to pave the way to a regional security arrangement, the question of a divided Korea needs to be settled first.

Finally, arms control between North and South Korea is necessary to obtain international support in the process of unifying the peninsula. If the two Koreas achieve unification without any arms control measures or arms reduction, a unified Korea will possess enormous military strength. Among the major Powers in North-East Asia, there is real concern about a *militarily-strengthened united* Korea. No major Power wants a nuclear-armed united Korea.[3] Since Korean unification needs to take place in the context of expanding regional cooperation in North-East Asia, it is desirable to eliminate that negative concern of its neighbours.

Recent security developments

The Korean peninsula is often described as the "last bastion or glacier of the cold war", owing to the ongoing acute military confrontation between the North and South. Over the past few years, however, there have been several major developments which have affected the security environment of the peninsula. Three events are worth noting in the exploration of the arms control possibilities between the two Koreas.

First, two important agreements were adopted in late 1991 and early 1992 that demonstrate significant progress in inter-Korean relations: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the

South and the North (appropriately known as the "Basic Agreement"), and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Both agreements came into effect on 19 February 1992.[4]

The Basic Agreement was the first official document governing basic inter-Korean relations that was consented to by the two Korean Governments. It covers three basic areas: political, military, and a multifaceted exchange and cooperation—overcoming sharp differences in past positions. For its part, the Joint Declaration stipulates, among other things, that both sides will not manufacture, produce, possess, or use nuclear weapons and that a joint nuclear control commission should be established, with a mandate to carry out inspections to verify that the Korean peninsula is nuclear-free. An additional important commitment is the prohibition of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

After the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration entered into force, various subcommittees and commissions were established, and a series of subsidiary protocols were adopted in September 1992. Implementation of the agreements and protocols has been delayed, however, by North Korea's unwillingness to develop the inter-Korean dialogue, including its reluctance to be transparent regarding its nuclear programme.

Second, there was a leadership change in North Korea in July 1994, caused by the passing of the North's founder, Kim Il Sung. There has been much speculation about the future of the post–Kim Il Sung North Korea. Although the future of that country, which has been almost impenetrable to outsiders, falls into the realm of speculation rather than prediction, the following assessment seems to receive broad support: North Korea will attempt changes in its economic and external policies, although the nature of change and reform

which Pyongyang's new leadership is expected to undertake will be far from wide-ranging.[5]

Third, the United States and North Korea finally adopted an Agreed Framework in Geneva in October 1994 to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.[6] The primary importance of the Geneva agreement is that it provides a framework for the ultimate resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue, which has seriously threatened peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as in North-East Asia, for the past two years. The Agreement was a compromise and, as such, has received mixed reviews. The centrepiece of the deal is the provision of light-water reactors to North Korea in return for the freezing and eventual dismantling of the North's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. Complete transparency in North Korea's nuclear activities, particularly its past activities, will not be secured until some time in the future, perhaps as late as five years from now.

Another significant feature of the Geneva Agreement is that Pyongyang has pledged to "consistently take steps" to implement the North-South Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to engage in the North-South dialogue. Pyongyang should re-engage Seoul if it expects rapid progress in implementing those aspects of the Agreement having to do with the overall normalization of relations and the supply of light-water reactors—aspects in respect to which the ROK will be a major player.

Those three major developments are determining the security environment of the Korean peninsula today and may have a positive effect on arms control in the subregion. If means can be found to reactivate the North-South dialogue, there is a broad agenda for pursuing arms control.

Applicable arms control measures

The types of arms control measures that can be introduced on the Korean peninsula are open-ended. In that regard, the Basic Agreement provides an important guideline. The Agreement, as a road map towards peaceful coexistence, requires the two Koreas to endeavour together to transform the present armistice into a solid peace. It contains specific confidence- and security-building measures, as well as arms control measures, the goal of which is to end the costly arms race and confrontation between the two parts of Korea. For instance, article 12 of the Agreement provides that the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps "to build military confidence and realize arms reductions, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof".

The Agreement and the subsidiary Protocol also indicate that a telephone hot line should be installed between the military authorities of both sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation, and a joint military commission shall be established in order to discuss concrete measures to prevent military confrontation.

In addition to the basic Agreement and subsidiary Protocol, existing international arrangements and institutions could also be utilized to facilitate arms control on the Korean peninsula. Currently, various efforts to stop arms proliferation are being employed at both global and regional levels. For instance, coordinated participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was opened on 1 January 1992, may be useful on the Korean peninsula. The Register asks Member States to provide data from the previous

calendar year on an annual basis in respect of import into and export from their territory of seven categories of major armaments. The Register could perform such a confidence-building function if the requested data were provided within the stipulated time-frame by both the South and the North.[7]

The list of arms control measures applicable to the Korean peninsula is clearly open-ended (Annex 1). To initiate arms control, however, measures such as those listed in the annex should be implemented as soon as possible and in good faith. On the basis of their implementation, further effective steps, namely, the control of the structure of the military forces or arms reduction, may be explored. For effective arms reduction between the two Koreas, the following working principles and objectives need to be considered:

1. The final objective of arms reduction should be the strengthening of stability and security on the Korean peninsula through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of defensive forces at appropriately lower levels;

2. The initial phase should eliminate military disparities between the two Koreas and subsequently proceed to further mutually agreed reductions;

3. The appropriate level of military strength to be maintained in the subsequent stages should be mutually agreed. The need for self-defence as an independent unified nation should be satisfied, taking into consideration the geostrategic location of the Korean peninsula, the history of foreign intervention, and the changes in the North-East Asian region;

4. As a matter of high priority, the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action should be eliminated, together with the reduction of weapons of mass destruction;

5. The overall verifiable levels of offensive equipment, such as tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers, central to the seizing and holding of territory, must be reduced radically in the first stage of reductions;

6. The number of military personnel may be reduced in accordance with reductions in armaments and equipment;

7. The reserve forces may be reduced in parallel with the reduction of regular forces;

8. Foreign military forces may be reduced gradually and withdrawn in accordance with the progress made in structural arms control between the two Koreas;

9. Compliance with all the agreed measures of arms reduction should be verified through an effective and strict verification regime that would include, among other things, provisions for on-site inspection and the exchange of information. Appropriate sanctions should be applied in cases of non-compliance and violation of agreements;

10. Towards that end, it is desirable to form and operate an international supervisory group that includes the two Koreas.[8]

Prospects for arms control: optimism vs. pessimism

The Basic Agreement and its subsidiary Protocols and the Declaration of Denuclearization provide meaningful guidelines for confidence-building and arms control on the Korean peninsula. It is important for both Seoul and Pyongyang to fulfil the pledges they committed themselves to in the agreements. Concluding an agreement is only the first step in

establishing a peace system. It must also be implemented fully in letter and in spirit.

Over the past few years, however, scepticism has developed about the possibility of implementing the principles and measures envisaged in the agreements. The primary cause is Pyongyang's unwillingness to re-engage in a North-South dialogue. For instance, the DPRK leaders are extremely cautious and reluctant about inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation, as they fear such transactions may have a detrimental effect upon their society. Such concern was reflected throughout the Agreed Framework concluded between the United States and DPRK to resolve the nuclear issue.

DPRK has renewed—most notably since last April—its call for the conclusion of a "peace agreement" with the United States. In the course of nuclear negotiations with Washington, Pyongyang proposed negotiations with the United States on the establishment of a new peace arrangement on the Korean peninsula. It withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), while setting up the so-called "Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People's Army" in the spring of 1994. It has also asked Poland to withdraw from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Poland is the only remaining member of the NNSC on the North Korean side, as there has been no replacement, since April 1993, for the former Czechoslovakia. At North Korea's request China recalled its delegation from the MAC in December 1994. In fact, the MAC has been virtually defunct since March 1991, owing to North Korean intransigence following the appointment of a ROK general as head of the United Nations side.

The two sides' different approaches to and perceptions of arms control constitute another major source of scepticism. As disclosed in the early stages of the prime ministerial talks, the basic requirements of the DPRK on arms

control are threefold: withdrawal of United States forces from the South; denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; and reduction of standing armed forces on each side to a specific ceiling, such as 100,000 troops. In addition, Pyongyang has viewed arms control as an end in itself, paying less attention to confidence-building and openness in exchanging military data.[9]

In contrast, the Republic of Korea has viewed arms control and its related confidence-building measures as a process of building peace and establishing national partnership with North Korea, working towards the goal of unification. At the heart of Seoul's approach is the belief that arms control and unification cannot be achieved without going through a step-by-step process. As for structural steps, the ROK has emphasized the importance of transforming offensive force structures into defensive ones, reduction of offensive equipment and forces to levels of parity, and elimination of other military asymmetries. Those outstanding differences between Seoul and Pyongyang could be an obstacle in reaching and implementing a further comprehensive agreement on arms control.

There is also room for optimism. That view is based upon recognition of the recent accumulation of positive and encouraging developments in and around the Korean peninsula and a critical assessment of the DPRK's economy.

First, as previously noted, the need for arms control is widely recognized. There is no doubt that arms control is an important means of lessening the risk of war, of curtailing incipient instabilities arising from military imbalances and stimulating an improvement in political relations.

Second, the major trends in the international security climate over the past few years call for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, where the interests of four Powers—China, Japan, Russia and the United States—intersect. The

end of the cold war, the demise of communism, and deepening economic interdependence all compel the major Powers in North-East Asia to avoid military conflict on the Korean peninsula. At least in so far as the peninsula is concerned, they are acting almost as a concert of like-minded great Powers. No major Power wants instability in the Korean peninsula—something which could have tremendous negative impact on the entire North-East Asian region.

Third, arms control makes sense for the DPRK in view of its worsening economy. It is reported to have a GDP of about $US 55 billion, and spends more than 20 to 30 per cent of its GDP on defence. Moreover, North Korea's economy has contracted for four years in a row—down in 1993 by as much as 25 per cent from the 1989 level. The high cost of maintaining the world's fifth largest regular army of approximately one million soldiers has exhausted North Korea, which has one of the poorest economies in the world. Just as the former Soviet Union was stretched to the breaking point trying to match the United States and its allies militarily, so North Korea has suffered *vis-à-vis* South Korea. Hence the pursuit of an arms control policy may appear to be a compelling strategy to Pyongyang.[10]

Conclusion

Arms control on the Korean peninsula requires that both South Korea and North Korea move away from their antagonistic relationship, that they negotiate with each other to provide avenues for resolution of political and military disputes or prevention of miscalculations and misperceptions which could escalate into military conflict. Against that background, enhancing security and stability on the peninsula, achieving peaceful coexistence, and fostering unification become the ultimate objectives of arms control in Korea.

To initiate arms control on the peninsula, the measures envisaged in the agreements adopted by the South and the North should be implemented as early as possible and in good faith. On the basis of sincere and complete implementation of such confidence-building measures, further steps for effective arms control, including arms reduction, may be explored. At the moment, the two sides lack the solid political will to pursue arms control and to investigate mutual interests. Pyongyang should abandon its reservations and re-engage in the Korean dialogue on a bilateral basis. It should recognize that the key to ultimate unification and the best hope for long-term stability on the Korean peninsula rest in the hands of the Korean people; thus direct negotiation between the two Koreas is essential.

To emphasize the importance of bilateral negotiations between the two Koreas, however, is not necessarily to exclude the role of external Powers in the region. Given the political conditions surrounding the Korean peninsula, any fundamental change in the inter-Korean situation would, in the long run, require the support of the international community, particularly the United States, Japan, China and Russia. The four major Powers in the region could support the North-South dialogue, help in the easing of tensions, facilitate discussion of common security concerns and possibly guarantee the outcomes negotiated between the two Koreas.

Notes

1 The term "arms control", which is often used interchangeably with "disarmament", is defined as the means intended to: (*a*) reduce the risk of accidental war; (*b*) build confidence through greater openness in military matters; (*c*) prevent certain military activities; (*d*) regulate the deployment of armed forces; and (*e*) freeze, limit, reduce or abolish certain categories of weapons. It is thus about seeking stable and peaceful coexistence, and contains two

major aspects: both operational and structural control of military forces. See Jozef Goldblat, *Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements* (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1994), p. 3.

2 *The New York Times*, 25 January 1995, p. A20.

3 Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, "The military build-up in Asia-Pacific", *Pacific Review 5*, No. 3 (1992), p. 202.

4 The text of the Basic Agreement is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 2 (1992). The Agreement (signed on 13 December 1991) and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (signed on 20 January 1922) were circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1147).

5 Jin–Hyun Paik, "The Geneva Framework Agreement and ROK's strategy of engagement", *IFANS Review* 2 (December 1994), pp. 1-2.

6 The text of the Agreed Framework is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XVII, No. 2 (1994).

7 The ROK submitted information to the Register for the inaugural period of 1992 and for the 1993 reporting period. That information was contained in the 1993 and 1994 reports of the Secretary-General on the Register (A/48/344 and Corrs. 1-3 and Adds. 1-3 and A/49/352 and Corr.1 and Adds.1-4).

8 Dong-Won Lim, "Peace and security on the Korean peninsula: Seoul's perspective", *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. 15, No. 3 (1992).

9 Byong-joon Ahn, "Arms control on the Korean peninsula: its prospects and international context", in Gerrit W. Gong and Richard L. Grant (eds.), *Security and Economics in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), pp. 100-102.

10 Gary Klintworth, *Arms Control and Great Power Interests in the Korean Peninsula*, ANU Strategic and Defense Studies Center Working Paper No. 231 (June 1991), p. 9.

Annex

Confidence-Building Measures on the Korean Peninsula

The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation is an ambitious document committing North and South Korea to build confidence and improve relations in political, security, trade, and other areas. Among its provisions are:

Reconciliation Measures

- Respect for each other's political and social systems; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; renunciation of propaganda, sabotage, and subversion; and a commitment to cooperate in the international arena;
- Resolution to transform the Military Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, into a "solid State of peace";
- Establishment of a joint reconciliation commission and a working group to ensure implementation and observance of the agreement.

Non-aggression measures

- Non-use of force, peaceful resolution of disputes, and prevention of accidental armed clashes;
- Establishment of a joint military commission to negotiate confidence and security-building measures and arms reduction accords on notification and limitation of military exercises; peaceful use of the demilitarized zone; exchanges of military personnel and information; phased reduction of armaments; elimination of weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities; veri-

fication provisions; and installation of a hot line between "military authorities".

Trade, exchange, cultural, and humanitarian measures

- Increased trade, economic development, and cooperation;
- Increased travel, communication, and educational contact;
- Family reunions and visits.

The Joint Decaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula includes a range of CBMs specifically designed to address the nuclear issue.

- Not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons;
- Not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment;
- To use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes;
- To verify compliance upon the request of one party but agreed to by both;
- To ensure implementation through the establishment and regular meeting of a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

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ASEAN

Openness and Transparency in the ASEAN Countries

Md Hussin Nayan

Generating greater openness and transparency through specific cooperative measures is neither new nor foreign to ASEAN. Owing to the very nature of openness and transparency, however, it is very difficult for anyone to measure the actual impact of those cooperative endeavours in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, by examining the pattern of cooperation among ASEAN member States, a qualitative albeit subjective assessment could be made that would indicate the state of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and of openness and transparency activities within ASEAN.

In making such an examination, especially in the context of cooperation for the maintenance of peace, security and disarmament, one has to appreciate the purpose for which ASEAN was established and its progress over the last 27 years, the workings of ASEAN, including its institutional framework, and the merit of its approach to regional cooperation, primarily to regional security issues.

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Creation and progress of ASEAN

The concept of regional cooperation for South-East Asian countries was mooted in the early 1960s amid the tension of the cold war and the rise in military might of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Leaders of the South-East Asian countries at the time recognized the need to manage their security situations, both domestic and regional, and they believed that the peace and stability of the region could be fostered by promoting economic, social and cultural development through cooperative programmes. They also believed that regional cooperation in the political and economic areas could enhance stability and safeguard the region against the effects of super-Power rivalry. They decided that the region needed an organization as a forum for dialogue, to find solutions to intra-regional differences as well as to manage relations with the super-Powers, whose presence and interest in the region were substantial. These ideas were expressed and eventually incorporated into the ASEAN Declaration (also known as the Bangkok Declaration), signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967. Hence the establishment of ASEAN could be regarded as the beginning of a process of establishing CBMs and openness and transparency among its members.

ASEAN objectives, as reflected in the Bangkok Declaration, represented the collective will of member Governments to address a major strategic challenge of that time: how to face growing communist insurgencies, internal tensions and civil strife in their countries without being dragged too deeply into East-West conflicts and without disrupting their domestic political and economic agendas. The response to that political, economic and security challenge was outlined in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, signed in 1971. The document reaffirmed ASEAN States' political resolve and shared determination to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South-East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom

and neutrality (ZOPFAN), free from any form of interference by outside Powers. ZOPFAN was the first indication that a process of openness and transparency was making some progress within ASEAN. Another interesting aspect of ZOPFAN—an indigenously conceived regional security order—was that it allowed and encouraged non-ASEAN countries to associate themselves with the concept and its objectives.

By that time, ASEAN leaders and officials had already succeeded in establishing a working relationship based on a flexible framework to accommodate diverse opinions and interests. Although the foundation had been laid for regional security cooperation, there were still no clear institutional programmes or plans of action in either the economic or the political security field.

Four years later, in 1975, following the withdrawal of American troops from Viet Nam, the political and security equation changed, dividing South-East Asia into two groups, each with its distinct ideological orientation. The region was plunged into a serious conflict that had the potential to destabilize ASEAN. Socialist regimes ruled in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane. For the first time, members of ASEAN recognized the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need to react to the threat of communism in a more concerted manner. Nine years after ASEAN's creation, its heads of government finally agreed to a summit meeting in Bali in 1976 to discuss, assess and respond to the alarming security situation.

The first ASEAN summit produced two significant agreements, which further indicated the direction of ASEAN cooperation: The Declaration of ASEAN Concord and The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. The Concord stated the objectives and principles of cooperation, complete with plans of action in economic and social

development, incorporated the members' pledges of mutual assistance in the event of natural disaster and reaffirmed their intention to cooperate in regional development programmes and to develop a recognizable ASEAN identity. The Treaty, on the other hand, provided the framework of political cooperation based on mutual respect for one another's sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The most significant aspect of the first ASEAN summit was the rejection of a military-bloc type of response or a confrontational approach to the threat of communism. The summit highlighted instead the benefits of harmonizing views, coordinating positions, and undertaking common and concerted action, in both intra-regional and extra-regional relations. The emphasis was on the need to enhance economic growth and social development, with the specific aims of achieving social justice, increasing the standard of living of the peoples of ASEAN, and strengthening the national resilience of member countries as well as the regional resilience of ASEAN. ASEAN countries have chosen an economic-cooperation model, suggesting that members integrate themselves substantially with the global economic system through trade, finance, investment and other international sectors.

In 1977, at the second ASEAN summit, in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN Heads of Government reaffirmed their commitment to ZOPFAN, the Concord and the Treaty of Amity. From 1977 to 1987, ASEAN countries proceeded to fulfil their commitment to ASEAN cooperation. The scope and nature of their cooperation expanded rapidly, primarily in the political, economic and social sectors. The subsequent ASEAN summit, in Manila in 1987, focused, *inter alia*, on improving the functioning and extent of ASEAN cooperation and joint ventures in industrial projects.

Progress was also made in regional security cooperation, as indicated by the introduction of the concept of a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone (SEANWFZ) in 1984. The SEANWFZ proposal was a follow-up to ZOPFAN, with the specific intention of making the region a nuclear-weapon-free zone. SEANWFZ could be considered as ASEAN's contribution to regional arms control and disarmament, particularly in support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At the fourth ASEAN summit, in Singapore in 1992, it was decided that the ASEAN Foreign Ministers should look into and elaborate the idea of the SEANWFZ.

ASEAN's comprehensive security concept covers not only military deterrence and territorial defence components but trade and commercial aspects, including the issues of market access, industrial development and technology acquisition, and the social well-being of individual members. ASEAN regarded comprehensive security as an interlocking system of political, social, economic and military forces that could result in trade-offs and synergistic effects. From that perspective, consideration of CBMs or measures to encourage greater openness and transparency, should not be confined to military or defence-related programmes alone. A multidimensional approach to managing the challenge of maintaining peace and security and to disarmament should be given consideration and greater encouragement.

It is through that multidimensional approach that ASEAN has been able to keep the peace and maintain stability for its members over the 27 years since its creation. Economically, socially and culturally, ASEAN members have progressed and recorded remarkable growth. The confidence gained and the openness and transparency among the members of ASEAN—owing to their cooperative endeavours in the political, economic and social areas—can be considered the major reasons for its success. The confidence gained by ASEAN was not derived from a previously established

structure for negotiating and implementing security and defence-related measures, but from persistent efforts to remain outside the balance-of-power game, watching from the periphery.

CBMs, openness and transparency

A major factor that contributes to CBMs, openness and transparency in ASEAN is the fact that all ASEAN countries are signatories to international non-proliferation agreements such as the NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Apart from supporting the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, ASEAN countries also adhere to and strictly observe all export control measures on dual-use materials. ASEAN is confident that there is no danger of nuclear weapons proliferation or an uncontrollable arms race among its members.

The habit of cooperation and dialogue, fostered through regularly scheduled meetings, is well institutionalized in ASEAN. Mechanisms include the regular summit meetings of heads of Government; the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers (AMM) and Economic Ministers (AEM); special meetings of foreign ministers or economic ministers as and when necessary; senior political and economic officials' meetings (SOM and SEOM); and a series of other meetings at official and unofficial levels. ASEAN also has a dialogue process with major and medium Powers through ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC), and a series of ad hoc meetings of experts and officials. Those frequent contacts and consultations have allowed ASEAN governments to develop habits of cooperation, to learn to accept one another and to overcome suspicions and years of hostility resulting from their different historical and cultural experiences. The meetings have

contributed extensively to the promotion of understanding and have helped to foster good will within ASEAN.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ZOPFAN and the SEANWFZ have been key concepts with the potential to build trust and confidence among ASEAN member countries. The concept, as explained in the relevant documents, could lead towards greater regional consensus on security matters for ASEAN. Wider acceptance of those concepts by outside Powers, along with CBMs, openness and transparency, would have a political impact, helping to ensure peace and security for ASEAN.

Specific cooperation in the security and defence fields has been bilateral. That format of cooperation has been extensive and regular. Although not regional in character, such cooperation has nonetheless heightened CBMs, openness and transparency between some members. That format of cooperation could be further expanded for border-control, anti-piracy and anti-smuggling activities. Frequent exchanges of visits between senior military officials have afforded the opportunity for military personnel to establish rapport, exchange views regarding threat perception and familiarize themselves with the defence doctrines of neighbouring countries, and have provided the opportunity for training at each other's defence colleges.

In considering the future prospects for truly region-wide ASEAN cooperation in security and defence, perhaps the question some might ask is the following: If, at the height of the cold war, ASEAN security cooperation was confined to bilateral cooperation among six States, is it conceivable now, after the collapse of the East-West rivalry, that ASEAN as a group could develop a regional security and defence pact? Once Viet Nam becomes a full-fledged member of ASEAN in July 1995, there is absolutely no reason for ASEAN to do so.

For the time being, it appears that ASEAN countries prefer informal mechanisms and an informal approach to CBMs, openness and transparency; informality allows for flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre. For ASEAN, CBMs and transparency measures seem to work well in an atmosphere of informality and cordiality. Such an atmosphere already exists but needs to be nurtured. The challenge for ASEAN, therefore, is to reach consensus on the appropriate mechanism and type of activity to nurture the openness and transparency. Some in ASEAN believe that while the mechanism and activities developed in Europe to address that region's specific geostrategic situation could be useful to ASEAN, others are of the view that Europe's model of CBMs and openness and transparency is not suitable for ASEAN and cannot be applied in an indiscriminate and open-ended manner.

Current regional security concerns

The collapse of the bipolar power structure of the cold war in late 1989 completely changed the security equation in South-East Asia. East-West ideological antagonism, bloc politics and military confrontation dissipated suddenly and unexpectedly. Erstwhile enemies have mended their relations. Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam have participated in a limited way in some ASEAN events, thus signalling a new peaceful regional order in the making.

Against this promising outlook, however, ASEAN members are being warned of a growing threat and possible aggression from China arising out of overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. While many view an external military threat to ASEAN as unlikely, the fact that this other perspective exists in the regional grouping underscores the reality that there is no consensus within ASEAN on the issue. Thus if management of potential conflict in the South China

Sea revolves around seeking accommodation between ASEAN and China, the achievement of a consensus resolution within ASEAN will be a difficult process. The tendency of analysts and researchers from certain countries to highlight the new security threat in the South China Sea and to emphasize the need to undertake a series of confidence-and security-building measures, as well as weapons-control measures, that resemble the European model, is considered by some to be counter-productive to peace and stability in ASEAN.

Among the ASEAN countries there are various views about how the Association should proceed with China. The fact is that ASEAN members are vulnerable, and there may be a tendency to over react. Experience indicates, however, that systematic effort in opposing a major Power, for example, imposition of an embargo or boycott, does little to promote stability and security in the region. On the other hand, there have been enormous changes in China, making it a very different country today from what it was. Its open-door policy has made it a much more congenial neighbour, and that is probably the key to the maintenance of peace and stability, open sea lanes, vigorous trade and investment opportunity in the wider Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

In summary, definition of a security role for ASEAN would help produce a new strategic landscape, one in which ASEAN issues and agendas would be given greater weight. The creation of a new strategic order in an ASEAN-based military alliance appears inappropriate and undesirable. The absence of a common threat perception makes it unlikely for ASEAN to evolve into a defence community. Instead of focusing on the existence of a security threat to regional peace and security, ASEAN countries prefer to see the evolution of

CBMs, openness and transparency, starting with cooperation within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In a security environment no longer dominated by cold-war ideological conflicts and extra-regional alliances, the impetus for regional defence collaboration withers. While ASEAN will continue to discuss security issues at its annual foreign ministerial meetings, it is unlikely that it will become a security or military alliance like NATO or that the ARF will follow the example of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The Future Course of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Openness and the Regional Approach to Disarmament

Pengiran Osman Bin Pengiran Haji Patra

The launching in July last year of the first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok generated much interest and high expectations among the members of the Forum and among security analysts in general. Inevitably, the question arose as to why ASEAN members felt the need to set up such a mechanism and whether they intended it to play a central role in the East Asia security regime.

This paper will set the ARF in its historical context, examine the reasons for its establishment, review current progress and suggest how it may proceed.

A battleground of conflicting interests

In recent history, the Asia-Pacific region could be described as a battleground of conflicting interests among external powers and regional States. It underwent colonization, when actions were not always taken in the interests of the region. Settlements of issues and arrangements which affected the countries in the region were concluded mainly by the great Powers of the day. In exceptional cases, regional States were brought in, for example, in the 1954 Geneva

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Conference or within the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Yet the efforts were never directed primarily towards giving the region a chance to decide and act for itself. The turmoil of the sixties and seventies further showed that internal problems sometimes provided opportunities for major Powers to intervene in localized struggles and conflicts towards ends which were not necessarily in the interests of the region.

During that uncertain period in South-East Asia, ASEAN was formed in an attempt to offer better prospects for peace and stability. While ASEAN professed not to be security-oriented, the reason for its formation was certainly the instability and insecurity of the period. From its early years, ASEAN has been conscious of the need to address security issues. Indeed, its most noteworthy achievements have been political, especially in terms of improved relations between the ASEAN States and their regional partners, brought about despite the many bilateral problems existing among its members at the outset.

Efforts to establish ASEAN on a firm and lasting basis coincided with the Association's collective efforts to assist in the management of the Cambodian problem. That signalled a future role. The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed the direct involvement of ASEAN members, individually and collectively, in the Cambodian peace process. The conclusion of the International Conference on Cambodia in 1991 was significant inasmuch as countries in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly ASEAN countries, participated for the first time on equal terms in the international settlement of a regional issue. For many countries in the region, that involvement was the first experience in negotiating a peace settlement, participating in peace-keeping efforts and monitoring elections. Perhaps most significant of all, countries in the region, large and small, began to learn to cooperate with one another on matters of common concern.

Coming at the end of the cold war, the experience of the International Conference showed that it was possible to ensure that the unfavourable conditions under which regional affairs had often been conducted in the past need not be repeated. It also meant that members of the region could seek jointly to address remaining concerns, such as the rehabilitation of Cambodia, the containment of the potential problems in the South China Sea, the nuclear challenge from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the management of change in the major power relationships in the region.

Although discussions at many ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) often focused on political cooperation in matters of mutual concern, ASEAN countries were nevertheless aware that security matters and security policy were still not formally on the ASEAN agenda. It was not only the political momentum gained from the Cambodian undertaking and the conditions prevailing at the end of the cold war that impelled discussion on specific security concerns, but the added impetus of the Leaders' Summit in 1992 in Singapore. At that gathering, the heads of government formalized and endorsed a process already under way.

Further momentum was provided by the growing importance of Asia and the Pacific in the global economy. Leaders in the region became aware that regional instability could threaten that growth and could have global repercussions. At the same time, they recognized that rapid economic growth created interdependencies which could result in vulnerability, especially because of reliance on foreign investments and markets. They accepted the fact that, as nations drew together, free access to markets, unimpeded sea lanes and access to resources were indispensable for further economic progress. They also became aware that those factors could be potential sources of conflict.

Increasing economic interdependence through region-wide trade and investment pointed to the need to talk about security with partners. As economic affluence grew, so did the desire of nations to enhance their defence capabilities and to upgrade defense structures through higher state budget allocations. Such moves could worry neighbours.

So, despite reticence on the part of regional leaders to discuss security matters, steps to create a region-wide security process went ahead. For example, the Foreign Ministers of Australia and Canada, in the early nineties, suggested an organization for Asia along the lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which could be known as the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA)". Though the concept was not accepted at the official level, regional "think-tanks" in the non-governmental sector began to explore the merit of having ASEAN discuss security issues through the established regional forums. Deliberations at the governmental and non-governmental levels kept interest alive in creating some form of regional security system and setting a logical time-frame for such an endeavour.

The perceived decrease in the United States military capability in the region following the termination of the United States-Philippines base agreements, taken together with the new post–cold war situation and the emergence of other regional powers, impelled the search for a relevant process. In another closely related development, the United States, in a fundamental change of policy, agreed to consider security aspects from a multilateral approach while maintaining its own bilateral arrangements with countries in the region.

In sum, in addition to various intense regional security concerns, the most important factor in placing security issues on the ASEAN agenda was the increased self-confidence of regional leaders, especially ASEAN leaders. That confidence

was brought about largely by unprecedented economic growth and improvement in the overall relations among regional countries. Moreover, ASEAN's involvement in the Cambodian peace process, its tackling of other security issues during ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC) and dialogues, meant that security issues were not entirely new to ASEAN discussions. Security matters took on much more prominence in the Declaration issued at the 1992 Leader's Summit in Singapore, which recorded the decision to use existing mechanisms like the ASEAN-PMC to enhance dialogue on political and security matters to promote peace and stability in the region.

The establishment of the Regional Forum

The commencement of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok last year was therefore logical and can be seen as part of the overall process of regional development. The region had recognized the need to create such a multilateral security process and to provide a venue for the exchange, of views on matters which affect not only South-East Asian countries but also the other Asia-Pacific nations. The ARF is unique in the sense that it was initiated not by the major powers but by the developing countries of ASEAN. Its membership spans three continents, and three permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are members. That adds a certain weight to its regional efforts.

When ASEAN conceived the idea of ARF, its objectives were broad-based. The general feeling was that the Forum should not be seen as a response to any particular threat, real or perceived, nor should it exist for the purpose of identifying enemies. In that same spirit, it was not supposed to become a negotiating or decision-making body for any particular set of concerns or problems. Rather, it should be a

process by means of which security could be sought among friends.

Initially, there were certain constraints on the ARF process, such as the political, economic and cultural diversity of the region. Additionally, no security structures existed which could be improved upon. There was concern that ASEAN's own working method of consensus-building might possibly affect the pace of the forum and that differences in perception of what constituted a threat would hinder a common strategy. Some observers were inclined to ask why ASEAN States should take up the challenge of designing a regional security forum and why such a security process was needed now, in the aftermath of the cold war, since the ASEAN countries, or at least most of the South-East Asian States, had for quite a long time experienced uninterrupted peace, stability and prosperity.

To those engaged in ASEAN affairs, both at the governmental and non-governmental levels, the answer seemed quite straight forward. As the regional States were becoming more involved through business and trade, they hoped to open their markets. Accomplishing that required ASEAN to deal directly with the major powers to attract their trade and investment and to keep them positively engaged in the region. It followed that major Powers and countries with a large economic stake in the South-East Asia region would need a guarantee that their interests would continue to be safeguarded. At the same time, ASEAN had to make sure that in engaging those Powers, its regional interests were equally protected. Some mechanisms to address mutual concerns were therefore needed.

While the constraints on the development of the Forum—the small size as a group, the diversity of the region and the lack of existing structures—should not be underestimated, they are far less dominant than in the past. Above all,

economic interdependence was rapidly overcoming historical difficulties and the problems created by diversity. Also, through Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), economic cooperation in the region was already under way.

Substance and structure of the Forum

Planning the substance and structure of the Forum required two important exercises. The first was to determine its objectives, methodology, intellectual input and number of participants. The second was to decide on the style in which ARF meetings should be conducted.

That has been the main work undertaken since the first meeting. The Forum is now in a position to consider how those tasks are to be undertaken. Discussions on the goals and expectations of the ARF over the last two years have tended to reflect some of the following:

(a) Views converged on the need to find a means for consultations on regional political and security issues that would foster a habit of open dialogue, even when views differed on some issues, and that would encourage patterns of behaviour to reduce security risks. (Singapore, 20-21 May 1993);

(b) In a Joint Communiqué issued at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, in Bangkok, 22-23 July 1994, the Foreign Ministers noted and welcomed ASEAN's increasingly central role in fostering political and security cooperation in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, through initiatives such as the inaugural meeting of the ARF (Bangkok, 25 July 1994). They felt that the ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. They considered that ASEAN should work together with the ARF to bring about a

more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

(c) The ARF should ensure and preserve the current environment of peace, prosperity and cooperation in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region and keep the major powers constructively engaged there, notwithstanding the changes which have taken place since the end of the cold war;

(d) The ARF should adopt comprehensive approaches to security, taking into account not only military issues, but also political, economic, social and other challenges in the region.

In evaluating those observations, I believe the original intention of ASEAN members was that the ARF should offer regional countries and other interested parties a multilateral forum where they could consult on regional political and security matters. I should like to stress, though, that the ARF was established primarily to assist the cause of regional peace and stability so that economic growth could proceed. It was hoped that the process would encourage the idea of regular consultation as an important security aspect in the region.

In implementing the decision of the 1992 Summit to intensify internal dialogue on political and security matters by using the ASEAN-PMC, ASEAN envisaged a future "community of security interests in the region in which a culture of peace" would be fostered. For that reason, I believe it is essential to encourage all regional States and others directly concerned to do their part in realizing that vision. It is important for ASEAN member countries to apply the concept of "open dialogue" and to continue working creatively with ARF participants and other regional States to design a pattern of relationship in the Asia-Pacific region.

I feel that emphasis should be given to ASEAN's special way of working, which has led to many achievements.

In the region, matters of peace and stability have always been approached on the basis of respect for international law and norms, and peace has been achieved through regional cooperation at all levels. The wide diversity of the Asia-Pacific region requires that even more because not all the ARF members are not all friendly neighbours and partners; some are also long-time adversaries. In addition, the security concerns and interests of members may differ. For the ARF to maintain a sense of security among its regional partners, ASEAN members strongly feel that it should operate—as ASEAN does—on consensus-building, cooperation, the principle of inclusiveness in terms of membership and in the matters under discussion, with pluralistic processes, and at a gradual pace which suits everyone.

ASEAN's cohesion as an association can be attributed to those working principles, which have contributed directly to the security of the subregion. By avoiding too many formal and legalistic requirements in its formation and dealings, ASEAN has been able to maintain subregional peace, stability and prosperity through confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. It has fostered restraint in the way members deal with each other and has encouraged the observance of international law and principles.

Future course of the Forum

Based on the ASEAN experience, the ARF planners feel that its present Chairman must, as a first priority, concentrate on bringing all ARF members together to engage in a constructive dialogue on regional security. The first step in the process should be for people to talk to each other frankly with a view to promoting understanding. That will most probably last for a number of years to allow participants to become fully acquainted and confident with each other before

moving on to more formal undertakings. ASEAN's evolution in that manner has taken almost three decades.

With ASEAN experience as a guide, the Forum, through discussion and consultation, will be able to create an atmosphere of openness and goodwill conducive to confidence-building, consensus and cooperation. The task is not simple. Flexibility and accommodation may, in the beginning, compromise the substance. In the immediate stages, while the opportunity to resolve problems can never be ruled out, it is not anticipated that dialogue and consultation will lead necessarily to the resolution of major concerns. Rather, such discussion may act as a form of moral suasion for members not to create problems among themselves. Elements of preventive diplomacy are inherent in the process. The Forum may also serve as a warning system for potential issues or problems.

What I have described is a step-by-step approach and a balance of interests in order to ensure that everyone is comfortable with the pace. Naturally, the controlled pace of the Forum could be frustrating for some. The close identification of the process with ASEAN-AMM and PMC have led some to view the ARF as ASEAN-driven. ASEAN maintains that the entire process is about open dialogue and constructive engagement among regional countries.

The ARF's chances of success appear to be good. That optimistic view stems mainly from the special momentum created following the cold war. The Asia-Pacific region can make its contribution to the new "United Nations thinking", especially in the resolution and prevention of conflict through peaceful means and its encouragement of global efforts by regional organizations to maintain international peace and security. ASEAN has established itself as a "community of security interests" through the application of quiet diplomacy to prevent numerous inter-state conflicts. Much has already been done in the area of preventive diplomacy and CBMs in

the South-East Asian region. According to some analysts, the promotion of ASEAN's ideas or strategic development of the region, such as ZOPFAN (zone of peace, freedom and neutrality) and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and SEANFZ (Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone), are based on efforts to counter cold war tensions and confrontations. As a small group, ASEAN has no major difficulty in starting some "new thinking" for the region. Initiatives by any of the major Powers in the region could be received with suspicion.

The size of the ARF membership could also determine its character. That is something current participants have to think through and address. In choosing the name, the ASEAN Regional Forum has avoided strict geographical delimitation in terms of membership eligibility. Careful consideration of the membership issue is merited, particularly where it involves countries with potential interests in the security of the region. There is an obvious limit even on those countries if the Forum is not to appear to be a "mini-UN". Even if such a straightforward criterion as the geographical delimitation of the Asia-Pacific region was used, questions would inevitably arise with the application of such criterion. Would it correspond to the geographical outline of APEC (with the exception of Taiwan)? Or is it to cover the area loosely defined as East Asia and the North Pacific? Or should the geographical definition reflect the distribution of security interests? For the time being, the eligibility for membership in the ARF has been based on political decisions, that is, eligible members are those that have formal relations with ASEAN.

Proposals before the Forum

During the ARF-Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and the first meeting of the Forum itself last year, many proposals were put forward. A large quantity were military-or defence-

related. Many came from the developed countries and reflected the traditional western approach to security, i.e., rapid movement to transparency measures in sensitive areas. Various proposals reflected the specific security concerns of participants. Their immediate implementation should not necessarily serve as a benchmark of progress made at the Forum.

The proposals submitted could be grouped in five main areas: confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, disarmament measures, peace-keeping and maritime issues. Rather than being classified in baskets in the western sense, proposals under the aegis of the ARF might be arranged in terms of stages, ranging from consensus-building and CBMs to preventive diplomacy measures. Their implementation will correspond closely to those stages.

While the military and defence-related aspect of security is certainly important, the ARF views security holistically, seeing the military and defense-related component as part of a comprehensive concept. Therefore, proposals brought forward during the Kathmandu meeting will be included among the ARF's matters.

Conclusion

The future of the ARF is open-ended, very much in line with ASEAN thinking. To ASEAN members, the ASEAN Regional Forum is an evolving process. Keeping it going is as important as obtaining specific results in resolving issues of contention or furthering cooperation. The informality of the Forum avoids overly institutional approaches which limit the options of the participants and promote dogmatic attitudes. My view is that, by giving the opportunity for participants to talk over issues and potential problems frankly and without confrontation, the Forum will have a chance, in the long run, to

fulfil the needs of its participants for a long-term regional security process.

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

The Seventh Regional Disarmament Meeting in the Asia-Pacific Region held at Kathmandu, Nepal 13-15 February 1995

Openness, Assurance of Security and Disarmament

Programme of the Meeting

13 February—Opening Session

Introductory Statement by the Director of the Global and Regional Activities Branch of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs *(Text follows)*

Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Nepal *(Text follows)*

Statement by the Vice Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture *(Text follows)*

Statement by the Mayor of Nagasaki *(Text follows)*

Presentations

Plenary I: Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
Lawrence Scheinman

Security assurances and regional stability
Ben Sanders

The 1995 NPT Conference: preparatory committee's work
Ben Sanders

Plenary II: Openness and the Regional Approach to Disarmament

Regional approaches to increase nuclear transparency
Hiroyoshi Kurihara

Future course of the ASEAN Regional Forum
Pengiran Osman Bin Pengiran Haji Patra

Risk reduction and maritime security in Asia and the Pacific
Stanley B. Weeks

Working Group I: Disarmament Proposals and Agreements: Regional and Global Approaches

The implementation of agreed confidence-building measures and their possible extension
Michael Krepon

Regional disarmament proposals: merits and problems
Aziz Babar

Working Group II: Regional Issues and Confidence-building

Disarmament and stability on the Korean Peninsula

A perspective from the DPRK
So Chang Sik

A perspective from the ROK
Seo-Hang Lee

Openness and transparency in ASEAN countries
Md Hussin Nayan

The impact of economic development and democracy on regional stability
Kazi Anwarul Masud/Burhanudeen Gafoor

Review of UN Regional Guidelines
Peggy Mason

15 February—Closing session

Disarmament Proposals and Agreements
Report of the Moderator of Working Group I (Text follows)

Regional Issues and Confidence-building
Report of the Moderator of Working Group II (Text follows)

Concluding Statement
Director of the Regional Centre (Text follows)

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The Growing Significance of Regional Approaches to Disarmament and International Security

Evgeniy Gorkovskiy

Regional meetings of this kind contribute positively to the understanding of complex issues and concerns in the area of security and disarmament, and foster the process of openness and confidence-building through an exchange of ideas and information in an atmosphere of informal deliberations. In these historic times, if we genuinely want peace and security, .making progress in disarmament means searching for more common ground, not more divisions.

As a person who has spent 15 years of his life in the disarmament field, I am a pragmatic optimist and am convinced that the final outcome will be positive. There is simply no other alternative.

1995 has great significance for the cause of international security, arms limitation and disarmament. It marks the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations and the end of the Second World War, a war that brought unbearable suffering to the peoples of the world, including those in the Asia-Pacific region. This year stands at an important political juncture which will provide us with an

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opportunity to reflect on the past, to assess achievements and setbacks, to draw lessons from them, as well as to explore future approaches to the challenges ahead of us in order to find a common agenda for a safer and better world.

As the Secretary-General of the United Nations has pointed out on a number of occasions, it is important to maintain the momentum created by positive developments in the field of disarmament. In his statement during the First Committee of the forty-ninth General Assembly, he said:

> "Never before has there been more opportunity for global cooperation towards arms control and disarmament. We must make full use of this opportunity. Not only do arms control and disarmament make the world secure, they release economic, scientific and technological resources for peace and human progress."[1]

Our efforts have acquired even greater significance in the context of an increasing number of regional and sub-regional conflicts.

Either by coincidence or by destiny, 1995 has also been the year of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I think that there is no doubt in the minds of disarmament experts that the NPT remains the central pillar of global non-proliferation and of future stability and security in the world.

This meeting offers the Asia-Pacific States an opportunity for an in-depth informal dialogue and examination of nuclear-related issues, thus contributing to the search for acceptable common ground.

In terms of the increasing importance of regional approaches to peace and security, this meeting will address the following topics: openness and assurance of security, regional

approaches to disarmament, the future course of the regional forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), efforts towards risk reduction and maritime security in Asia and the Pacific, the implementation of confidence-building measures and the merits and problems of existing regional disarmament proposals.

One of the Regional Centre's functions is to provide support for the initiatives or any other activities mutually agreed upon by Member States for the enhancement of peace and disarmament in the region. The Centre's agenda has been crowded with regional and subregional disarmament and security issues. For instance, informal conditions for the initiation of a North-East Asian regional dialogue on cooperation issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula is a familiar item on its agenda since 1990.

The entire world welcomed the satisfactory solution of the problem between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to the implementation of the former's commitment to its safeguards agreements.

Openness and transparency in military matters are essential to increase confidence among States and to contribute to global and regional stability. Efforts to develop non-discriminatory practical means to enhance openness should be continued.

Since 1992, the international community has witnessed substantial progress in disarmament particularly in the area of weapons of mass destruction. It is evident, though, that such parallel progress should be made by parallel progress in the conventional field, particularly light arms; lately, those weapons have been killing people in the hundreds of thousands.

Over the past years, we have witnessed the intensification of interest in developing new approaches for dialogue

on regional and subregional security and disarmament issues which is taking place in different parts of the world. It is encouraging to see ASEAN countries and their dialogue partners make a significant leap by the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). I hope that discussions will reveal a clearer picture of the direction of political dialogue, as well as possible cooperation between ASEAN and the Regional Centre with respect to the common endeavour of promoting disarmament measures.

Last year, the Regional Meeting held a preliminary discussion on the regional disarmament guidelines adopted by consensus at the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The discussion and comments presented to the Regional Centre afterward encouraged the exploration of a set of principles applicable to the region. The Regional Centre would welcome a concrete examination of those proposed guidelines.

The end of the cold war has brought about a significant change in the world situation. We have witnessed a growing tendency towards the development of regional approaches. That could indicate a greater role to be played by the Regional Centres. As you are aware, the activities carried out by the Asia-Pacific Centre are called "the Kathmandu process". As the word "process" indicates, there is no magic and instant solution for disarmament and peace. In order to achieve visible results, long and painstaking efforts will be required. The Regional Centre is ready to take another step forward with your renewed commitment and wisdom.

Notes

1 Reproduced in *DISARMAMENT* vol. XVII, Number 2, 1994.

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Regional Disarmament Should Complement Global Efforts

Madhav Kumar Nepal

I am delighted to have the opportunity of addressing this august gathering of eminent diplomats, learned academicians, and renowned experts who have dedicated themselves to promoting peace and security through disarmament in our region and elsewhere in the world. We note with great satisfaction that the Kathmandu process initiated in recent years has received wide acclamation for its contribution to regional disarmament dialogue. This meeting, I believe, will add to the string of significant achievements of the Kathmandu process.

Disarmament is a paramount concern of our time. The present century has lived through the trauma and tragedies of unspeakable devastation in two world wars and several other conflicts of various proportions. This century has also witnessed an unprecedented arms race that was honed and expanded the ability to kill. Millions of lives have been lost owing to the use of increasingly lethal weapons. Mankind possesses in its arsenals weapons sufficient to annihilate the world many times over. We have lived in fear of the nuclear Armageddon that loomed large in an ideologically divided and hostile world during the cold war. That fear lingers still in

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our psyche, and we are confronted with the continued existence of stockpiled nuclear weapons.

No less traumatic and tragic has been the eruption, on the heels of the cold war, of innumerable ethno-religious conflicts, accompanied by narrow nationalistic motives, which have spawned societies asunder and inflicted horrendous suffering and genocide on a multitude of people in many parts of the world. The severity of those contretemps in the civilized societies of our time has been accentuated by the use of highly sophisiticated arms weaponry.

The lifting of the pall of superpower rivalry has left the ground open for regional arms races. Regional escalation of an arms build-up would be far more frightening than the cold war had ever been. It would not only compromise meticulous and detailed safety requirements to prevent an accidental triggering of weapons of mass destruction, but would also heighten the prospects for pre-emptive use of such weapons at the slightest provocation. A regional arms race would also sap the capacity of developing countries to invest in socio-economic development, which they badly need.

The world has not become a peaceful and secure place with the amassing of weapons. On the contrary, it has turned into a dangerous tinder-box. We are now in a bind from which we must break loose in order to establish a more dependable security environment. The road to lasting peace and security in the world leads through conscientious and committed endeavours to disarmament, poverty alleviation, sustainable economic development and harmonious social progress.

The Asia and Pacific region embraces a vast geographical area. It is home to the largest population in the world and is characterized by ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. The vast array of geographic, economic and social differences offer us both splendid opportunities for mutual sharing of unique experiences and daunting challenges for

building confidence and progressing together towards lasting peace and security built on the foundations of socio-economic advancement.

Nepal has always stood for transparency and openness in security relations in order to foster predictability and discourage surprises. The international community has already found a toe-hold in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. That, however, addresses the least of our concerns, as non-conventional weapons—more deadly and destructive—remain outside the purview of the Register. Nepal staunchly and unequivocally supports initiatives to expand the scope of the Register to cover all categories and grades of weapons as the cornerstone for an edifice of confidence. We also see the possibility of working towards an agreement on a regional arms register which embraces all categories and grades of weapons, and I take this opportunity to urge you to explore that possibility.

During peacetime, measures related to keeping neighbours abreast of major troop and weapons deployment and military exercises, evolving cooperative security arrangements, effecting regular consultation between security personnel, and collaborating on defense technology, among others measures, could also go a long way to enhance openness and create an environment of mutual trust.

We live in a world marked by staggering disparities among nations: land and population sizes, levels of socio-economic development, technological progress, resources endowment, military strength and possession of weapons, to name a few. The bipolarity to which we had inured ourselves in the latter half of this century has eroded, and the power configuration of the post–cold war era has brought about incertitude in international security relations. Nepal believes that mutual security assurances must be the pragmatic means

to pursue to foster confidence in the changed circumstances rather than yield to runaway military aspirations.

The question of security assurances, therefore, deserves serious consideration. Credible and firm security assurances from nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States, for instance, would help to cap nuclear proliferation. The question of legal use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be interpreted in that light. Nepal appreciates the underlying merit of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a central element of common security and has extended its support wherever they have been proposed. Moving one step further, it is our earnest yearning that comprehensive and credible security assurances, including no-first-use of weapons of mass destruction, and no-first-attack agreements, be made a kingpin in international arrangements.

The most disturbing nightmare in weapons technology has been the development and production of nuclear weapons—weapons that have in their rudimentary stage indicated their killing potential by inflicting a holocaust on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is our privilege to have the distinguished Mayor of Nagasaki and the Vice Governor of the Nagasaki Prefecture here with us to remind us how disastrous the use of nuclear weapons can be. Nepal feels strongly that it is the duty of our generation, which is responsible for developing most of the sophisticated nuclear weapons of increasingly lethal capacity, to exorcise the ghost of such weapons and leave a safer world for our children.

Twenty-five years have elapsed since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force. The Treaty is now awaiting renewal. It has been evident, in the face of the international community's failure to iron out major differences in four preparatory committee meetings, that we would be participating in the NPT review and

extension conference in April this year with differing assessments and perceptions about whether the renewal of the Treaty should be for an indefinite period, a definite period or a series of definite periods. Like all human instruments, it is not a perfect treaty, but it has elicited near universal acceptance, with more than 165 State parties, and has stemmed the tide of nuclear weapons proliferation. The NPT review and extension conference affords the international community a rare opportunity, as well as an unprecedented challenge, to plug loopholes and remove inadequacies so as to make the Treaty equitable and acceptable to all and to consolidate its past achievements. That, in turn, will pave the way for nuclear disarmament.

NPT extension cannot and should not be dealt with in isolation. Issues relevant to nuclear disarmament such as the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and a fissile materials cut–off treaty, as well as a ban on production of nuclear weapons accompanied by expeditious dismantling of the existing stockpiles, must receive serious attention from the international community.

It is disheartening to note that the journey from the Partial Test Ban Treaty to the CTBT has been rather long. Further delay in committing firmly to, if not concluding, CTBT will jeopardize the prospects for the indefinite extension of the NPT. The imposition of voluntary moratoriums on nuclear testing, if made by all the nuclear-weapon States which have not done so, as well as by threshold States, would promote an environment of trust conducive to both NPT extension and a CTBT. A global compact on the prohibition of production and enrichment of fissile materials for weapons purposes, in our view, must be taken up with a sense of urgency. Safeguards mechanisms to monitor and prevent diversion of such materials also should be strengthened concomitantly and applied in a non-discriminatory manner.

Disarmament has regional dimensions for Asia and the Pacific, with nuclear disarmament the top of the agenda. South Asia, East Asia, West Asia and the Pacific subregions have for long lived in tension of dangerous proportions, including the eruption of wars of varying intensities. The existence of declared and threshold nuclear-weapon States renders our region extremely volatile. In view of that, disarmament in general and the elimination of nuclear weapons in particular should be a regional concern of high priority.

Global nuclear and general disarmament initiatives which can be envisioned or are already on track can and should be complimented and strengthened by regional initiatives. We should therefore seriously contemplate the Asia and Pacific region leading the rest of the world in such initiatives and contributing immeasurably to world peace and security.

The United Nations has been celebrating its 50th anniversary this year. The first 50 years of the world body have been basically devoted to promoting international peace and security. We must make the next 50 years an era of international development. That will be a fitting tribute to the United Nations' 50th anniversary—to re-dedicate ourselves to the cause and goals of world wide development as a means of promoting peace.

I wish to conclude by reaffirming Nepal's abiding faith in the United Nations and emphasizing the latter's catalytic role in promoting the goal of durable world peace and security through disarmament, poverty alleviation and sustainable socio-economic development—a goal Nepal cherishes and to which it stands pledged.

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Sustaining the Momentum Towards the Complete Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Yoshihiro Kiyoura

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the foundation of the United Nations. For more than forty years of those fifty years, under the influence of the East-West confrontation, we lived in fear of another world war, especially an all-out nuclear war. While it is true that the danger of a world war diminished substantially after the collapse of the cold war, the fact remains that there are States which still possess nuclear weapons. And new causes for concern have arisen after the cold war, such as outbreaks of conflict and confrontation kept in check during the cold war and the problem of nuclear weapon proliferation.

Russia and the United States have intensified their efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Ukraine also took positive steps by acceding to the NPT and allowing the START I Treaty to enter into force. Now that the momentum for disarmament has accelerated, I believe we should propel that positive movement towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

With a view to promoting disarmament and coping with the new set of issues arising from regional conflicts and nuclear proliferation, the United Nations should assume an

Yoshihiro Kiyoura is the Vice Governor of the Nagasaki Prefecture.

increasingly important role in enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by facilitating cooperation and building confidence through dialogue. It is in that context that this conference takes on such significance.

One of the items for discussion at the meeting is the NPT Review and Extension Conference to be convened 17 April–12 May this year. As an advocate of the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, I hope that some effective measures for nuclear non-proliferation and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will be identified during that meeting. It is our ardent wish that declarations be made by the nuclear-weapon States in favour of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a commitment to the non-use of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, we request that the nuclear-weapon Powers declare their willingness to make continuous efforts for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

Nagasaki fell victim to the atomic bomb in 1945. We experienced first-hand the devastation that nuclear weapons can bring. With the firm determination not to allow the tragedy to repeat itself, the people of Nagasaki Prefecture have been very vocal in pressing for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of eternal world peace, as reflected in the Nagasaki Prefectural Declaration on the Dignity of Freedom and Peace in 1990.

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the atomic bomb, we in Nagasaki, as victims of the atomic bomb, reaffirm our deep commitment to continue to convey the meaning of our experience to the rest of the world, and our strong desire for peace.

Nagasaki will be hosting the next United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in June this year. Our expectations are that the conference in Nagasaki, coming after this meeting and the conclusion of the NPT Conference, will be another step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

To create a peaceful global society, the issues we have to grapple with, including the problems of the environment and refugees, are colossal. In an attempt to explore ways to establish lasting peace and sustainable development, the Prefecture is sponsoring an International Forum with the theme "Peace, Disarmament and the Environment", which will be attended by experts in those fields from different countries.

It is my sincere hope that the spirit of the people of Nagasaki, our wish for the abolition of nuclear weapons and for eternal peace will be appreciated by all peoples, and I encourage all of you in your efforts towards the realization of those worthy goals.

I would like to take this opportunity to express officially the deep gratitude of the people of Japan for the sympathy and great assistance extended to us by many following the recent earthquake in Kobe and its surrounding area. As a Japanese citizen, I must tell you how much Japan appreciated the many warm expressions of concern we received. That incident has convinced me that as long as such good will exists in the hearts and minds of people, eternal peace can surely be made a reality.

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An Appeal for the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

Hitoshi Motoshima

I would like to extend our deep appreciation for the support and sympathy offered by many countries after the Great Hanshin Earthquake.

This is the second Regional Disarmament Meeting I have had the privilege to attend. I am here at Kathmandu with Mr. Kiyoura, Vice Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture, to convey to you the wish of the citizens of Nagasaki for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. I carry this message to you as Mayor of Nagasaki City, which will host the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues to be held in June this year in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing.

On 9 August 1945, 50 years ago, the city of Nagasaki was devastated by an atomic bomb. By the end of that year, 73,000 people had lost their lives and another 74,000 had been injured. Since then, tens of thousands of people have passed away and many "hibakushas" (atomic bomb victims) continue to suffer from the sequela of radiation exposure and from fear of death.

We, the citizens of Nagasaki, experienced the atomic bombing and realized that nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons to annihilate all mankind. Because of our experience, we began to appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons. That

Hitoshi Motoshima is the Mayor of Nagasaki.

appeal stems from our humanitarian desire to prevent the destruction of all humanity.

You may have heard that the Smithsonian Institution in the United States gave up its plans to hold an exhibit commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. When I heard the news, I was amazed to contemplate the vast differences in how the Americans and the Japanese perceived the atomic bombing.

Japan annexed Korea and fought the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War, which resulted in the dropping of the atomic bombs on two Japanese cities. I believe that the Japanese should apologize to the people of Asia and the Pacific for having inflicted on them so much sacrifice and suffering. But at the same time, I wonder how right it was to have dropped atomic weapons and to have sacrificed so many civilians in those towns. What do you think, ladies and gentlemen?

We, the citizens of Nagasaki, strongly assert that the dropping of an atomic weapon, a weapon of indiscriminate mass destruction, can never be justified under humanitarian and international laws. We shall continue our efforts in collaboration with peoples of other nations for the elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date.

The current international situation has undergone remarkable changes in the area of nuclear-weapons reductions, as can be seen by the START II agreement between the United States and Russia and the nuclear testing moratoriums declared by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Even with those large reductions in American and Russian nuclear arsenals, enough nuclear weapons remain to destroy humanity many times over. There is a general trend now to believe that nuclear weapons are no longer a threat. I think that is a misperception. As long as nuclear weapons

exist, we can never be free from the risk of annihilating humanity. The citizens of Nagasaki long not only for the reduction, but for the total elimination, of nuclear weapons.

The NPT Review and Extension Conference will be held in April this year. The Treaty is based on the assumption that five nuclear Powers will continue to possess nuclear weapons and is not aimed at their elimination. Nuclear weapons can never be eliminated as long as the five nuclear-weapon States depend on the theory of nuclear deterrence.

As Mayor of one of the cities that experienced nuclear destruction, I am against the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, as nuclear-weapon States have not shown their intention to abolish nuclear weapons altogether.

A total ban on nuclear testing is the first step towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. History has shown clearly that nuclear tests facilitated the development of nuclear weapons and increased the risk of nuclear proliferation. It is our wish in Nagasaki that the multilateral negotiations under way at the Conference on Disarmament will lead quickly to agreement on a CTBT, and that a treaty to totally ban nuclear weapons will soon follow.

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues will be held in Nagasaki City in June this year. I should like to assure you that the city of Nagasaki and the Nagasaki Prefecture are doing their utmost to ensure the success of that conference, particularly in the light of the important commemorations this year—the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing and of the foundation of the United Nations.

Peace is the supreme asset we can bequeath to our descendants. I would like to urge you to extend your efforts to make the 21st century a century of peace.

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Disarmament Proposals and Agreements: Regional and Global Approaches

Brahma Chellaney, Moderator of Working Group I

This report does not purport to be a full account of the deliberations in Working Group I. It can only summarize the main themes that came up in the discussions. Also, the report is not intended to be a consensus document of the Working Group, but only the reflections of the moderator.

I have been most impressed with the patience and skill with which Evgeniy Gorkovskiy and Tsutomu Ishiguri have handled this meeting. This has been a constructive meeting, and I have greatly enjoyed participating in it.

For this report on Working Group I, I am indebted to my good friend, Ben Sanders. Ben took extensive notes of the deliberations of the Working Group and assisted me in preparing the final report.

The five presentations in the Working Group were split into two halves, with the first set focusing on the regional and global approaches to disarmament and the second on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. The presentations in the first half focused largely on the regional dimension.

The moderator set the tone with a brief outline of the meeting held in January 1995 in Goa as part of the four-nation Shanghai Initiative, a unique Track II venture involving officials and non-officials. The Shanghai Initiative meeting adopted a consensus document that seeks to address the core issues covered by the topic of our Working Group I in Kathmandu. The document suggests a framework for global

and regional disarmament which, if adopted internationally, would revolutionize the arms control agenda and help to usher in a new security order based on equity. The document recommends the elimination of all nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within a specific time-frame, no-first-use and non-use nuclear conventions, mutually agreed force reductions at the regional level, and the development of an international system based on collective security.

Michael Krepon was the first speaker in Working Group I. He presented a "typology" of three categories of measures which in one form or another might be applicable to regional problems.Those range from conflict-avoidance measures—the most elementary, most easily applied measures to avoid unwanted, unintentional conflict through the more challenging confidence-building measures, to peace-making measures, which form the most complex and difficult set of the three groups of measures. Peace-making measures, he argued, are often the product of far-sighted leaders. Mr. Krepon cited events in southern Asia to illustrate his points. Although Pakistan and India have conflict-avoidance measures in place, neither side appears to have confidence in them. So in the event of another crisis, to quote Michael Krepon, "the two sides are in a very poor position to deal with it" In contrast, China and India have adopted substantial CBMs which, he contended, "have removed the threat of war and made a return to chilly relations very remote."

Khalid Aziz Babar submitted a paper that serves as a useful primer on the merits and problems of regional disarmament. In his presentation, he stressed that disarmament approaches have to be determined by the different problems and characteristics of the regions involved. The approaches have taken into account internal and external issues. He outlined a variety of instruments that might serve the interests of specific areas, pointing out that they should be so designed and applied as to fit not only regional require-

ments but also the precepts laid down by the United Nations and its agencies as well as the principles and rules of international law. He stressed that confidence-building measures (CBMs) ranged widely in nature from civil to military to those imposing various forms of policy constraints. Citing the example of the CSCE, he argued that CBMs ought to be transparent and legally binding in order to be effective. Verification of compliance is another important consideration, as are ways of enlightening and informing the public at large.

Peggy Mason focused on the processes involved—or, as one speaker earlier said, how to "get on with it". She sought to address two basic issues: (a) why there is a need to "get on with it" and (b) the possible role of the United Nations in facilitating the regional initiatives. She saw a progression of measures: CBMs, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but warned against "overloading" any newly created institution with too many functions. The real challenge usually is whether the process would be completed in time to address acute, pressing problems. In that regard, she referred to the comment of one participant that the Asian Regional Forum was a "young plant" that should not be overburdened and that, with its "multiparents," there was need for "consensual parenting". A lesson to be drawn from the CSCE process is that CBMs are initial steps only—not ends in themselves. They addressed symptoms rather than causes. It is worth noting that the idea to boost CSCE functions to include conflict prevention was never fully realized. That illustrates that we are dealing with a lengthy process which cannot be rushed and within which the various elements do not automatically follow each other. Progress in the Asia-Pacific region might be facilitated if more attention is paid to agreements reached in the global (United Nations) deliberative bodies which, she argued, had "internationalized" certain concepts and principles originally developed in other regional contexts.

The second half of the Working Group dealt with issues relating to cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Brahma Chellaney pointed to the growing web of export controls that impede peaceful nuclear energy cooperation and called for a proper balance between non-proliferation concerns and the rights of nations to harness the atom for commercial power under international safeguards. He said the growing emphasis on controlling dual-purpose technologies raised issues that went beyond the subject of peaceful nuclear energy cooperation and touched the core issues of civilian modernization in the developing world. He stressed the need for fresh, innovative thinking in the 50th anniversary year of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings—not for apologies to justify existing constraints to nuclear disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation. The future of non-proliferation depends on consensus-building and international cooperation, not on unilateral or cartel actions. A prerequisite for such consensus-building is respect for, as well as a readiness to address, the aspirations and concerns of the 85 per cent of the nations in the world which are outside the present system of security alliances and umbrellas. Those nations believe that the bargain that was struck in 1968 between the nuclear-weapons States and non-nuclear-weapon States has become lopsided. To address their concerns, Mr. Chellaney called for United Nations supervision of multilateral export barriers; transparency in the functioning of the London Club, which, he pointed out, lacks international sanction; and the streamlining of export controls. It should be remembered that the NPT was not designed solely to deter horizontal proliferation; rather it represents a far-reaching, multidimensional bargain. He said it was vital to build international consensus and cooperation on non-proliferation, and that all the components of the non-proliferation regime should be the product of such consensus and sanction.

Hiroyoshi Kurihara described in detail the proposal for an Asiatom, or Paciatom. That would consist of a cooperative arrangement in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and include multinational production facilities and inspections, nuclear safety assistance and nuclear material control. He preferred the term Paciatom, since it would reflect wider cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy issues in the Asia-Pacific region. He argued that Asiatom/Paciatom need not be modeled on Europe's Euratom and that it could evolve its own distinct Asian identity and structure. If sensitive production facilities were operated by a multinational body, it would serve the cause of non-proliferation well. For compliance with non-proliferation rules, he said the new Asiatom/Paciatom agency could look at regional arrangements like Euratom and ABACC (Argentine-Brazil Joint Inspectorate). The process for creating Asiatom/Paciatom would first have to involve exploratory meetings, a careful planning exercise and eventually the creation of a framework for various options.

A lively discussion followed the presentations. Among the comments and suggestions, the following stood out:

(a) One reason why more progress had not been made on CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region might be because many of the proposals had relied too much on European concepts that are not directly applicable or understood elsewhere. Roger Ball said Western strategic concepts could not be transplanted in the Asia-Pacific region. It was pointed out by more than one delegate that the term "transparency," for example, translated as "nakedness" in some Asian languages, and that being "naked" was not a good thing in those societies. Western concepts must be integrated with indigenous thinking. Pengiran Haji Osman Bin touched on that theme earlier, when he

spoke on the regional notions of comprehensive security.

(b) The terminology used was not always clear. Terms should be unambiguous and relate regionally.

(c) The distinction between "process" and "framework" should not be overestimated. Indeed, the process itself is a CBM.

(d) It was pointed out that CBMs need not necessarily be only governmental in nature and could involve all manner of private and informal exchanges of information and specialists.

In the discussion on Part II of the Working Group, Lawrence Scheinman contended that the restrictions placed on exports were not directed indiscriminately at the South but aimed deliberately at containing recognized risks to the non-proliferation regime. He argued that NPT parties in compliance with their treaty obligations had wide access to peaceful nuclear assistance. "Non-nuclear-weapon States unwilling to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA have shown they are not committed to non-proliferation and most suppliers agree these States should not be given the benefits of nuclear assistance", he declared. He argued that nuclear export controls were a requirement of the NPT itself and that the London Club was "now an open process." In contrast, Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat questioned the justifications for export controls and said that peaceful nuclear energy cooperation assured under Article IV should be seen in the context of Article VI, which obligates the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate "in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament". Ben Sanders raised the possibility of associating would-be nuclear recipients with the Nuclear Suppliers' Group process, possibly at the price of an a

priori acceptance of full "special inspection" procedures or other extended safeguards.

The idea of an Asiatom/Paciatom involving multinational cooperation in fuel-cycle activities was well received, although a note of caution was sounded against too much ambition. It was noted that Japan and the Republic of Korea were already cooperating with China on nuclear matters. It was also pointed out that any concern that Japan would ever make nuclear weapons was highly misplaced.

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Regional Issues and Confidence-building

Sadaaki Numata, Moderator of Working Group II

Working Group II focused on the situations in the Korean peninsula, in ASEAN countries and in South Asia respectively. Five presentations were made: on disarmament and stability on the Korean peninsula by So Chang Sik and by Seo-Hang Lee; on openness and transparency in ASEAN countries by Md Hussin Nayan; and on the impact of economic development and democracy on regional stability by Burhanudeen Gafoor and by Kazi Anwarul Masud. That quick tour through the Asia-Pacific region brought into relief some of the challenges and opportunities common to the region as a whole, as well as the diverse problems peculiar to respective parts of it. There were notes of optimism and caution.

Korean peninsula

Lively exchanges took place with respect to the Korean peninsula, reflecting real and divisive issues. While some concern was expressed regarding the perceived delay in the IAEA's close scrutiny of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear development activities, it was felt generally that the implementation of the October 1994 Agreed Framework signed by the DPRK and the United States was a key to the resolution of the nuclear issue. The discussion also encompassed the respective views of the participants on such issues as the Korean Armistice Agreement and the related new peace agreement, the path to reunification, the role of confidence-building and arms control measures and the

combined Republic of Korea-United States military exercise. Concerning inter-Korean issues and the implementation of the related agreements and declaration, it was observed that the lack of trust or political will, as the case might be, stood in the way of an early improvement of relations. Interest was expressed by non-Korean participants in how the North-South dialogue might be resumed and what mechanisms might be used. There was general recognition of the need for a favourable political climate and, in that context, the need to address the security concerns of the two Koreas.

Openness and transparency

The discussion on openness and transparency in ASEAN countries was based on the evolution of ASEAN since its foundation. It stressed that ASEAN had consistently taken a multidimensional approach to peace and stability, i.e., emphasizing economic, social and cultural development over military matters. It was noted that even when faced with the communist threat after the withdrawal of American troops from Viet Nam, ASEAN rejected a military-bloc-type response. ASEAN had done well in terms of openness and transparency through its assiduously cultivated habit of cooperation and dialogue. Specific cooperation in the security and defence fields had been based on interlocking webs of bilateral contacts and exchanges. Informal mechanisms and an informal approach towards CBMs, openness and transparency were preferred, and an alliance-type institutionalization of defence or military cooperation was considered inappropriate.

The point was raised as to how that process, having evolved into the ASEAN Regional Forum, might yield further substance. The response was that consolidation of the confidence building process was necessary before going on to tackle specific disarmament or maritime security issues

collectively. It was suggested that ASEAN might move beyond quiet, bilateral approaches in trying to resolve sensitive issues, e.g., border disputes, among its member States. That, however, did not seem to be an immediate possibility. The possible expansion of ASEAN Regional Forum membership, in which a specific interest had been expressed, was examined.

Economic development and stability

The discussion on the impact of economic development and democracy on regional stability brought out some contrasts between the perceptions of ASEAN and of small South Asian States. In the context of ASEAN's multidimensional approach to security, the two-way relationship between economic development and security was recognized. It was pointed out that as long as the economic pie was expanding and everyone got a share, political differences tended to recede. In its pursuit of economic development, ASEAN fostered the habit of cooperation and dialogue, which in turn led to the security dialogue embodied in the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The Singapore-Malaysia-Indonesia and Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand "growth triangles" could have a favourable impact on stability and thus provide a foundation for political consultation. A similar logic might hold for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

On the basis of the Bangladesh experience, it was asserted that the shift to a democratic government with accountability contributed to improved economic performances. However, there remained security concerns which emanated from the major disputants in the region and were beyond the control of the smaller States. The fear of nuclear proliferation and the long-standing problem of water-sharing were cited in that connection. There were grounds for

optimism that in the long term economic development would lead to stability. In the short term however, some of the outstanding political issues bedevilling the relations among South Asian States did not offer the immediate prospect of either confidence-building measures or real disarmament, nuclear or conventional. It was stressed that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) had an important role to play both in reducing tensions in the region and in contributing to economic development through the early implementation of South Asian preferential trade arrangements.

Mention was also made of Myanmar's transformation from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy and the stated intention of its interim leadership to hand power back to the people.

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Concluding Statement of the Seventh Regional Meeting

Tsutomu Ishiguri

I set the dates for this year's meeting approximately two weeks later than usual in order to allow this meeting to reflect on the results of the final Preparatory Committee of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 23-27 January. I hope you will agree that the delay enabled participants to hold in-depth discussions on key nuclear disarmament issues, which are of great significance to the outcome of the 1995 NPT Conference.

NPT Review and Extension Conference

While views still differ on the degree of progress made by nuclear-weapon States in the fields of nuclear disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation, and on the issue of the extension of the Treaty, there is nevertheless a general feeling among States parties that the political and legal authority of the Treaty should be upheld.

In view of the fact that the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT) was pivotal to the outcome of previous NPT Review Conferences, the meeting heard with great interest Dr. Scheinman's report on President Clinton's recent decision to withdraw the United States proposal made

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during the CTBT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a special "right of withdrawal" from the treaty 10 years after its entry into force. I hope that shift in United States policy will help to make headway in the complex negotiations in Geneva.

I am gratified that the meeting has provided the Asia-Pacific region with a further opportunity to discuss the issues connected with the forthcoming NPT Conference, and that it helped to make maximum use of the time between the PrepCom and the Conference itself to attempt to bridge differences among the States parties on substantive issues and the length of extension. The meeting has also proved to be an additional opportunity for States parties to exchange views with non-States parties of the NPT on an effective regime to enhance the goal of nuclear non-proliferation.

Openness and transparency

This meeting acknowledged last year that openness and transparency had emerged as significant international norms in the field of disarmament and security. That understanding was confirmed again at this meeting during consideration of the questions of regional disarmament and regional dialogue.

Michael Krepon's presentation on various types of confidence-building measures (CBMs), which he illustrated with concrete events and with an explanation of how to introduce CBMs on a step-by-step basis, started with conflict-avoidance measures (CAMs) and confidence-building and ended with the strengthening of peace. It contained valuable suggestions for Asia-Pacific nations. Stanley Week's proposals on maritime CBMs, including the establishment of regional incidents-at-sea agreements, adds to the notion that the basic ingredients of CBMs are openness and transparency. With the close cooperation of Asia-Pacific nations, the

Regional Centre will be able to conduct a preliminary study on how to develop region-oriented CBMs.

The importance of cooperation in promoting openness and transparency in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was also pointed out. Lengthy discussions took place in connection with the utilization of plutonium for civil use. Hiroyoshi Kurihara presented a detailed picture of Japan's plutonium recycling programme, with emphasis on its present transparency and further efforts in that regard. In view of the foreseen long-term increased demand for nuclear energy in the region, he introduced the idea of establishing an ASIATOM or PACIATOM organization to promote regional cooperation and coordination in research and development (R&D) of the peaceful use of nuclear energy or to meet the challenge stemming from the further development of a commercial nuclear fuel cycle. In my view, although that proposal may be considered ambitious under current conditions, it can be useful in promoting cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and as a CBM to expel any doubt about the purpose of nuclear activities in a given country. I am looking forward to hearing of new developments that may lead to the realization of that idea when we meet here again.

ASEAN Regional Forum

In the context of regional dialogue and subregional political developments, the meeting heard a report on the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum and its future course. It seems to me that the Forum's gradual approach based on consensus-building, which reflects the Asian culture, is gaining broad-spectrum support from the Asia-Pacific nations. Many are taking part in the process with enthusiasm. In that regard, I hope consideration will be given of how best to utilize the Regional Centre in relation to the ASEAN Regional

Forum's agenda, particularly in connection with items such as confidence- and security-building, nuclear non-proliferation, and the exchange of military information, including the use of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Korean peninsula

Concerning confidence-building and peace and security on the Korean peninsula, we heard presentations from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Throughout the discussions that took place, I felt that the most pressing issues facing the two countries, and their neighbours, were the implementation of the agreed United States-DPRK Framework Agreement and the resumption of North-South dialogue. Those would ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and open ways to explore other forms of cooperation. A long-term process seems required to achieve peace and stability on the peninsula. In that regard, the Regional Centre is proud to bring all the parties in the region together at this annual exchange of views. I believe that the Regional Centre can be useful for exchanging views on regional cooperation as a way of establishing the "habit of dialogue" among the North-East Asian nations in the coming years.

Guidelines to regional disarmament

As in last year's programme, we explored the "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" adopted by consensus at the Disarmament Commission in 1993. Peggy Mason's detailed examination of agreed principles and measures, and her valuable suggestions, gave us hope that a set of guidelines applicable to the region could be developed. Very shortly, the Regional Centre will compile for future consideration the suggestions and proposals made at this

meeting, along with the comments made on the same subject at last year's meeting. Any comments and suggestions on possible guidelines would be much appreciated.

Role of the Regional Centre

In view of the new trend towards exploration of regional approaches parallel to the "traditional" search for global solutions, the Regional Centre, with the requisite political and financial support, could play a greater role in promoting openness, transparency and confidence-building in the region. This meeting, I trust, has shown that it can be a useful tool to foster mutual understanding and to promote dialogue as a basis for building consensus. With your continued support, I should like to create a Centre that is a linchpin between global and regional approaches and a hub of disarmament-related activities among the subregions of the greater Asia-Pacific area.

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Documentation relating to Disarmament and International Security

On the eve of the conclusion of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (17 April-12 May), the 175 States Parties participating in the Conference adopted without a vote the following three decisions of historic significance to the future of the Treaty itself and to the nuclear non-proliferation effort as a whole.

Decision on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty*

New York, 11 May 1995

1. The Conference of the Parties on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.

3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review

*NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1, contained in an annex to the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)).

Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.

4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.

6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

7. The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

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Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*

New York, 11 May 1995

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,

Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

*NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2, contained in an annex to the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)).

Universality

1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

Non-proliferation

2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

5. The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.

6. The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.

7. The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the

maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.

Security assurances

8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

Safeguards

9. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, parapraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

10. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.

11. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of

Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.

15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the

non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.

17. Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.

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Decision on the Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

New York, 11 May 1995

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragrapg 2, on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted by the Conference,

Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,

*NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.3, contained in an annex to the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)).

Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with its article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

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Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference*

New York, 11 May 1995

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,

Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December 1994,

Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

*NPT/CONF.1995/32/RES/1, contained in an annex to the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)).

Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof,

Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

1. *Endorses* the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, *inter alia*, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that, in its report (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference "call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities";

3. *Notes with concern* the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. *Reaffirms* the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

5. *Calls upon* all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, *inter alia*, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;

6. *Calls upon* all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear–weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

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Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) on Security Assurances*

New York, 11 April 1995

The Security Council,

Convinced that every effort must be made to avoid and avert the danger of nuclear war, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with particular emphasis on the needs of developing countries, and reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to these efforts,

Recognizing the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive security assurances,

Welcoming the fact that more than 170 States have become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and stressing the desirability of universal adherence to it,

Reaffirming the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply fully with all their obligations,

Taking into consideration the legitimate concern of non-nuclear-weapon States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, further appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Considering that the present resolution constitutes a step in this direction,

*Adopted unanimously at its 3514th plenary meeting.

Considering further that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, any aggression with the use of nuclear weapons would endanger international peace and security,

1. *Takes note* with appreciation of the statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States (S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263, S/1995/264, S/1995/265), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Recognizes* the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive assurances that the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, will act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in the event that such States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. *Recognizes further* that, in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, any State may bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council to enable the Council to take urgent action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to the State victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, such aggression; and recognizes also that the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the Security Council will bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Council and seek Council action to provide, in accordance with the Charter, the necessary assistance to the State victim;

4. *Notes* the means available to it for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including an investigation into the

situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security;

5. *Invites* Member States, individually or collectively, if any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance, and affirms its readiness to consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression;

6. *Expresses* its intention to recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression;

7. *Welcomes* the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

8. *Urges* all States, as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control which remains a universal goal;

9. *Reaffirms* the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security;

10. *Underlines* that the issues raised in this resolution remain of continuing concern to the Council.

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Statements on Security Assurances of the Russian Federation*

New York, 5 April 1995

In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation transmitted the text of a statement dated 5 April 1995 by the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation regarding the presentation of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and a statement dated 5 April 1995 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation consisting of a national statement on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Recognizing the fundamental importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, respecting the legitimate desire of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to that Treaty to receive assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, based on the provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is authorized to make the following statement (see annex).

It should be pointed out, furthermore, that as the President of the Russian Federation proposed at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, work on a further United Nations Security Council resolution on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States has been harmonized. The draft resolution, prepared with the participation of Russian representatives, is being submitted to the Security Council for its consideration. The main provisions of the draft resolution are as follows:

In the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the

*A/50/151-S/1995/261

nuclear Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council will immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Council and will seek to ensure that they provide, in accordance with the Charter, necessary assistance to the State that is a victim of such an act of aggression or that is threatened by such aggression.

The draft resolution provides, further on, for the possibility of taking appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim of such an act of aggression for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance and for payment of compensation by the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

We believe that the adoption by the Security Council of this draft resolution would be welcomed by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and would help strengthen the non-proliferation regime, international solidarity and world stability.

Annex

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

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Statement on Security Assurances of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland *

New York, 6 April 1995

In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom in New York transmitted the text of a declaration on security assurances made by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Conference on Disarmament at a plenary meeting of the Conference on 6 April 1995.

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a declaration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on security assurances, issued by my Government on 6 April at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (see annex).

In issuing the declaration, the Government of the United Kingdom recognises that those States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for assurances that such weapons will not be used against them. The revised negative security assurance is a solemn and formal undertaking by the Government which meets those concerns. The positive security assurance also contained in the declaration reiterates and expands on the assurance which my Government gave in 1968 by recognising the desire of non-nuclear-weapon States to be reassured that the nuclear-weapon States would take appropriate measures in the event of the former being attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons.

These assurances have been given by my Government after consultation with the other nuclear-weapon States. They are extended to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and demonstrate the continuing determination of the nuclear-weapon States to strengthen and make permanent that Treaty.

*A/50/152-S/1995/262.

Annex

The Government of the United Kingdom believes that universal adherence to and compliance with international agreements seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are vital to the maintenance of world security. We note with appreciation that 175 States have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime which has made an invaluable contribution to international peace and security. We are convinced that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and without conditions.

We will continue to urge all States that have not done so to become parties to the Treaty.

The Government of the United Kingdom recognises that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. In 1978 we gave such an assurance. Assurances have also been given by the other nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Recognising the continued concern of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the assurances given by nuclear-weapon States should be in similar terms, and following consultation with the other nuclear-weapon States, I accordingly give the following undertaking on behalf of my Government:

The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a

non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

In giving this assurance the United Kingdom emphasises the need not only for universal adherence to, but also for compliance with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this context I wish to make clear that Her Majesty's Government does not regard its assurance as applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In 1968 the United Kingdom declared that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

I, therefore, recall and reaffirm the intention of the United Kingdom, as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

This Security Council assistance could include measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security, and appropriate procedures, in response to any request from the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under interna-

tional law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

If a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom would also be prepared to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance.

The United Kingdom reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognised under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

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Statement on Security Assurances of the United States of America *

New York, 6 April 1995

In a letter to the Secretary-General, the chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America forwarded a statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, issued on 5 April 1995, announcing the following declaration by President Clinton on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The United States of America believes that universal adherence to and compliance with international conventions and treaties seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a cornerstone of global security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a central element of this regime. 5 March 1995 was the twenty-fifth anniversary of its entry into force, an event commemorated by President Clinton in a speech in Washington, D.C., on 1 March 1995. A conference to decide on the extension of the Treaty will begin in New York on 17 April 1995. The United States considers the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without conditions as a matter of the highest national priority and will continue to pursue all appropriate efforts to achieve that outcome.

It is important that all parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. In that regard, consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be in compliance with these undertakings in order to be eligible for any benefits of adherence to the Treaty.

*A/50/153-S/1995/263

Statement on Security Assurances of the United States

The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression. Any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a legitimate desire for assurances that the United Nations Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would act immediately in accordance with the Charter, in the event such non-nuclear-weapon States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The United States affirms its intention to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

Among the means available to the Security Council for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be an investigation

into the situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and to restore international peace and security.

United Nations Member States should take appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, and the Security Council should consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression.

The Security Council should recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

The United States reaffirms the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

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Security assurances of France *

New York, 6 April 1995

In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations drew attention to the contents of the following statement on security assurances made on behalf of France by its Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995.

The issue of security assurances given by the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear-weapon States is, for my delegation, an important one:

Firstly, because it corresponds to a real expectation on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those which, have renounced atomic weapons by signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Secondly, because it involves our particular responsibilities as a nuclear Power;

Finally, because it has acquired new meaning since the end of the cold war, with the growing awareness of the threat which the proliferation of nuclear weapons represents for everyone.

It is in order to meet that expectation, to assume its responsibilities and to make its contribution to efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons that France has decided to take the following steps:

Firstly, it reaffirms, and clarifies, the negative security assurances which it gave in 1982, specifically:

*A/50/154-S/1995/264

France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on France, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, or against its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State.

It seems to us natural that it is the signatory countries to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—that is to say, the overwhelming majority of countries in the world—who should benefit from these assurances, since they have made a formal non-proliferation commitment. Furthermore, in order to respond to the request of a great many countries, France has sought as much as possible to harmonize the content of its negative assurances with those of the other nuclear Powers. We are pleased that this effort has been successful. The content of the declarations concerning the negative security assurances of France, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are henceforth practically identical.

Secondly, and for the first time, France has decided to give positive security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Its accession to the Treaty made this decision both possible and desirable. Accordingly:

"France considers that any aggression which is accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would threaten international peace and security. France recognizes that the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are entitled to an assurance that, should they be attacked with nuclear weapons or threatened with such an attack, the international community and, first and foremost, the United Nations Security Council, would react immediately in accordance with the obligations set forth in the Charter.

"Having regard to these considerations, France makes the following declaration:

"France, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, pledges that, in the event of attack with nuclear weapons or the threat of such attack against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, France will immediately inform the Security Council and act within the Council to ensure that the latter takes immediate steps to provide, in accordance with the Charter, necessary assistance to any State which is the victim of such an act or threat of aggression.

"France reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack, including an attack with use of nuclear weapons, occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

In this area also, we are pleased that the content of these positive assurances has been the subject of close consultations with the other nuclear Powers.

Thirdly, France, with the four other nuclear Powers, has decided to submit to the United Nations Security Council a draft resolution which constitutes a first in many respects, and which reflects our intention to meet the expectations of the international community globally, collectively and specifically;

Globally: for the first time, a draft resolution deals with both negative and positive assurances;

Collectively: for the first time, a resolution of the Security Council specifies the measures which the Security Council could take in the event of aggression, in the areas of the settlement of disputes, humanitarian assistance and compensation to the victims.

The draft resolution solemnly reaffirms the need for all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fully respect their obligations. That is not a *petitio principii*, but a reminder of a fundamental rule. The draft resolution also emphasizes the desirable nature of universal accession to the Treaty.

The decisions which I have just announced correspond to our intention to consolidate the non-proliferation regime and particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is the cornerstone of that regime. It is our hope and firm conviction that the initiatives we have just taken will contribute thereto.

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Statement on security assurances of the People's Republic of China*

New York, 6 April 1995

In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations transmitted the following national statement on security assurances.

For the purpose of enhancing international peace, security and stability and facilitating the realization of the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, China hereby declares its position on security assurances as follows:

1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.

2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon States that have entered into any comparable internationally-binding commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices.

3. China has always held that, pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. China strongly calls for the early

*A/50/155-S/1995/265

conclusion of an international convention on no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as an international legal instrument assuring the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

4. China, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, undertakes to take action within the Council to ensure that the Council takes appropriate measures to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that comes under attack with nuclear weapons, and imposes strict and effective sanctions on the attacking State. This commitment naturally applies to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any non-nuclear weapon State that has entered into any comparable internationally-binding commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, in the event of an aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against such State.

5. The positive security assurance provided by China, as contained in paragraph 4, does not in any way compromise China's position as contained in paragraph 3 and shall not in any way be construed as endorsing the use of nuclear weapons.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

The following are short summaries of books received by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs of particular interest in the field of arms reduction and disarmament. Books relating to broader topics of international peace and security are listed after the summaries.

Materials received are maintained in a permanent collection in the Centre for Disarmament Affairs Reference Library for the use of diplomats, staff members of the United Nations, participants in the Disarmament Fellowship Programme, students, and members of research institutes and non-governmental organizations interested in the field of arms control, disarmament and international peace and security.

The Centre for Disarmament Affairs wishes to thank the publishers, institutions and organizations for their continued collaboration with its Library.

The Chemical Threat in Iraq's Motives for the Kuwait Invasion. Jean Pascal Zanders. Brussels, Belgium, Free University of Brussels, 1995. 28 p.

The author describes and extrapolates from Iraq's activities in the chemical weapons field in terms of repercussions on political and strategic relations in the Middle East region and beyond. Among the enabling factors influencing Iraqi moves, he cites lack of response from the West to chemical weapons use during the first Gulf War and against the Kurds, inconsistent criticism from other parts of the world which confused Arab countries and elicited their support for Iraq, and that country's need to turn chemical weapons into a political weapon.

The Converging Roles of Arms Control Verification, Confidence-Building Measures, and Peace Operations: Opportunities for Harmonization and Synergies. Patricia Bliss McFate, Douglas A. Fraser, Sidney N. Graybeal and George R. Lindsey. Ottawa, Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International

Trade, 1994. 86 p. (Arms Control Verification Studies No.6)

The third in a series of studies by a Canadian-American team of scholars, the report charts the changing, increasingly close relationship among arms control verification, confidence-building and peace-keeping. Synergies among the three elements may promote international security by improving effectiveness and fostering more efficient resource use. Expanded and harmonized activities on the part of the United Nations and other international entities could enhance transparency and security.

The Future of the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Marianne van Leeuwen, ed. Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, in association with the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", 1995. 326 p.

Authors from Australia, Europe and the United States examine nuclear proliferation and international efforts to combat it in the regional contexts of the Korean peninsula, South Asia, the Middle East and countries of the former Soviet Union. Succeeding chapters cover nuclear safeguards, export control systems, security assurances and a comprehensive test ban treaty.

New Horizons and Challenges in Arms Control and Verification. James Brown, ed. Amsterdam, The Netherlands, VU University Press, 1994. 277 p.

Based on the collected papers commissioned for and presented at the Fourth Annual International Arms Control and Verification Conference held at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, in October 1993, the volume treats, among other things, the emergence of new nuclear powers, the spread of weapons, including nuclear arms, into politically volatile areas, and the regional dimension acquired by arms control and disarmament issues in the wake of the cold war.

The Middle East Military Balance: 1993-1994. Shlomo Gazit, ed. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, in association with Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), 1994. 575 p.

The various authors in this volume review and assess the major strategic changes and trends in the Middle East, covering such issues as nuclear and conventional arms control and proliferation, as

well as the Arab-Israeli peace process, and aspects of regional foreign and defence policy.

Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences. Richard K. Betts. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1995. 322 p.

With the end of the cold war and large reductions in United States defence spending and force levels, the credibility of American military readiness to face new challenges has been called into doubt. Through historical and conceptual analysis, the author explores the problems currently faced today by United States defence planners, and the possible solutions available to increase the military readiness of its nuclear and conventional forces.

1994 Arms Transfers: A Register of Deliveries From Public Sources. John Sislin and Siemon Wezeman, eds. Monterey, California, Monterey Institute of International Studies, in association with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1995.

Supplementing and corroborating the contents of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the authors present data derived from public sources in a format not unlike that of the Register and analyse 1994 arms deliveries. Similar, though not identical, in its coverage of weapons, the study differs in the type of information, the amount of detail and the number of submissions presented.

1995: A New Beginning for the NPT? Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds. New York, Plenum Press, 1995. 309 p.

In original essays, authors from Austria, Germany, Japan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States assess prospects for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in terms of dramatically altered and continually changing world conditions: the end of the cold war, the demise of the Soviet Union, weapons reductions in the former Soviet Union and the United States, possible restraints on future nuclear tests, the results of the Persian Gulf War and the anomalous nuclear situation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Security Assurances: Implications for the NPT and Beyond. George Bunn, Virginia I. Foran, Harald Müller, George Quester, Victor Utgoff and Michael

O. Wheeler, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995. 79 p.

The four draft chapters which compose this work will constitute part of a forthcoming publication entitled *Missed Opportunities? The Role of Security Assurances in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy*, based on a workshop held in February 1995 and scheduled to be issued in July 1995. They concentrate on the implications of security assurances for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference and on their potential significance for future non-proliferation efforts.

Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995. Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Even S. Medeiros, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995. 194 p.

In the post–cold war world of the 1990s, the abandonment and acquisition of nuclear weapons are two paradoxical issues high on the agenda of international politics. The authors provide a detailed regional analysis of the major trends in nuclear proliferation providing assessment of the global developments in this field of security in both written and graphical form.

Verification 1995: Arms Control, Peacekeeping and the Environment. J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie, eds. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, in association with the Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC), 1995. 406 p.

This compilation of critical essays reviews the major developments and activities that have occurred in arms control, peace-keeping and the environment over the past 12 months, and examines their effects and implications for future progress in the fields of peace and security.

Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC. Trevor Findlay. New York, Oxford University Press, in association with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1995. 238 p. (SIPRI Research Report No.9)

Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-fire. James D.D. Smith, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1995. 308 p.

The United States, Japan, and The Future of Nuclear Weapons. Report of the U.S.-Japan Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation after the Cold War, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995. 181 p.

Our Global Neighborhood. The Report of The Commission on Global Governance, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 410 p.

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Recent and Forthcoming Publications from the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Department of Public Information and UNIDIR

Centre for Disarmament Affairs

Books*

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook
Volume 19: 1994 (Sales No. E.95.IX.1)
The *Yearbook* contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament taking place each year, together with a brief history of major issues.

Disarmament Newsletter

January/July 1995 — Volume 13, Number 1 (forthcoming)

Department of Public Information

The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(with an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Secretary-General of the United Nations)
The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume III,
Department of Public Information
(Sales No. E.95.I.17) (Soft)

Les Nations Unies et la non-prolifération nucléaire
(avec une introduction de Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies)

*Forthcoming in French, Russian and Spanish.

Série Livres Bleus des Nations Unies, Volume III
Département de l'information
(Numéro de vente F.95.I.17 (Broché)

In collaboration with the Centre

The Unfinished Disarmament Agenda
A survey of progress in the global arms limitation and disarmament field prepared by the Special NGO Committee for Disarmament, Geneva. (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.IX.3)

Ending Reliance on Nuclear and Conventional Arms. Excerpts from the panel discussions organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc. at the Disarmament Week Symposium, 25-27 October 1994 in New York, and of the panel discussion on *The Land-mines Crisis,* 16 November 1994 in New York. (Forthcoming)

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Research Reports

Arms and Technology Transfers: Security and Economic Considerations among Importing and Exporting States. Proceedings of the Geneva Conference, 14-15 February 1994, by Sverre Lodgaard and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff (eds.), 1995., 287p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.10.

Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia. Proceedings of the Seoul Conference, 25-27 May 1994, by Andrew Mack (ed.), 1995, 263p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.8.

Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities: Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring, by Pericles Gasparini Alves (ed.), 1995, 357p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot). (Forthcoming)

Research Papers

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Geneva, 21 February 1994

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Acronyms

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meetings
APEC	Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN-PMC	Association of Southeast Asian Nations/ Post-Ministerial Conference
CAMs	conflict-avoidance measures
CBMs	confidence-building measures
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDA	Centre for Disarmament Affairs
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific
CSCE (now OSCE)	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now Organization)
DC (or UNDC)	United Nations Disarmament Commission
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EEZ	Exclusive economic zone
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
INCSEA	Incidents at sea agreement
JAEC	Japan Atomic Energy Commission
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEANWFZ	South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organization
SSOD	Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, SSOD-I (1978), SSOD-II (1982), SSOD-III (1988)
ZOPFAN	Zone of peace, friendship and neutrality

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